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Preface
This book had its inception in a common teaching experience. Although
it is now almost two years since we were first involved in the preparation
of materials on the Middle East for a course in the problems of American
democracy, world events continue to remind us of the critical importance
of the Mediterranean area. Our students were aware of an increasing
variety of proposals for the role the United States should play in easing
the tensions in the Middle East, but they were relatively unfamiliar with
the general history and geography of the area. Thus they were unable to
evaluate these various proposals critically.
As a result of this experience it was felt that there was a general need
for a selection of materials designed to guide the citizen in formulating
his own view of United States policy in this troubled zone. We then
undertook a dual task: (1) the preparation of a descriptive essay which
would meet the need of student and lay reader alike as a guide to the
basic historical and geographical data of the Middle East; and (2) the
provision of a source book of historical and recent documents which would
constitute a framework for developing and testing foreign policy proposals.
We were assisted in our undertaking by many interested colleagues.
We wish to express our appreciation to all of them with a particular note
of gratitude to Professor Stuart Gerry Brown and Dean Harlan Cleve-
land of the Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs,
Syracuse University.
We would also like to acknowledge our thanks to the following for
permission to quote privileged or copyrighted material:
To The American Political Science Review for the selection from "The
Mainspring of American Foreign Policy," by Hans Morgenthau;
To Henry Holt and Company for the selection from Caravan, the
Story of the Middle East, by Carleton S, Coon;
To The New York Times for the selection from Harry S. Truman's
series, which appeared January 13, 1957;
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To the University of Chicago Press for the selection from American
Diplomacy, 1900-1951, by George F. Kennan.
CAROL FISHER and FRED KRINSKY
Maxwell School, Syracuse University
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Introduction
The big failures are the most interesting part of history. This book brings
together some of the crucial documents necessary to understand the recent
failure of the West to read aright the signs of change in the Middle East,
and to cope with changes when they occurred. Because the drama of
American involvement in that turbulent area is only beginning, every
American can usefully acquaint himself with the facts.
The twenty-one months, from the Suez crisis to the Lebanon landings,
are truly a watershed in the history of the modern world. These stirring
events the rise of Nasser in Egypt, the Arab unity movement, the de-
velopment and will-to-survive of Israel, the decline of European influence
in the Levant, the competitive intervention of the Soviet Union and the
United States have their origins deep in a past but dimly remembered.
The state of Israel can be seen as a political fulfillment of the ancient
Hebrew prayer to God to lead his chosen people back to Jerusalem. The
Arabs grope toward unity spurred by the memory of an antique time,
already a millenium past, when a Moslem empire spanned the world from
central Asia to Spain. The British-French landings at Suez can be seen in
perspective as a pathetic reversion to methods that used to work in the
nineteenth century In that same century, we learned in school, Tsarist
Russia was forever pushing at the edges of the Middle East in search of a
warm-water port. And as for the Marines in Lebanon, are they not the
heirs and assigns of a tradition which includes a landing on the shores of
Tripoli in search of pirates?
What's past is prologue, to be sure; but the roots of the contemporary
crisis do not all lie deep in the kind of history that is measured in cen-
turies. A closer look at the Middle East in 1956-58 shows us a past that
is full of "proximate causes."
The ingathering of the Jews in Palestine would hardly have achieved a
momentum so disturbing to the Arabs had Hitler not consigned six mil-
lion of their brethren to confinement and death. When the Industrial
ix
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Revolution made petroleum a form of wealth, and petroleum was even-
tually found in unequal measure beneath the nations of the Arab World,
a move toward Arab unity was fore-ordained the "have-not" nations
taking the initiative to federate with the
uhaves " Once Lenin took power
in nearby Russia, and established the policy of undermining capitalist
strength by cutting the West off from its colonial ties, it was only a matter
of time before the Soviets would get around to penetrating the Middle
East in earnest. The wonder is that it didn't happen sooner before,
rather than after, the much larger and more difficult operations in China
and Southeast Asia.
Add to all of this the sudden emergence of the United States as the
most powerful nation in the world if also the one most astonished by its
ro le anc] American involvement in the Middle East can be seen as almost
inevitable. The wonder is that we were able to stay on the sidelines as
long as we did.
This little book might well be subtitled, "The Sudden Education of the
United States." For two brief, crowded years, in the microcosm of the
Levant, Americans have been exposed to three homely truths. We have
learned that the mighty cannot avoid involvement in a crisis anywhere in
so shrunken a world. A policy of studied disinterest in Soviet arms traf-
fic with Egypt, in Israel's desperate appeals for arms, in the precarious
position of the Hashemite kings in Iraq and Jordan, in the growing power
of the Arab unity movement simply did not work. The same old prob-
lems remained and were rapidly joined by others. When President Eisen-
hower decided to "sit out" the Suez crisis, some kind of dramatic over-
involvement at a later date was predestined. Destiny was in a hurry: less
than two years later, the Marines were sloshing ashore at Beirut.
We learned, too, how unhelpful to our real interests are those cliches
by which we have lived for more than a generation in our relations with
the several regions of the world. Attractive ideas like "nationalism" and
"self-determination" and "federal union" somehow look different when
others take them up and use them to justify the assassination of Iraqi
political leaders and Egypt's "federation-by-swallowing" with Syria.
If, a few years ago, you had asked most Americans what they really
wanted in the Middle East, the unhesitating answer would have been:
"stability." We have learned now that the attempt to assure stability by
bottling up political forces both ineluctable and readily exploited from
Moscow is a dubious way to seek peace and order in a revolutionary
world. If we have learned this lesson well, all the diplomatic heartburn
recorded in these pages will have been eminently worth while.
Introduction xi
Taken together, the documents in this volume constitute a judgment of
irrelevance against some of the methods powerful nations have long used
to affect the actions of others. When the British and French attacked
Egypt in that abortive and miserably executed little war of 1956, the
outrage of the rest of the world soon gave way to amazement that any
prime minister of Britain or France could have started so quaintly old-
fashioned an enterprise. Similarly, while the real drama was being played
out in the "internal" affairs of several Middle Eastern countries, men
with international reputations for diplomatic sagacity were engaged in
setting up military alliances, announcing "doctrines" against the least
likely forms of aggression, and gravely pretending that the established
order of tiny, unviable "nations" was not already beyond repair. How far
some United States officials were from knowing the score was revealed
when, a few days before the murder of Iraq's king and prime minister, an
American intelligence agent reported in Baghdad that the stability of Iraq
was assured. "These Iraqi Arabs are different," he averred. "They are con-
genitally incapable of assassinating their leaders."
In diplomacy as in genetics, only the fittest survive for long. The skills
required to deal effectively across national boundaries are therefore un-
dergoing rapid mutation these days. It is no longer adequate for American
diplomats to negotiate with the thin upper crust of each foreign society,
to deal only with other diplomats and high governmental officials. Ameri-
cans abroad are engaged nowadays in operations on a very large scale
technical aid, industrial investment, military training, and overt or
clandestine liaison with all significant elements of each nation's political,
economic, and cultural life. The more deeply we become involved in other
people's "internal affairs," the more conscious we are of the need to get
along, not only with the existing authorities, but with their possible suc-
cessors. In the Middle East, we temporarily laid aside this first principle
of twentieth-century diplomacy. We opted for stability in a region where
there will be no stability until there has been plenty of change.
Because the Middle East's m^r-national affairs cannot be understood
without seeing the dynamic change in their wtfra-national affairs, Miss
Carol Fisher and Professor Fred Krinsky have not only put together a col-
lection of timely historical documents but have produced a guide-book as
well an introductory essay which provides the background for under-
standing the place of each document in the tangled story of contemporary
Middle Eastern history.
The resulting work is not just a "survey" of Middle Eastern affairs; it
is, rather, a basis for discussion of United States interests and United
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States policy in the area. More than that, it is a discussion guide tested
and proved in terms of past success. The documents it contains were first
assembled as a basis for a study-and-discussion project in a sophomore
course in Citizenship, conducted by the Maxwell School as part of Syra-
cuse University's liberal arts program.
Both authors teach in the Citizenship Program, a general-education
curriculum designed to introduce freshmen and sophomores to the com-
plexities of public affairs and to methods of making and executing public
policy. Miss Fisher, a graduate of Colorado College, has combined anthro-
pological field work with her duties as Instructor at Syracuse University
and is completing her requirements for the interdisciplinary Doctor of
Social Science degree in the Maxwell Graduate School. Dr. Krinsky, As-
sociate Professor in the Citizenship Program, earned his Ph D. in Politi-
cal Science at the University of Pennsylvania in 1951 and taught at the
University of California before joining the Syracuse faculty in 1948. He
is co-author of several textbooks used in the Citizenship Program and
chairman of the editorial board which produced the sixth revised edition of
Problems in Democratic Citizenship, published by the Maxwell School.
HARLAN CLEVELAND
Dean, Maxwell Graduate School of
Citizenship and Public Affairs,
Syracuse University
HISTORICAL REVIEW

CHAPTER 1
The Land and Its Peoples
Many Americans first recognized the importance of the Middle East to
the United States when Israel was established as an independent nation,
May 14, 1948. The political attacks by Arab states on the new nation, the
short but bloody Arab-Israeli war, the plight of Arab refugees, the con-
tinuing efforts of the United Nations to maintain a truce along the border
of Israel, the nationalization of the Suez Canal by Egypt in July, 1956,
the frightening moment of war between Israel, France, and England on
one side and Egypt on the other at the very moment of the Presidential
election of 1956, the increasing Russian influence in Syria and Egypt, and
the revolutions which have overthrown the monarchy in Iraq and threaten
other Middle Eastern nations all these events have brought the Middle
East to the forefront of popular attention and concern. Yet perhaps the
first thing an alert citizen needs to know about the Middle East is that
behind these dramatic developments lies a complex history.
Many American citizens have viewed the happenings of October, 1956,
and the troubled times that have followed as due somehow to an un-
fortunately volatile mixture of the Suez Canal and Israel. Some have
assumed that there is necessarily a "right side" and a "wrong side" both
legally and morally in these events, and have been disappointed in the
search for a quick but just solution.
The purpose of this selection of readings is twofold. It is hoped that
the geographical, historical, and cultural materials in the introductory
essay together with the selection of important documents will provide
the reader with a clearer understanding of the problems and tensions in
the Middle East and of the importance of this area to world peace. It
is further hoped that following developments in the Middle East from
local tensions to the actual threat of world conflagration will serve as
useful staging for illustrating the development of America's foreign policy.
The Middle East contains the most appalling contrast between wealth
and poverty to be found anywhere in the world. It gave birth to and
3
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contains treasured relics of three great religions Hebrew, Christian, and
Moslem. Here are found peoples enjoying the advanced technologies of
industrial civilization surrounded by nomads living in mud huts and
animal-skin tents, caring for small wandering herds of camels and goats as
their ancestors did literally ten thousand years before them. The challenge
of the environment is formidable in this land of deserts, swamps, barren
rocky wastes ; and isolated areas of fertile coastal plain. This variety in
environment is matched by variety in the cultures of peoples relatively
isolated for generations by almost impassable desert.
From earliest times this area has been the meeting ground of East and
West. Overland transport depended upon long and tedious caravans for
safe passage through desert and barren hills. Even ocean vessels relied
upon Middle Eastern ports for provisions and welcome rest on the journey
across oceans and around the tip of Africa. These deserts became the
" Middle East" midpoint between Europe and the exotic spices and wares
of India and China or the "Near East" with reference to Europe.
The building of the Suez Canal brought the Middle East into even
sharper focus as a strategic geographical midpoint, and the discovery of
incredible amounts of oil beneath the desert sands and coastal plains won
for the Middle East the favors and attention of all the industrialized
nations of the world. Unfortunately, but logically, the area became a pawn
in the power struggles of the richer and more advanced nations. Its peoples
know too well the yoke of foreign domination. To them imperialism is a
word of hateful meaning. But before we begin a more detailed considera-
tion of the several categories of tensions in the Middle East we might first
turn to a brief contemporary political and geographical orientation.
During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the Middle East, with the
exception of Persia, came under the control of the Ottoman Empire, where
it remained until the termination of World War I. Thus the contemporary
political history of the Middle East begins at the war's close in 1918
with the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and the partitioning of
the Middle East into spheres of influence and League of Nations pro-
tectorates awarded to Great Britain and to France.
The Middle East is an area about the size of the United States, mainly
desert and wasteland, supporting approximately 80,000,000 people.* A
majority of the people are illiterate and live in great poverty; a few are
* Population statistics for Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Iran, Israel, Lebanon and
Turkey are taken from Monthly Bulletin of Statistic*, Vol XII, No. 10 (Oct. 1958),
Statistical Office of the United Nations, United Nations, New York. Population
figures for Yemen, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Aden, and the Sheikdoms are curient New
York Times estimates.
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among the richest men in the world. In some areas technological develop-
ment is creating a growing middle class, not yet successfully integrated
into the economic or political structure. The most modern buildings stand
beside those many centuries old. Transportation may be by a camel
caravan over desert trails, a "cadillac caravan" on a modern highway, or
a public conveyance, often a late model station wagon.
Although some of the desert lands yield to cultivation if irrigated,
water is universally scarce. Since water is differentially available, in many
areas the full utilization of potential water resources will necessitate in-
ternational cooperation. Mineral reactions in the soil, for example,
"salting up," further complicate irrigation problems.
An estimated two-thirds of the world's known oil resources lie beneath
this land but in general the people are not technically advanced enough
to develop or use them. Most of the oil is produced by more advanced
industrial nations on a fifty-fifty agreement basis.
Another of the Middle East's major advantages involves its strategic
geographic location linking the three continents of Europe, Asia, and
Africa.
Problems of commercial and agricultural development, intense nation-
alism, conflict in religious beliefs, resentment against former colonial
powers, internal intrigues and rivalries between ruling families, as well as
boundary disputes with frontiers periodically in motion, all encourage
weak, unstable governments and increasing internal and external tensions.
EGYPT
On February 21, 1958, Egyptians and Syrians voted nearly unanimously
to establish the United Arab Republic, a union of Egypt and Syria with
Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser as its first president (see Doc.
44). On March 8, Yemen joined with the UAR in a federation to be
known as the United Arab States. This agreement permitted Iman Ahmed
of Yemen to remain as absolute monarch of Yemen, but provided for
unified armed forces and foreign policies. A Federal Council of the UAR
and Yemen representatives was granted veto power.
Let us look first of all at these three countries who have linked their
political futures for better or for worse.
At the outbreak of World War I, Egypt, once a powerful civilization
became a British protectorate. In the tide of rising nationalism before
World War II Egypt was the first Middle Eastern country to achieve
political independence, though British troops maintained a strong base
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in the Suez area. After a period of continual tension, the last British
troops finally left Egyptian soil in June, 1956.
Egypt has no coal or iron and only a little oil, not enough for her own
needs. A population of 24,000,000 lives in an area about half again as large
as Texas, 386,198 square miles. Ninety-six per cent of the country
is
desert, however, and most of the people are concentrated in a narrow
strip of cultivated land along the Nile Valley. Although general living
conditions are very poor and mortality rates high, the population is in-
creasing, unemployment is rising, sales of cotton the major export are
falling off, and the flow of imported goods is dwindling. Thus it is under-
standable that now, more than ever before, the Egyptians have come to
look upon the Suez Canal as their greatest potential asset.
The government, prior to union with Syria, was a dictatorship under
Gamal Abdul Nasser who rose to power in 1952 through an army coup
that dethroned King Farouk. The government seeks to improve the econ-
omy, raise standards of living, increase industry, and generally strengthen
the power and position of Egypt.
SYRIA
Syria, like Iraq, is underpopulated \vith a little over 4,000,000 people
inhabiting an area of 66,039 square miles, a country about the size of New
England. Some authorities estimate that up to 3,000,000 additional set-
tlers are necessary to provide the manpower to develop Syria's resources.
Very little land is now under irrigation, although water is available in
some quantity and the use of irrigation is increasing. Most Syrians are
farmers and herders, and enough wheat and meat are produced to meet
the country's needs. Other than building stone, raw materials are at a
bare minimum. Syria is paid considerable rent, however, for oil pipelines
running through its land from Iraq.
Syria was granted independence by the French in 1941, but French and
British troops did not leave until 1946, and then only under strong United
Nations pressure led by the United States. The government, prior to union
with Egypt, was run by an unstable army clique closely allied with Nasser
in Egypt and increasingly pro-Soviet.
YEMEN
This country, least known and most backward in the Middle East, is about
as big as Nebraska, 75,000 square miles, and supports a population of
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about 4,500,000. Yemen is not the typical Middle Eastern country re-
cently released from colonial rule. Although controlled by Turks during
the sixteenth century, Yemen, a completely independent oligarchy, has for
centuries been closed to outside influences.
This country has no roads, no transportation facilities, and no industry
of importance. It is rich in water and minerals, however, and has fertile
plateaus where grain and coffee are grown, though at least 90 per cent of
the population is both illiterate and poor.
JORDAN
On March 19, 1958, Iraq and Jordan formally proclaimed the constitu-
tion of a union between these two countries to be known as the Arab
Federation (see Doc. 45). Although Jordan and Iraq under this union
were to retain sovereignty over their own territories, the constitution of
the Federation provided for equal representation in legislative, executive,
and judicial bodies empowered to act for the Federation as a whole.
On July 28, 1958, the government of Iraq was overthrown and a re-
public sympathetic to the United Arab Republic established in its place.
King Hussein of Jordan proclaimed himself head of the Arab Federation
under the constitutional clause that delegated authority to him in the
event of King Faisal's "absence," but without armed force he was power-
less to support his claim and Iraq again operated as an independent gov-
ernment. Let us look for a moment at these two countries united as a
Federation for such a brief period.
For a few years immediately after World War I, the area now known
as Jordan was part of the Arab kingdom of Syria. With the collapse of
the Syrian authority in 1920 it came directly under British supervision.
Thus it was that Winston Churchill, acting as Colonial Secretary in 1922,
was able to set up Jordan as an independent national unit under Abdullah,
the second son of the Arab king, Hussein. His purpose in so doing was to
divert this ambitious prince from leading a Bedouin army to war against
French-held Syria. At this time the area, then known as Transjordan,
was primarily a desert home for bands of wandering tribesmen, though
some important towns remained from the centuries when the major cara-
van routes crossed these lands. The population there in 1922 was approxi-
mately 300,000. Today it nears 1,500,000. Since Jordan annexed some of
the Palestine lands set aside by the United Nations for an Arab state,
it now extends across some 37,500 square miles, making it a territory a
little larger than the state of Indiana.
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Severe desert conditions and scant material resources, except for an
abundance of phosphate rock, constitute Jordan's grave economic handicap.
The political future is equally uncertain. Under Arab nationalist in-
fluences Jordan had ousted British officers from its territory in March,
1956. The July, 1958, revolution in Iraq, however, posed such a serious
threat to the monarchy in Jordan that Great Britain at once returned
troops to its support. Jordan's political uncertainty is based
on a combin-
ation of unstable government and threats of revolution together with
border struggles, high feelings of revenge against Israel and the problem
posed by the return of British forces.
IRAQ
Long before biblical times, an ancient civilization flourished on the rich
alluvial plain between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. This territory
which we now know as Iraq was even then made fertile by an ingenious
system of canals on which the life of the countryside depended. At one
time or another over the centuries invading Persians, desert tribesmen,
Asians, Greeks, Romans, and Turks destroyed the irrigation systems and
so destroyed a succession of empires. The desert knew a hundred years of
return to fertility in the eighth and ninth centuries only to fall back into
wasteland again under the Ottoman Empire.
In World War I, British forces drove the Turks out of this land which
was then known as Mesopotamia, Iraq was created under British protec-
torate as a constitutional monarchy and in 1932 was recognized as an in-
dependent nation. In 1956 under pressures of Arab nationalism the last
British forces left Iraq and in July, 1958, a revolution overthrew the
monarchy in favor of a republic sympathetic to the cause of an extreme
nationalist group.
Approximately 6,500,000 people live in this country which is about half
the size of Texas.
Oil was discovered in great quantities in Iraq and the present govern-
ment has been directing oil profits into programs designed to raise the
standard of living of the Iraqi who were, until just recently, as poor as
any of the peoples of the Middle East. Long-term programs for roads,
irrigation, dams, schools, and industrial development are in progress.
Iraq's oil moves to Europe through pipelines across Syria. These pipe-
lines were damaged by Syria when Egypt was attacked in October, 1956.
Oil income fell to a minimum and tension developed with Syria over
repair of the pipelines.
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Apart from oil the only major export is dates. When properly irrigated
the soil is unusually fertile and the country could support and would need
several million more people to develop its resources.
SUDAN
Though located on the southern Egyptian border and primarily a central
African country, the Sudan has been included in this discussion of the
Middle East because of its strategic and economic importance to Egypt.
Long-range control of the Nile waters hinges on cooperation between
Egypt and Sudan.
This area, about one-third the size of the United States, supports a
population of about 10,200,000 people who live in tropical forests, wide
plains, and fertile lands along the Nile. The population represents a vari-
ety of religious and racial groupings including Arabs, Negroes, Nubians,
and Mulattoes.
Britain and Egypt ruled the Sudan from 1899 to 1953. The present
government is a parliamentary republic. On January 1, 1956, under an
agreement among these countries, Sudan proclaimed her independence. Se-
rious disputes over the border between Egypt and Sudan remain unsettled.
The standard of living in the Sudan generally is still quite low, roads
are few, and transportation minimal. There is an abundance of farm land
with cotton as the major crop. Another natural resource is gum arabic
and most of the world's supply comes from this area.
Though a member of the Arab League and in receipt of arms from
Egypt, Sudan has not yet formally discussed military pacts with any
country.
ISRAEL
In 1948 when Israel officially came into being through the United Nations
as a parliamentary democracy, its Jewish population was 650,000. As a
result of intensive immigration, inhabitants now total nearly 2,000,000
in an area about the size of New Jersey 8,048 square miles.
Although much of the land is sandy waste and stony hill country, in-
tensive irrigation development is continually opening new land for culti-
vation, with the result that citrus fruit is now being exported in even
greater quantity than before. Here, as throughout most of the Middle
East, the struggle for water is intense.
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The seaports of Tel Aviv, Jaffa, Haifa, and Elath are increasingly im-
portant in the Israeli economy, as are both fresh and salt water fishing.
Some mineral resources have been found in Israel, and recently several
high grade oil strikes have improved and advanced an already ambitious
industrial development program.
This industrial program together with transportation, health, and edu-
cational developments combine to bring Israel closer to "modern" states
than any other nation in the Middle East today.
SAUDI ARABIA
Though Saudi Arabia includes some 870,000 square miles, a country three
and one half times the size of Texas, most of it is a desert wasteland. Its
6,000,000 Arabs are forced to live mainly on the watered fringe of the
Arabian peninsula and in its scattered desert oases.
Today the land and peoples of Saudi Arabia literally belong to one
man Saud Ibn Abdul-Aziz al-Saud. He inherited the property from his
father who orginally united it by conquest of local tribal chieftains. On
March 23, 1958, Saud conferred unlimited power over "internal, external
and financial policies" on his prime minister and half-brother, Crown
Prince Faisal. But Saud nonetheless remains king.
Oil was discovered in Saudi Arabia in 1928. A group of United States
oil companies holds the concession to develop and market King Saud's
oil. As a result the United States holds also a major air base in Saudi
Arabia and trains and arms the Saudi army. Other than oil, Saudi Arabia
exports only dates, camels and a few horses.
Since King Saud owns the land, all income from oil and export is his
personal wealth. Although there is indication of an expanding middle
class, the general population maintains a very low standard of living in
a desert subsistence economy.
LEBANON
In this ancient land 1,500,000 people live in an area about half the size
of New Jersey. At one time or another Persians, Egyptians, Romans,
Crusaders, Turks, and numerous other groups have ruled the territory.
At the close of World War I, Lebanon became a French protectorate
under a League of Nations mandate, and in 1926 was organized as a re-
public. Although the French mandate remained in juridical effect until
1946, when the last French troops quit Lebanese soil, the French Com-
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mittee of National Liberation and Great Britain recognized Lebanon as
an independent republic as early as 1941. Even today the people of
Lebanon are so diverse culturally that the seats in parliament are divided
on the basis of religious affiliations. A slim majority are Christians.
Although Lebanon is the smallest country in the Arab League, it is
considered by many as the most advanced. It has an infant industrial
economy and natural resources to aid in its development. Water is avail-
able, though as yet only part of the land is under irrigation or even cul-
tivation. Lebanon exports fruits, tobacco, and olive oil. It also collects
rent for oil pipelines running through its territory from Saudi Arabia and
Iraq. Most Lebanese are farmers, while city folk are devoted and skilled
traders.
Since most of the Christians in Lebanon are Arabs, there is still no
real peace commitment with Israel. Pro-Western sympathizers combined
with increasing numbers of Moslem citizens and Arab refugees produce
in Lebanon an increasingly difficult dilemma. National policy has often
reflected this uneasy truce between Western and Arab affiliations. In 1958,
when armed rebellion in Lebanon and the successful revolution in Iraq
threatened the government in Lebanon, United States armed troops were
sent to Lebanon at the request of President Chamoun. It is unlikely that
there will be much lessening of tension in Lebanon for some time to come.
IRAN
The Persis of antiquity and the Persia of modern times, Iran is a kingdom
of 628,060 square miles, an area about two and one-half times the size
of Texas, containing 19,700,000 people.
Not an Arab nation, Iran's history has been in some real measure
distinct from the development of other Middle Eastern nations since it
successfully resisted attack from the Ottoman Empire and remained in-
dependent of Turkish control.
In 1907 a revolution, intended to overthrow the absolute Shah in favor
of a constitutional monarchy, led in effect to a power vacuum. Russia and
Britain moved in and divided Persia into
"spheres of influence" with
Russia looking after the northern and central area and Britain overseeing
in the south. During the 1920's and 1930's the Riza Shah consolidated
the nation, strengthened the constitutional government, brought an end to
the Anglo-Russian agreements and thus established Iran's independence
as a sovereign nation. During World War II, however, the USSR and Great
Britain again sent troops into Iran. Though this was not technically an oc-
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cupation, the presence of foreign troops renewed old fears among the people
that Russia and Great Britain intended to occupy permanently. At the
conclusion of the war British troops withdrew from the south and the
Iranian government sent its own troops to the north to reclaim the last
areas of Soviet control.
Up to this point the oil that had been discovered in the southern section
was developed under agreement by a British company. The nationalist
movement at the end of World War II, internal struggles, and government
instability resulted, however, in abrogation of this agreement in 1951. The
oil fields were nationalized under the leadership of the extreme national-
ist, Mohammed Mossadegh, but nationalization proved no solution. Inter-
nal power struggles, often violent, continued. The signing in 1954 of a
new oil agreement, discussed on pages 29 and 30 moderated the situation
only slightly.
Iran formulated a policy of increasing economic and political coopera-
tion outside the Soviet bloc, including membership in the Baghdad Pact
and, at the same time, encouraged the development of cordial relations
with the USSR. In April, 1957, Manouchehr Eghbal, with army support,
took over as Shah, ended the martial law which had been in force for six-
teen years, and entered upon the development of a freer two-party system
in Iran.
Oil revenue is the greatest source of income to the country, and oil
profits are going into a development plan that should slowly improve the
general standard of living.
Iran has considerable mineral resources but, since these are as yet un-
developed, the people are still chiefly farmers and migrant tribesmen.
THE SHEIKDOMS
Around the rim of Arabia lie an assortment of Arab sheikdoms which have
been under British protection since the last century. In the Yemen area
alone Britain protects eight sultanates, two emirates, and seven confed-
erations of small sheikdoms and tribes.
Much of this land is fertile and abounds in fresh-water springs. The
people are tribesmen, herders, and farmers.
The discovery of oil in Kuwait has transformed the ruler of the 200,000
tribesmen in this area into one of the world's wealthiest men. In smaller
quantities oil is produced in Bahrain and in Qatar, both under British
protection. More oil is thought to lie under the Oman, Muscat, and Hadh-
ramaut lands. Traces have been found in several of the smaller desert
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sheikdoms near Yemen. This oil wealth, both realized and potential,
provides real incentive for controversy over control of these lands. Inter-
nal rebellions and increasing pressures from neighboring nations continually
threaten British hegemony.
ADEN
Aden is a British colony won from Yemen in 1839. Aden proper is only
about 80 square miles in size with a population of 140,000: The city of
Aden is among the busiest seaports in the British Commonwealth. This
port is on the direct line of commerce between Africa and India and ser-
vices a vast shipping trade. Aden proper has a large British air base and
a petroleum refinery of considerable size.
Aden Protectorate, an area of Arab chiefdoms also under British
control, is far larger. This territory covers 112,000 square miles and con-
tains 650,000 people. Oil was discovered in 1955 in the eastern Aden
Protectorate.
TURKEY
Although Turkey is not included in some Middle Eastern geopolitical
groupings, its role as ruler of the Middle East during the centuries of the
Ottoman Empire, together with the fact that 98 per cent of its people
are Moslems, suggests a place for it in our survey.
Even though the later years of Ottoman rule placed France, Great Bri-
tain, and Russia in influential positions with regard to the Middle East
(see page 4), the Ottoman Empire remained in control until Turkey's
defeat in World War I. The abrupt swing at the close of the war relegated
Turkey to a position of relative mediocrity as the newly mandated areas,
freed from Ottoman control, attempted to win back from Turkey "stolen"
trade and cultural centers. In the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, Turkey
was established as fully independent. Under the leadership of Mustafa
Kemal, or Ataturk, in reality a benevolent dictator, a parliamentary
republican system was developed.
With the termination of World War II and the onset of the Cold War,
Turkey's pro-Western sentiment brought it back into a position of some im-
portance. As a relatively stable republic, a founding member of the United
Nations, and a strategic member of the NATO alliance and the Baghdad
Pact, Turkey has become a committed Western ally.
Turkey's population numbers around 25,500,000 in 296,185 square
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miles, an area a little larger than Texas. The growing economy includes
sizable exports of tobacco, cotton, hazelnuts, chrome, and copper exports
sent mainly to the United States, Great Britain, and West Germany.
The government is planning programs for a stabilized economy, includ-
ing industrial development and extension of facilities for transportation,
education, health, and housing.
DIVERSITY AND UNITY
The Middle East is a land of sand and mountains, sparse in wood and
water. The natural resources that do exist metal ore, workable stone,
tillable land, even flint are often widely scattered, separated by burning
deserts or malarial swamps. Such a land would seem a formidable chal-
lenge to peoples devoid of all power but that of human muscle. Yet such
people living in this difficult environment produced in ancient biblical times
many of those crucial inventions upon which modern civilization depends.
From these early dwellers in the Middle East we have received most of
the plants and animals we use daily. We owe to them likewise the inven-
tions of metallurgy and glass making, the principles of the rotating shaft,
the alphabet, and a religious way of life deeply affecting our contemporary
culture.
In a land where resources are so widely scattered and transportation so
minimal we might logically expect to find the development of specializa-
tions confined to an area where necessary materials are immediately
available. In the Middle East, however, the specializations have been de-
veloped to a point where an entire village or area concentrates on one
vocation, be it metalwork, pottery, silken textiles, woolen rugs, or the breed-
ing of camels and horses. From fathers to sons for generations have passed
secrets of working with metal or wool. In geographic isolation communi-
ties have practiced their skill to its perfection. Such specialization is an
efficient way to exist in a poor environment, but it depends upon the de-
velopment of an adequate means of transportation. A village devoted
to silk spinning or metalworking relies for its very life upon transport of
its goods out to trade centers and a flow of necessities in from other
centers. A complex of transportation specialists must develop along with
traders and merchants.
Many areas, because of this relative isolation and economic speciali-
zation, developed unique customs among their people special manner-
isms, modes of dress, colloquial speech, and later even variations upon the
basic faith of Islam. If their journeys took them from home these special
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customs identified them, for example, as well-diggers of the north or
rug-weavers of the south.
The relationship established between man and land has traditionally
been successful in supporting a stable population. Introduction of modern
means of power, sudden population increases, a transportation system
adequate for transporting finished goods and also for transporting raw ma-
terials from one area to another have demanded the establishment of new
man-land relationships in parts of the Middle East. In some areas the
ancient village specializations have broken down and a more diversified
way of life has developed. In other areas, and even in the large modern
cities, the ethnic division of labor has simply been adapted to supply men
for the new jobs created by industrialization. Until recently, for example,
most of the clerks in Egypt were from an ethnic division known as the
Copts.
Although the introduction of modern power has required readjustments
in the original pattern of living, leaving the cities and the few main high-
ways even today brings us back relatively swiftly to the old pattern where
we find peoples living as they did in the times of Abraham and Isaiah.
A crucial development over the past ten years that has disrupted more
seriously the stable organization of life in the Middle East, involves
the phenomenon of mass migrations numbering into the hundreds of thou-
sands. Thousands of Jews, economically specialized in this Middle-Eastern
mode of living, moved into Israel from areas that had been their homes for
generations. Arabs moved out of Israel, away from their ancestral homes. In
Yemen, for example, the Jews had almost a monopoly on the export-
import trade, ironworking, stone masonry, money exchange, and marketing
of textiles. Who can be found to adopt these vocations for centuries ex-
clusively Jewish? Such losses in human ability have disrupted and strained
the system throughout the Middle East.
Even as ethnic specialization has formed the pattern of living in the
Middle East, religion has been the bonding agent holding these diverse
human beings together in an exchange of mutual confidence.
About A.D. 570, Mohammed, Prophet of Islam, was born in Mecca.
Before Mohammed's time the peoples of the Middle East worshiped in
many forms, ranging from local tribal superstitions to universal religions
like Buddhism, Judaism, and Christianity. Mohammed and his followers
succeeded where all others had failed and united the Arab world under a
common god and a single code of ethics.
Mohammed's code was built upon the religious outlines of Judaism and
Christianity. Moslems see these three faiths as identical in their early
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development. They feel, however, that Judaism corrupts the true faith
in its refusal to accept Mohammed as the last and complete prophet whose
words were the fulfillment of God's communications to mankind. Chris-
tianity corrupted the true faith by turning Jesus (to the Moslems only a
prior prophet) into a god. Thus the Middle East, holy land for the three
faiths, contains objects and places enshrined and reverenced alike by Jews,
Christians, and Moslems. The kinship was in part responsible for the
relatively peaceful cooperation among the faiths characteristic of the early
development of Islam. This same kinship, complicated by political differ-
ences between Christian nations and the Arab world, and with the empha-
sis shifted from likeness to difference, bred hostility and suspicion in later
years.
The faith of Islam cultivates the virtues of devotion, humility, and ac-
ceptance virtues achieved through obedience to the Law. The Law itself
is a carefully detailed code of behavior derived from the Koran (the will
of God spoken through the mouth of Mohammed) and from the Tradi-
tions, noninspirational sayings and records of the action of the prophet.
Deviations from the original code are common throughout the Arab
world. Some sects, perhaps more seriously influenced by Christianity,
attribute varying measures of divinity to Mohammed. Other variations
stem from differing opinions on the meaning of some passages in the
Koran. More limited deviations result from the natural addition of local
superstitions to the body of basic Islamic beliefs.
In spite of these deviations, however, the incredible success achieved by
Mohammed and his followers deserves special notice. Carleton Coon in
Caravan, his definitive book on Middle Eastern culture (see Bibliography),
has this to say of the religious unity of Islamic peoples:
If ever a religion were built to fit a cultural situation, Islam was it Its
principal differences from Christianity (and here I expose myself to criticism
from both sides) are' that it was suited to a particular environment and
culture, while Christianity is applicable to all time and space, and that by so
limiting itself Islam became correspondingly more practical in the immediate
situation, and surer of success within its smaller field Conceptually a less
ambitious and more certain venture, it produced its golden age earlier
than that of Christianity, which, though older, required a wider canvas,
greater resources, and a more elaborate technology for its fruition.
The peoples of the Middle East are united, then, in diversity a diversity
born of specialization and a unity born of necessity and bonded by
religion.
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Nationalism is a strange phenomenon to place against this mosaic of
diversity. Peoples whose loyalty has rested for generations within an isolat-
ed community, peoples who have looked upon all others outside of their
local specialization as strangers, do not easily learn to shift their loyalty
from the real and immediate to the larger and, to them, entirely unreal and
arbitrary ^national" identity. The two seem to be incompatible. The fact
of their union is again due in no small part to the uniting of human beings
in a common emotion this time an emotion of hatred.
CHAPTER 2
Nationalism and the Arab League
Until the termination of World War I the Ottoman Empire of Turkey
ruled the Middle East from Persia to the Sudan, uniting it again under
foreign rule. This time, however, as had not been true under the Romans,
conqueror and conquered shared a common religious faith and, to a large
extent, many common aspects of cultural life. Under the despotic rule of the
Ottoman Empire, cultural and commercial centers of the Middle East de-
clined as trade and commerce shifted to the Bosphorus and Constantinople.
Little distinction was made in terms of any national boundaries within
the Empire. The distinctions that remained were in terms of local tribal
chiefdoms and heads of leading families who through inherited religious
office maintained control of important religious centers, as for example,
the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem or the Sherif of Mecca.
The exception to this situation was found in Egypt which managed to
retain identity as a national entity. The French occupation under Napo-
leon at the end of the eighteenth century brought with it a new scholarly
interest in the past glories of Egyptian civilization which was not without
its long-range effect in reawakening Egyptian self-consciousness. Further-
more, British military and economic control in the nineteenth century,
together with Egypt's location in relation to the Suez Canal, served to en-
hance Egypt's position as a strategic area and bring its people to national
awareness.
Egyptians were also Moslems, however, and the Moslem religion can be
called to account in part for the degree of unity as well as fatalism with
which Ottoman rule was accepted. It must be remembered that the Middle
East is a harsh environment. Peoples isolated for centuries continued in
isolation throughout the Ottoman period. The Ottoman rulers interfered
rarely with internal tribal affairs. Commercial centers with their classes
of tradesmen and merchants felt the foreign rule most strongly, but the
fatalism inherent in the Moslem faith and the fact that the rulers shared
this faith made the situation more palatable if not thoroughly acceptable.
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Toward the end of the nineteenth century Pan-Arab and Pan-Islamic
nationalism began to appear, first as an organized movement in greater
Syria, spreading thence throughout the southern Middle East. This move-
ment envisioned release from Ottoman rule and the establishment of some
sort of autonomous Arabian polity. Opposed by several leading Arab
families and without strong leadership of its own, the movement constitu-
ted no great threat to Turkey until World War I. Under stimulus from
French and American mission schools throughout the Middle East, deeply
disappointed in a rebellion in Turkey itself which resulted only in in-
creased
"Turkiftcation," and heartened by vague British references to an
Arab State, the Middle East Arabs rallied to the allied cause in World
War I, helping in the defeat of Turkey and the collapse of the Ottoman
Empire.
The Arabs had not reckoned with European politics, however, and the
close of World War I found Britain involved in commitments to France
and the Zionists. France was granted control of Syria. Concessions were
made to Zionism (see page 41 ff) through the Balfour Declaration. Arab
visions of a great Arab nation became swamped in the embroilments of
European politics, and the Middle East was divided into a series of British
and French protectorates under mandates from the League of Nations.
Nationalism to this point had been twofold: British-inspired Pan-Islamic
in the south and French-inspired libertarian in the north. At the close of
the war, Faisal of the Hashemite family ruling the Holy City of Mecca,
who had been cooperative and sympathetic to the establishment of a
Jewish home in Palestine, entered Damascus and declared himself king of
Greater Syria. Britain, fearing loss of her Middle Eastern power, could not
support such a move. By 1920 Faisal was forced to surrender his power
to France and the partitioning of the Middle East began in earnest. Faisal
was pacified by the British and given the kingship of Iraq. His brother
Abdullah was made regent of Transjordan in order to put down a Bedouin
revolt against French-held Syria.
In 1925 the King of Hejaz and Sherif of Mecca, father of Faisal and
Abdullah, was overthrown by Ibn Saud, a former chieftain of a small and
humble tribe who, with British help, was establishing himself as supreme
leader over all the Arabian peninsula. A bitterness which has been the
basis of much insecurity in the Middle East developed between Saud's
family and the Hashemite family. It was not surprising that the Hashem-
ites felt that Saud was in illegal control of a land rightfully belonging to
them, while Saud for his part feared that the Hashemites might some day
command enough power to dethrone him.
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Over a period of years Faisal and Abdullah advanced Greater Syria
plans, sometimes in cooperation with and sometimes opposed to plans for
a Jewish national home but always with a view to restoring the Hashem-
ites to what they considered their rightful throne in the Arabian peninsula.
The success of any Greater Syria plan would undermine Saud's security;
even control of southern Palestine by Jordan would threaten both Saud's
power and the security of Egypt.
In 1949, when the Syrian army took control of the Syrian government,
relations with Jordan were severed, the borders were closed and the an-
nouncement was made that not only did Syria reject categorically all plans
for an Abdullah-led Greater Syria but threatened to annex Jordan and
warned Iraq against interference.
In 1951, Abdullah was assassinated, reportedly by agents of the ex-Mufti
of Jerusalem, The ex-Mufti, alternately pro-Nazi or pro-Soviet, was des-
perately bitter over his loss of influence when the British established
Abdullah as king in Jordan. Abdullah, a commanding personality with a
strong following, occupied a highly strategic position as king of Jordan.
Toward the close of the Second World War events surrounding the estab-
lishment of a Jewish national home had often waited upon the political
movements of this man. His violent death precipitated fears of invasion
from Syria, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, thereby upsetting the delicate bal-
ance of power in the Middle East. Britain stepped in to fill the power gap,
promising aid to Jordan if attacked. Abdullah's son Talal took the throne
and made overtures to end the long feud with Saud, leaving Britain fear-
ful of the loss of her alliance with Jordan. In 1952, Jordan's parliament
deposed Talal, an ineffective man, harrassed by ill-health, and set up in
his stead his young, English-educated son Hussein. Anti-British elements,
pro-British elements, and pressures from Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Egypt
all contributed to a complex, politically unstable situation for Jordan's
young king. The spring of 1951 brought another threat of invasion by Syria
and Saudi Arabia to the little kingdom and again British intervention
protected Hussein's throne.
The establishment of the League of Arab States introduced one more
factor influencing Arab relationships. The Arab League, while seemingly
representative of Pan-Arab unity, in reality based its strength on its
success in redirecting internal rivalries and bitterness outward against any
foreign intrusion or intervention in Arabian affairs.
In 1942, the prime minister of Iraq, fully supported by Great Britain,
proposed an Arab federal union of Iraq, Palestine, Jordan, and Syria.
Egypt and Saudi Arabia, afraid of such united strength, violently opposed
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the plan. Nahas Pasha, prime minister of Egypt, suggested instead and
won support for the formation of an association of sovereign Arab states
which was then formally established in Cairo in 1945 (see Doc. 9), Al-
though first plans envisioned the League as a prior step toward an even-
tual Pan-Arab polity, the final form specifically called for "respect for the
independence of these (member) states." The League in its initial or-
ganization became Pan-Arab not Pan-Islamic. It allowed for limited
association with Palestine, provided for association with nonindependent
Arab countries, pledged every nation against any undertakings thought to
be to the detriment of the whole, and specifically warned against any out-
side intervention in the internal affairs of any member nation. Contrived
by Egypt with the blessing of Great Britain, the leadership of the League
fell to Egypt and a campaign designed to secure its position of leadership
was inaugurated at once a campaign committed to the promotion of
intense nationalism, heightening the fervor against
uWestern imperialism"
and
"foreign domination."
The League might well have collapsed for lack of strength in its earliest
months had not Britain and the United States intervened in its support
in the League's first trial. In 1941, Syria and Lebanon had been pro-
nounced independent by France but France continued to exert pressures to
control their internal affairs. By 1945, Syria and Lebanon severed relations
with France in spite of French armed advances. The Arab League accord-
ingly issued warnings of armed protest to France. Since the League was in no
position to supply either arms or men in support of Syria and Lebanon,
France ignored the warnings and undertook military occupation. Britain,
with the support of the United States, then sent troops to Syria to enforce
a cessation of hostilities and support the Arab League demand for the
removal of French forces. Largely due to this intervention the League
emerged from her first trial with added strength and support.
There were points of both strength and weakness in the League's
secular, individual sovereign approach. It was probable that cooperation
among these widely divergent governments, hostile and suspicious toward
one another, could not have been achieved on any ground other than
individual member sovereignty. But such a concession meant a continu-
ance of rivalries between nations and hostilities within the League itself.
Certainly the failure of the League in the 1948 war with Israel was largely
due to a compounding of these tensions.
On May 14, 1948, with Israel's declaration of independence, the Arab
World presented a strongly united front in its apparently unanimous de-
cision to "drive Israel into the sea." This was, in reality, an enforced
22 MIDDLE EAST IN CRISIS
unity, made necessary because of the hatred existing between the Arab
nations themselves. Each nation, deeply suspicious of all its neighbors,
could not afford to let any one other nation invade Israel alone on the
risk that it might win Palestine and thereby increase its own power
sufficiently to dominate other Arab nations. The only self-defense in this
situation became, paradoxically, a united war against Israel. Even Leb-
anon, predominantly Christian and benefiting enormously from trade with
the Palestine area, found it necessary to send a token force into the war.
(See page 49.)
In 1950, in an attempt to strengthen the League and, incidentally,
Egypt's position of leadership in the Arab World, Egypt proposed a joint
defense and economic treaty (see Doc. 12) and by 1952 won total rati-
fication of the treaty. In addition to pledging the military assistance of
the whole League to the aid of any attacked member nation, the treaty pro-
vided means for enhancing economic and cultural cooperation. The hope
that such a treaty would open the arms embargo and allow free shipments of
arms from Western democracies without restrictive commitments was frus-
trated in 1950 with the announcement of the tripartite agreements be-
tween France, Great Britain, and the United States (see Doc. 13). Accord-
ing to the terms of these agreements, arms would be shipped to Israel and
Arab nations provided assurances were given that such arms were to be
used nonaggressively.
Frustrated in the arms agreement, embittered by the power struggles
of Western democracies over control of Arab lands, and finding it impos-
sible to live with the pro-Israel sentiment of these same Western democra-
cies, some individual member nations began more and more to flirt with
Soviet Russia for economic and military aid (see Doc. 17).
It must be remembered that among Middle East nations all but Egypt
owe their national existence less to efforts of their own than to the po-
litical maneuverings of the great powers of Western Europe. Their leaders
had come to recognize the insecurity of weak peoples, too long exploited
by the political ambitions of stronger nations, but they had come to realize
too that their continued existence depended, in part at least, upon the
support of stronger powers. National independence had been achieved in
large part in an atmosphere of violent hatred for former colonial powers
and "Western imperialism." Israel became in Arab minds another attempt
at Western imperialism in the Middle East. Once having produced this
state of hysteria, it became increasingly difficult for Middle Eastern lead-
ers to deal with Western powers or seek their support without cries of
"traitor" arising from other Arab nations, or from their own people. In the
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view of the leaders, Soviet Russia became the logical and "safe" power
from which to seek aid.
The Arab League achieved a real measure of economic and cultural co-
operation by uniting these insecure, suspicious nations, each individually
aspiring to influence and control within the Arab world, each alert to pre-
vent any neighbor from accomplishing any similar ambition. In turning
the great part of the internal fear and resentment outward into resentment
of foreign intervention, in defining Israel as another Western scheme for
further imperialism, the League managed to produce a substantial measure
of political unity. It has become a focal point for intense Middle Eastern
nationalism and as such constitutes an ethical and attitudinal position not
to be overlooked or treated lightly, even though this "unity" is precari-
ously balanced and easily disrupted. The importance of the Arab League
was manifested in its resolution, adopted by the United Nations General
Assembly in August, 1958, breaking the deadlock on the Middle Eastern
issue then before the Assembly (see Doc. 48).
The unity of the Arab League was seriously disrupted by the Middle
East Treaty Organization, or the Baghdad Pact (see Doc. 16), an alliance
of Great Britain, Pakistan, Turkey, Iran, and Iraq the so-called "north-
ern tier." This alliance, initiated by Great Britain with the approval of the
United States, attempted to halt the erosion of British and Western power
in the Middle East, form a stronghold against Russian intrusion, and
provide a nucleus for a general Middle East defense system.
Hopes that the Baghdad Pact would be a rallying point for other
Middle East nations were soon dashed by the creation of a "southern tier"
military alliance among Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria with the support
of Soviet Russia and in direct opposition to the Baghdad Pact. True to
earlier Egyptian aims, President Nasser aspired to Egyptian supremacy
in the Arab world (see page 57 ff). The northern coalition presented serious
obstacles to such an ambition. Bitter riots and demonstrations against the
Baghdad Pact, accusations of Western imperialism and of pro-Israel sen-
timent in the Baghdad Pact countries breached the tenuous unity of the
Arab League. Even British-created Jordan was torn by violence and its
government seriously shaken by rumors that it considered joining the Pact.
The change in government in Iraq as a result of the July, 1958, revolution
in effect leaves the Pact without a single Arab member nation and its
usefulness in the future is in serious question.
The United Arab Republic was formed in February, 1958 (see page 5)
at the height of the Middle East Treaty Organization Council meeting
held in Ankara. Both President Nasser's opposition to the Baghdad Pact
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and his aspiration to Arab leadership were manifest in this union of Syria
and Egypt under his personal leadership. In his installation speech Presi-
dent Nasser invited all Arab states to join the United Arab Republic in
a Pan-Arab polity. The immediate response of Jordan and Iraq, in obvious
mistrust of the Syrian-Egyptian alliance, was to join together in the Arab
Federation. The Arab Federation, like the United Arab Republic, also
urged other Arab nations to join with Jordan and Iraq in Arab unity.
Again the old rivalries and suspicions among Arab leaders resulted in
the development of opposing factions in the Middle East. The Hashemite
dreams of a great Arab kingdom with its center in Damascus and the
Egyptian drive toward a Pan-Arab polity centered in Cairo met squarely
in troubled Syria.
At the time of its union with Egypt, Syria was rocked with internal
violence. The army, under strong pro-Soviet leadership, was threatening
the moderate nationalist government of President Shukri el-Quwatli. Ob-
servers in Syria expressed the opinion that Quwatli accepted Nasser's
control as a means of dealing with the unruly Communists in Syria, since
Nasser, while carefully courting Soviet economic and military aid, had
severely suppressed the Communist Party within Egypt. Shortly after the
formation of the United Arab Republic, Nasser flew to Moscow for exten-
ded talks with the Soviets which resulted in a joint pledge of friendship
and cooperation, and an extension of Soviet economic and military aid
to the newly formed union.
With their hopes of a Greater Syria now thwarted and under pressure
from Syrian and Egyptian agitation, Jordan and Iraq found the resolution
to their dilemma in the union of these Hashemite kingdoms. The treaty of
federation stipulated that neither partner would be committed by the
other's prior alliances nor would the union abrogate alliances of either
partner.
This did not prove to be a solution to the growing nationalistic, pro-
United Arab Republic fervor in Jordan and Iraq, for on July 28, 1958, the
government of Iraq was overthrown, King Faisal and Premier Nun were
killed, and a republican government was installed under the leadership of
Brigadier Abdel Kerim el Kassem. Revolutionists, encouraged by the turn
of events in Iraq, posed a serious threat to the governments of Jordan and
Lebanon. In response to requests for aid the United States sent troops to
Lebanon and Great Britain sent troops to Jordan (see Docs. 46 and 47).
Again the Middle East became the source of a major world crisis. Anti-
Western elements charged the West with imperialism and intervention in
violation of the United Nations Charter. The Western powers responded
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that Iraq had fallen prey to
" indirect aggression" from the United Arab
Republic and that Jordan and Lebanon were likewise severely threatened.
The Western nations contended that they had acted in compliance with
the United Nations Charter since they had entered these countries at the
request of their official governments. Russia threatened not to remain in-
different to these "acts of aggression" near her borders and the matter was
referred to an emergency session of the Security Council. A Western
proposal to remove the troops as soon as a United Nations police force
could be empowered to protect the sovereignty of Middle East nations was
vetoed by the Soviet Union and the issue was referred to the General
Assembly. On August 21, 1958, the General Assembly adopted a resolution
drafted by the Arab League plus Tunisia and Morocco which in its two
main clauses:
1. called on members of the Arab League to observe the pledge of
noninterference in one another's internal affairs contained in the League
Pact,
2. requested the United Nations Secretary General to uphold "the pur-
pose and principles of the United Nations Charter in relation to Lebanon
and Jordan . . . and thereby facilitate the early withdrawal of the foreign
troops from the two countries." (See Doc. 48.)
Despite the advantage of geographic contiguity and strong family ties
between two leaders, the Arab Federation has dwindled to an ineffectual
status. On the other hand, the United Arab Republic has apparently
surmounted the severe disadvantage of geographic separation, deriving
its strength from increasing military and economic aid from the USSR,
control of the Suez Canal, and control of the oil pipelines that run through
Syria. Problems of economic and political adjustment, however, still face
the United Arab Republic. Yemen's membership, for example, raises seri-
ous questions of political relations with this independent oligarchy.
The many difficulties facing Lebanon and Israel have been increased
now that they have become obstacles in the path of geographic union be-
tween Syria and Egypt. In Lebanon, the disruption of the delicate balance
of power through intense agitation and violence inspired by pro-UAR
elements led to an armed rebellion in May of 1958.
The revolution was led by extreme nationalists who were opposed to the
government's acceptance of United States military aid and were angered
by reports that President Chamoun would seek a constitutional amend-
ment that would allow him to run for a second term. The introduction of
United States troops in late July did not prevent the revolutionists from
continuing their activities against the government. In September of 1958,
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Chamoun surrendered the presidency to the newly elected president,
General Fouad Chebab, a man who is more popular with the nationalists
than Chamoun. Nevertheless it is unlikely that the tensions resulting from
the presence of foreign troops and continued revolutionary agitation will be
resolved without further turbulence.
King Saud of Saudi Arabia, tentatively pro-Western, but at times given
to outspoken support of President Nasser's ambitions, has encouraged
both the United Arab Republic and the Arab Federation while remaining
apart from commitment to either. By acting thus he hoped perhaps to
strengthen his own role in Middle Eastern affairs. The transfer, however,
of the principal reins of power to his half-brother, Faisal, suggested a
significant measure of support for Nasser.
Although these two unions involved a recurrence of old rivalries, it
must be remembered that both are steps toward strengthening the political
unity of the Middle East. President Nasser's ambitions do not stop with
the Middle East. His vision of an Arab union includes the troubled Arab
nations across the whole of North Africa.
Our newspapers will continue to carry news of turmoil in the Middle
Eastern states. Often these tensions do not involve Israel, or, for that
matter, the Suez Canal, but instead reflect both the political maneuver-
ings of the Cold War and the interfamilial suspicions and hatreds between
Middle East leaders themselves.
The nationalistic fervor would seem to suggest that we should cease
"meddling" in the affairs of the Middle East, but the Western World will
continue to pursue its interests in the face of this adversity. Abandoning
the Middle East might well mean abandoning it to Soviet Russia. Our
moral commitment to democracy as well as the strategic location of the
Middle East forbids us this option. And to this already volatile brew
we must add the ingredient that most uncomfortably gives flavor to the
Middle Eastern charge of foreign imperialism oil.
CHAPTER 3
The Problem of Middle Eastern Oil
Even a very cursory examination of the Middle East and its role in world
affairs since World War I shows conclusively that water and oil are not
the only incompatible elements in the area. Most recent studies of this
trouble spot indicate that Middle Eastern oil is one of the fundamental
issues at the root of the problems that prevail there. Thus, an eminent Mid-
dle East analyst, Benjamin Shwadran, in a recently published work (see
Bibliography) put the matter in strikingly clear-cut alternatives: the
Middle East "must be held by the West as a vital strategic base and as
an invaluable source of petroleum with which to oil a possible future war;
conversely, it must not be allowed to fall into the hands of the enemy."
Let us, therefore, first present the oil statistics and then proceed to an
evaluation of the political problems arising therefrom.
Two-thirds of the world's proved oil reserves are in the Middle East.
As a comparison, it may be noted that whereas America has some 31.3
billion barrels of proved oil reserves, the Middle East has no less than
144.8 billion barrels. In 1955, Britain and the Western powers used 75 per
cent of the area's total output. In 1956, up to the time of the sabotaging
of the Iraqi pipelines and the closing of the Suez Canal, Europe and North
Africa were receiving over three million barrels of oil a day from the
Middle East. This marked a sixfold expansion since 1945. Barring further
political complications, there is a bright promise for a continued high rate
of expansion. The sources of this flow are oil concessions almost entirely
in American, British, French, and Dutch hands. The total gross invest-
ment in all aspects of the oil industry in the Middle East is probably in
excess of $2.5 billion. The usual arrangements call for something like a
fifty-fifty division between the oil companies and the governments in-
volved. Suggestive of the great financial returns in this area is the fact
that net profits of the American oil companies alone in the Persian Gulf
were approximately $900 million for the year 1955. It is expected that in
1958 the oil companies and the producing states will split a profit of more
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than $2.5 billion. This marks a trebling of the 1951 figure which in itself
constituted an increase from about $115 million in 1947. The following
list shows the expected oil returns in 1958 for these countries:
Kuwait (approx.) $375 million
Saudi Arabia 300 million
Iraq 260 million
Iran 275 million
Qatar 50 million
Further indirect revenues, which when added up amount to very sub-
stantial sums (estimated as high as half of the direct payments), result
from wages paid to native labor and from other expenditures by foreign
companies and their employees. A country-by-country breakdown pre-
sents the following picture of concession arrangements:
Kuwait
This tiny sheikdom, a British protectorate, is now the largest single oil
producer in the Middle East, supplying one and one-half million barrels
a day. The concession, owned jointly by the British Oil Company and
the Gulf Oil Corporation, is contracted for until the year 2026.
Saudi Arabia
Here the concession, which runs to the years 1999-2005, is held by the
famous combine known as Aramco, the Arabian American Oil Company,
which consists of the Standard Oil Company of California, Standard Oil
Company of New Jersey, Socony Vacuum Oil Company, and the Texas
Company. Crude oil production prior to the Suez crisis ran around one
million barrels a day. This has now increased by approximately 50,000
barrels per day.
Saudi Arabia is the country most often cited by the critics of
a
oil
diplomacy" as a dramatic manifestation of all that the term implies.
They point to Aramco, for example, as being responsible for securing for
Ibn Saud some $100' million in direct and indirect lend-lease aid in the
years 1940-1947 despite the fact that his kingdom was not directly in-
volved in the Second World War.
Iraq
The concessions in Iraq, running till the year 2000, are owned almost in
their entirety, by a combined British, French, Dutch, and American
group. Approximately 750,000 barrels are produced daily.
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Of particular significance to the West was the announcement by the new
premier and revolutionary leader, Abdel Kerim el-Kassem, that he will
continue to honor the nation's lucrative oil contracts with the West.
Iran
The original concession was granted in 1909 to the Anglo-Persian Oil
Company, now known as the British Petroleum Company. Controlling
stock in the company was purchased by the British government at the
start of World War I. These were the assets which were so dramatically
nationalized by the Iranian government in 1951 (see Doc. 14). This
seizure marked the first successful attempt by any segment of the new
Arab nationalism to nationalize vast holdings of a former imperial power
in that area. It thus has served as a continual impetus for further simi-
lar action throughout the Middle East. Three years later, after lengthy
negotiations, the Iranian government came to terms with a "consortium"
of companies representing private British, American, French, and Dutch
interests and provision was made for short-term (25-40 years) opera-
tion by this group of oil installations formerly held by the Anglo-Iranian
Oil Company. Iran's current oil production is reportedly 850,000 barrels
a day.
In addition to these major concessions, there is a combined production
of approximately 200,000 barrels daily in the sheikdom of Qatar, the
island of Bahrain and the so-called neutral zone between Saudi Arabia
and Kuwait.
Turning now to some of the political considerations, we can start by
presenting the unavoidable dilemma which plagues Western policy makers.
The West feels that it must have Arab good will and knows that it must
have Arabian oil, but neither can be purchased in the future by the same
means as used in the past. The wave of nationalistic outbursts which have
so characterized this area in the last decade has made it abundantly
clear that, despite the fantastic revenues accruing to the oil concessions,
the gap between Arab social and political demands and Western ability
to fulfill these demands continues to grow. To put it in the simplest terms,
the profit demand of Western oil companies and the political demands of
the Arab nationalists do not and cannot in the foreseeable future coincide.
Furthermore, the situation is one in which the Western bargaining posi-
tion must become progressively worse. The continued dependence of West-
ern European nations in general and Great Britain in particular on the
uninterrupted flow of Middle East oil has made of them nervous hostages
of Arab good will. This dependence has become symbolic of the West's
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apparent helplessness and diplomatic weakness in regard to the Middle
East. It also helps account for the French-British gamble upon a mili-
tary coup de force in 1956. Contrariwise, the same juxtaposition of cir-
cumstances has led to everincreasing aggressiveness on the part of Arab
diplomacy, thus further crystallizing the dilemma.
To complicate the matter further, we should consider the effect of the
USSR'S new role as a major participant in Middle East affairs. For some
time prior to the Western debacle at Suez, the Soviet leadership had shown
evidence of great interest in the oil situation. As elsewhere, in their ap-
proach to the Middle East they adopted an initial position of altruistic
and disinterested onlookers. They, their argument ran, had no need for
Middle East oil; they were only concerned about Western exploitation of
the Arabs. Thus, in a portion of his speech at the momentous Twentieth
Party Congress, Anastas Mikoyan, a leading figure in the new Soviet
hierarchy, had the following to say: "In the Middle East in 1955, the
United States and British monopolies took out 150 million tons of oil at
a cost of $240 million. This is fabulously cheap. The net profit they made
on this oil amounted to $1.9 billion one year's return covered the entire
capital investment in that area .... If all the income earned from oil were
to remain with its legitimate owners, the Arab and other peoples of the
Middle East, how speedily might not these peoples abolish poverty and go
forward with their economic and cultural development, which has been
retarded for years by the ruthless exploitation of the foreign capitalists."
The point here is not the inaccuracy of Mr. Mikoyan's figures, though
we have already noted above that there is at least an element of truth in
them. What is of greater immediate consequence is the fact that this theme
of imperialist exploitation was constant in the Soviet propaganda bom-
bardment of the Middle East for at least six months preceding the war in
Suez. Excerpts from only one of many Egyptian radio broadcasts echoing
the theme give ample evidence of the degree of skillful influence exercised
by the men in the Kremlin. The Cairo radio on March 6, 1956, announced:
The Arab rulers granted the exploiting imperialist companies a host of rights
and concessions at the expense of the people struggling against them. The
Arabs allow the crude oil to go to the countries of their enemies and coloni-
zers. We do not want United States dollars, British pounds, French francs, or
Dutch guilders . . Oh Arabs, our oil is plundered by aliens, it is seized by
your enemies Remember oil it is our last wealth ! Oil is for the Arabs !
An ever present element of the Soviet "line" is the implied promise (some-
times made explicit) that should the West make difficulties, the USSR is
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ready to move in from the sidelines and provide all the aid necessary
including the purchase of Arab oil.
It is this combination of factors which leads so many "realistic" com-
mentators to dismiss as childish naivete the criticism of those who refer
to any diplomacy in the Middle East as "simply" oil diplomacy. Such
observers particularly abhor the attachment of the value-judgment "evil,"
for their contention is, obviously, that all things considered the West,
particularly Western Europe, has no alternative but to deal for Arab oil
on whatever terms it can.
One more factor must be considered. Since the Iranian nationalization,
it has become an inescapable conclusion that Arab nationalism, whatever
its particular form, has marked off the heretofore privileged position of the
Western oil companies as a primary target for elimination. The limited
success of the Iranians, and later the Egyptians (albeit with the aid of
foreigners), in handling the intricacies of a technical operation long con-
sidered beyond their ability has further encouraged the extremists in all
of these countries. As a result of this heightened impatience, the emergent
Soviet-Arab alliance becomes even more significant.
CHAPTER 4
The Soviets Enter the Middle East
The machinations of Soviet diplomacy in the Middle East make it abun-
dantly clear that the Russians have serious intent in terms of permanent
policy-making in that area. However, to get a truer picture of Soviet am-
bitions one must place USSR involvement within the context of a much
broader Soviet and Russian foreign policy.
The entire history of Czarist Russia is marked by consistent efforts to
find a warm-water port, particularly on the Mediterranean. The penetra-
tion of the Middle East also has stood high on the list of Soviet priorities.
Only since the Geneva Conference of 1955 and, more particularly, since the
Czechoslovakian-Egyptian arms deal have these ambitions been realized.
As long ago as 1940 the Russians entered into secret protocol agreements
with the Axis powers which stated that "The Soviet Union declares that
its territorial aspirations center south of the national territory of the Soviet
Union in the direction of the Indian Ocean." This in itself is but the
continuation of a yet older Soviet theme in the Middle East. As far back
as the First Congress of Peoples of the East some thirty-seven years ago,
the Russians had already enunciated their strident theme of anticolonial-
ism. Whereas the implementation of a policy in keeping with this approach
remained relatively dormant, its eventual emergence in the form of a new
Soviet imperialism has always been imminent.
The degree to which the Russians have successfully entered into an area
which in the past seemed closed to them can be traced to major psycho-
logical as well as political and economic reasons. To the peoples of the
Middle East, as in Asia generally, the Russians have appeared as com-
paratively disinterested and unselfish benefactors. In their manifold re-
lationships with the new sovereign states of Asia the Russians have gone to
great pains to indicate their desire simply to help these new peoples estab-
lish political freedom and economic viability. Time and again Russian
headway was made by offering Asian nations what they desired; no direct
gifts were proffered but so-called business deals almost amounted to phi-
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lanthropies. Because in tendering aid and trade they have been oblivious
to the rules of economics but fully aware of the rules of politics, each deal
has created much good will at relatively low cost. Perhaps the most vital
consideration in Soviet success has been the very absence of Russian power
in the Middle East for so long a period of time. As a result, the Russians
entered the arena untainted by the epithet "colonial imperialists." While
the Western powers have a long history of intervention in the affairs of Arab
and Asian nations and have thus built up a tremendous reservoir of ill feel-
ing, the Soviets by comparison often appear to native nationalists as inno-
cent and as disinterested as they claim to be. There has been also, unfortu-
nately, an American record of offers of aid with political or military
strings attached, which tended to confirm pre-existing nationalist suspi-
cions of the United States as nothing better than a replacement for the
recently ousted Western European "imperialists." The combination of
these factors with those described above pertaining to the rise of Arab
nationalism led to the emergence of a common goal for the Soviets and
Arab nationalists in the Middle East. A simple definition of this goal
would be the elimination of Western power in the Middle East and Africa.
Soviet aims can perhaps be better understood by briefly analyzing the
series of steps employed to realize them. The first aim may be seen in the
formulation of a policy which the Soviets hope will lead to the breakup of
Western concessions in the oil fields (see pages 29-30).
The second can be stated in negative terms as the prevention of the
establishment of a combined Middle Eastern-Western collaborative de-
fense organization. By the end of 1955 this goal was achieved for all prac-
tical purposes, as we have seen. Until the recent revolt which deposed the
pro-Western government, only Iraq, among the Arab countries, retained
any major ties with the Western powers.
The third goal can be described as the eventual dismantling of Western
military bases in the Middle East. This aim likewise seems well on the
way toward realization.
The Arab attitude in regard to the fulfillment of these aims was perhaps
best stated by Moscow's strongest ally in the Arab World, President
Nasser of Egypt. At the conclusion of his work, The Philosophy of the
Revolution, which is in effect a prospectus for the future, he has this
to say:
When my mind travels to the eighty million Moslems in Indonesia, the
fifty million in China and the several other million in Malaya, Siam, and
Burma and the hundred million in Pakistan, the hundred million or more in
the Middle East and the forty million in Russia, as well as the other millions
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in the distant parts of the world, when I visualize these millions united in one
faith, I have a great consciousness of the tremendous potentialities that co-
operation amongst them all can achieve
1
a cooperation that does not deprive
them of their loyalty to their countries but which guarantees for them and
their brethren a limitless power.
I now revert to the wandering role that seeks an actor to perform it. Such
is the role, such are its features and such is its stage
We and only we are impelled by our environment and are capable of
performing this role [Italics ours.]
It is doubtful that the Soviet Union is much concerned with either the
national or international aspirations voiced in the above declaration. What
is much more probable is that the Russians are very much interested in
maintaining a constant "crisis" situation in the Middle East which would
serve to embarrass and eventually dislodge Western influence. To the
degree that Egypt, Syria, or others serve this purpose for Soviet foreign
policy, the present Russian leadership can be expected to remain compara-
tively unconcerned with either the manifestoes of would-be Arabic Cae-
sars, or for that matter with any of their local intrigues. The Egyptians
seem to be aware of the Soviet attitude and quite willing to play the Soviet
game so long as their own ambitions are realized at the same time. Thus
we have Colonel Nasser explaining to New York Times correspondent
Osgood Caruthers (April 1, 1956): "The Russians are very clever. They
know what I want to say and they please me by saying what I want to
say." Both the Russians and the Egyptians have also apparently learned
that, in an era when any "minor war" might erupt into an atomic holo-
caust, prudential bluffing becomes a workable foreign policy. What the
Russians hope to achieve is perhaps best stated by U.S. News and World
Report (March 16, 1956):
If Russia succeeds in provoking an Arab-Israel war, a big area of strategic
importance to the West is thrown into chaos. Western defense systems are
broken or imperiled . . . Even if war is averted, Russia still stands to gain
the regard of Arab countries as the only big power that gave them military
aid .... Armies equipped with Soviet weapons become dependent on Soviet
repairs, spare parts and ammunition. Russia thus sees a chance to infiltrate
some of the very armies on which the West is relying for military support in
event of war with Russia.
A specific example of how Russian and Arab nationalist demands often
coincide can be seen in the demand for the nationalization of Middle
Eastern oil fields, Egypt and Syria, neither one a major oil producer, were,
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prior to their union, the most pro-Soviet of the Arab nations. Thus, even
such acts as closing the Suez and cutting Syrian oil pipelines need not
necessarily prove to be disastrous for the Western powers, since more than
. 80 per cent of Middle Eastern oil could be carried in tankers around the
Cape of Good Hope. The Russians, therefore, have openly supported Arab
demands for nationalization of the oil fields which would cut off the oil at
its source. Needless to say the Soviet political support both in the United
Nations and elsewhere of Egypt, Syria, and others in their attempts to
eliminate Western might from the Middle East is another manifestation
of this alliance (see Docs. 24, 41).
Against this background let us now examine the specific means by which
the Soviets have entered the Middle Eastern scene. Their approach has
been made on separate political, cultural, and economic levels. On each
of these levels a relationship of friendly reciprocity has been established
between the USSR, or its satellite nations, and members of the Arab bloc.
For example, in terms of economic aid the following have either taken
place or been promised :
1. installation of Egypt's first nuclear laboratory by the Russians;
2. construction of a new railroad in Saudi Arabia and steel plants in
Egypt by the Poles;
3. purchase of Egyptian cotton by Russia, China, and Czechoslovakia
(it was, in fact, the bulk purchase by Czechoslovakia of surplus Egyptian
cotton which made possible the famous arms deal of 1955, see Doc. 17);
4. construction of oil refineries in Syria by the Czechs;
5. building of bridges across the Nile by the Hungarians;
6. construction work in Alexandria's harbor by the Bulgarians;
7. drilling for water in the Sudan by East Germans.
On the political level the Russians have either established or renewed
relations with Yemen, Sudan, and Libya. In addition, there has been a
general strengthening of the Russian diplomatic corps throughout the en-
tire Middle East, with the moves of the Soviets being supplemented by
the action of their satellites. Added to the growing number of Soviet dip-
lomats is the veritable army of advisers and technicians on military and
economic, as well as political matters. There has also been many a rumor
concerning the presence of Soviet military missions, particularly
in Egypt
and Syria. More than one commentator has attributed the Anglo-French-
Israeli attack upon Egypt in part at least to the fear of what the Soviet
military technicians might achieve with the Arab armies.
A further ex-
ample of the great significance with which Soviet leaders now regard
this
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area is the public apology made by V M. Molotov to the Twentieth Party
Congress for not having paid propei attention in the past to the Middle
East.
Recognizing the great susceptibility of the Arab leaders and people to
public flattery, the Russians have given particular attention to the tech-
nique often referred to as "cultural exchange." Thus, at any time since
the middle of 1955, the natives of Cairo and Damascus, in particular, but
of other Arab lands as well, have had the opportunity of viewing ballets,
soccer teams, movies, and cyclists on tour from Russia and the satellite
nations. As a special treat one might even have attended the performances
of the Peiping Opera Group. In addition, exhibitions and fairs were con-
stantly being opened to the Arab public. There began, too, to appear an
inordinately large number of new periodicals representing the ideology of
the Soviet-Arab bloc. News reports emanating from Moscow radio and
the Tass News Agency became regular features in Egypt and Syria. That
the Soviets overlooked nothing in theii attempt to win over mass Arab
support can be seen in their wide use in all of their delegations of repre-
sentatives of Moslem origin It should be added, too, that in all of these
undertakings the Soviets have readily availed themselves of the machinery
of the Arab League. This in itself served to endear them to a vital element
of the Arab leadership.
Much has been made here and in the public press of the Soviet inroads
into Egypt. On pages 57-58 we will discuss further the 1955 arms deal.
There are, however, some mitigating factors which should be considered.
There is now some evidence of the existence within Egypt of groups
which are fearful of the additional strain on Egypt's economy involved in
military adventurism. There is also the possibility of restraint being ex-
ercised by those who have become an established bureaucracy in the new
Egypt and see in Nasser's ambitions a threat to their own security.
Above all, there is the historical record that when faced with a deter-
mined adversary (as, for example, Adenauer's inflexible policy of contin-
uing war reparations to Israel, or Sudan's stubborn stand against merger
with Egypt), Nasser has shown himself both reasonable and flexible.
The other great area of Soviet concentration had been Syria. The de-
velopment there of the largest Communist Party in the Middle East can
be attributed to its background of political immaturity combined with
social and institutional instability. When one adds to this the additional
combination of a restless and impoverished peasantry, a similarly discon-
tented urban proletariat plus support of the majority of the Army's high
command, it is little wonder that the extravagant appeal of the Commu-
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nists found ready receptivity. One of the remaining paradoxes attendant
upon the recent emergence of the United Arab Republic has been the
relative eclipse of the Syrian Communist Party despite the general cement-
ing of ties between President Nasser and the USSR (see page 24).
As one might expect, Soviet friendship with the Arab bloc has led to
a corresponding attack on Israel. In the Soviet press and radio Israel is
constantly attacked as an ''aggressor," a tool of the "Western Imperialist
Powers." The Arabs on the other hand are constantly portrayed as "peace-
loving people" whose sole desire is to rid themselves of the domination of
their former colonial masters. Only one familiar with communist jargon
is aware of the extent of the Soviet attack, which in the Twentieth Party
Congress singled out Israel alone among the nations of the world as being
guilty of "fascization."
Against this background of political intrigue and raging nationalism,
let us now proceed to a closer survey of the role in the Middle East played
by the old-new nation of Israel.
CHAPTER 5
From Palestine to Israel
It is almost impossible to set forth a specific set of events or a given era
of historical time as the exact point of origin of a reborn Jewish national-
ism. But perhaps the most striking conclusion to be reached from any
survey of Jewish history is the prevalence of strong nationalistic feeling
among the Jewish masses ever since their dispersion from Palestine in A.D.
70. It was in recognition of this unbroken attachment to an ancestral land
that the British government referred to Jewish nationalism as "the oldest
nationalist movement in history." *
The idea of a return to Palestine was ever a dominant theme of Jewish
life in the diaspora, which term applied to any Jewish community living
in exile from Palestine. The whole history of the Jew lies in a demand for
political restoration. This helps explain why most Jewish leadership as
well as the Jewish masses have persistently rejected schemes such as the
British Uganda Plan in 1903 which aimed at resettlement of persecuted
Jews in a land other than Palestine. The idea found expression in the past
in both successful and abortive attempts to colonize Palestine. It constantly
emerged in the form of prayer and poetry and general religious practice.
The method whereby the Jews succeeded in maintaining their identity
as a unit throughout the long centuries of their dispersion was a reversal
of the usual procedure of making religion a part of national life, for the
Jews transformed all the elements of nationalism into religious practice.
Thus, by surrounding their nationalism with a halo of sacredness, they
succeeded in warding off all attempts to assimilate them culturally or ob-
literate them physically. It is on this tenacious, unwavering concentration
that the nonlegal Jewish claim was based and not alone on the mere ex-
istence of a Jewish state in antiquity. It should be added, however, that
as early as 1891 a host of experts in international law contended that since
* Peace Handbook No. 162 on Zionism, London, 1920.
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the Jews never gave up their title to Palestine the "law of dereliction" did
not hold in their case.*
Toward the end of the nineteenth century groups of Jews were attempt-
ing to extricate Jewish nationalism from the confines of its religious bonds
and set it up as an end in itself. Among the groups were a few Hebraists
who were themselves the product of a Hebrew cultural renaissance. These
men differed from their medieval predecessors in that they undertook the
task of establishing a Jewish national movement independent of religion.
They secularized and expanded the Hebrew language. They undertook
vast research into Jewish history. They glorified Palestine in song, drama,
and novel and spoke of it in terms of geography and history rather than
religion. In essence, these men were attempting to reverse the medieval
trend of Jewish nationalism, which had emphasized the protective bond of
religion, and to re-establish a completely independent and secular Jewish
nationalism. The one thing both these forms of nationalism had in common
was Palestine as the symbol of their vision.
Another major cause of the rebirth of a vital Jewish nationalism was
the outbreak of violent anti-Semitism. The wave of anti-Semitic outbursts
in Russia in the 1880's, accompanied by further government restrictions
upon the Jews, served as a great catalytic agent in popularizing national-
istic ideas. The pogroms crushed all hopes of free Jewish survival even
in an enlightened Russia, and spurred the efforts toward the colonization
of Palestine. Furthermore, the growing discrimination against the Jews of
Eastern Europe for economic reasons, coming as it did on top of a seem-
ingly endless struggle with the Christian church and a generally hostile
Gentile community, convinced many others of the inevitability of choos-
ing Zionism as the only remaining path to freedom, social justice, and
security.
Colonization of Palestine as the only solution of the Jewish question was
advocated quite often in the late eighteenth and throughout the nineteenth
centuries by many statesmen and writers, Jew and Gentile. It culminated
in the foundation in 1884 in Russia of a society known as Hovevei Zion
(Lovers of Zion), whose avowed purpose was to promote Jewish resettle-
ment in Palestine upon a more extensive scale than the isolated new
settlements that had already been founded in the two preceding decades.
It should be noted here that at no time did the Jewish returnees ever
forcefully oust Arabs from their land. The Jewish aim was the restoration
of a people in its homeland, and not the establishment of an alien rule
*
See, particularly, Dr. William E. Blackstone, "May the United States Intercede
for the Jews?" Our Day, October, 1891.
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over the population and resources of the country. Thus all the land cul-
tivated in both the early and later days of the Zionist movement was
purchased from the Arabs either by leading Jewish philanthropists or by
a fund set up for that purpose, the Jewish National Fund.
Yet only with the advent in 1896 of Theodore Herzl, an Austrian play-
wright and man of letters, was the Jewish national sentiment propounded
as an idea whose expression should not limit itself to the creation of scat-
tered colonies in the Holy Land, but should expand into an organized
endeavor of the Jewish people to work for its national regeneration.
Herzl published his first ideas on the reorganization of the Jews in a
pamphlet, Judenstat (the Jewish State), in which he advocated the crea-
tion of an autonomous Jewish settlement as the solution to the Jewish
question. Despite relentless and powerful opposition, Herzl succeeded in
bringing together the First Zionist Congress for the purpose of considering
his project. It convened at Basel, Switzerland on August 27, 1897, and
was attended by delegates from all parts of the world. After much dis-
cussion the Congress adopted as the aim of Zionism: "The creation for
Jewish people of a publicly and legally assured home in Palestine." To
realize this aim, the Zionist Congress proposed the following measures:
1. to promote through effective means the settlement of Palestine by
Jewish agricultural and industrial workers ;
2. to organize the whole Jewish people by means of local and inter-
national institutions suitable for the purpose and conforming with the
laws of the countries in which Jews live;
3. to strengthen Jewish national sentiment and consciousness;
4. to take proper steps toward securing the concurrence of the Powers,
insofar as their assent might be necessary, for the achievement of the
Zionist goal.
Thus Zionism, for the first time in modern history, strode onto the
arena of world politics and international diplomacy. Virtually everything
that was to unfold in the Zionist movement of later years was already
discernible in this first Congress in Basel.
Herzl died in 1904, heartbroken and penniless, without having achieved
his purpose. But others took up the cause and the task of colonizing Pal-
estine went on in almost uninterrupted fashion, so that, at the termination
of World War I, the Jewish community there numbered some 80,000 in
a total population of about 850,000. Over fifty agricultural colonies, with
a total of over 100,000 acres, were firmly established as were the beginnings
of the Israeli metropolis of the future, Tel Aviv.
The outbreak of World War I brought colonization to a comparative
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standstill, but the course of the war led to the issuance, on November 2,
1917, of the Balfour Declaration, a letter from Lord Balfour to Lord
Rothschild supporting the establishment of a Jewish national home in Pal-
estine. The Declaration was hailed by the Zionists of the day as a Magna
Carta of future Jewish rights in Palestine (see Doc. 4).
In retrospect, it seems that the promulgation of the Declaration was
prompted by at least four major considerations. Firstly, there was a long
history of British concern over the fate of European Jewry. For a period
of 50 to 75 years prior to World War I there had arisen in England a
Christian-sponsored movement favoring the return of the Jews to the Holy
Land as the only solution to their chronic woes on the Continent. Sec-
ondly, there was the serious military problem posed by the Turkish threat
to Suez. A protective bastion had to be erected on the Palestinian coast
to help keep open the lifeline to India. Thirdly, the Declaration would
draw the enthusiastic support of the masses of Jews in Eastern Europe
a sector facing total capitulation to the German war machine. It would
also gain the very important backing of leading American Zionists.
In fact, in his appearance before the Palestine Royal Commission of
1936, Lloyd George testified that the launching of the Declaration at that
specific moment was due to "propagandist reasons." He remarked further
that "the Zionist leaders gave us a definite promise that if the Allies com-
mitted themselves to giving facilities for the establishment of a national
home for the Jews in Palestine, they would do their best to rally Jewish
sentiment and support throughout the world to the Allied cause. They
kept their word."
It must be remembered that at the time of the Balfour Declaration there
were over 600,000 Jews in the ready-to-collapse Russian army. These men
were fighting for a government they hated and whose success in the
war they did not anticipate with relish. That the Germans were aware of
this is evident in the daily proclamations they dropped over the Russian
lines promising that a German victory would bring them true liberty. The
following serves as an example :
TO THE JEWS OF POLAND:
The heroic armies of the great mid-European governments, Germany and
Austria-Hungary, have entered Poland . . . Our flags bring you rights and
freedom; equal citizenship rights, freedom of belief, freedom to work undis-
turbed in ail branches of economic and cultural life in your own spirit ....
Remember Kishinev, Homel, Bialistok and many hundreds of other pogroms!
.
. You . . . must rise as one man to aid in the holy cause . . APPLY
WITH THE GREATEST CONFIDENCE TO THE COMMANDANTS
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OF OUR MILITARY IN THE PLACES THAT ARE NEAREST TO
YOU. HELP BRING THE VICTORY OF FREEDOM AND JUSTICE.*
After the Balfour Declaration was finally issued the German and Turkish
governments issued a similar promise which, if anything, was more in line
with Zionist aspirations than was the British declaration. But by then the
propaganda victory had been snatched from their hands.
A fourth motivating factor behind the release of the Declaration at
this time was the British fear of postwar French domination of the entire
Mediterranean littoral. The French, through M. Georges Picot, had al-
ready insisted that any postwar settlement should place the whole of Syria
down to the Egyptian frontier under their control. The British looked
upon a Jewish home in Palestine, under their mandate, of course, as an
almost heaven-sent means of thwarting the French pretensions. What
made the entire scheme even more appealing was the fact that this new
fortress on the imperial lifeline would be self-supporting in the sense that
it would be built as a Jewish undertaking supported by Jewish financing.
Negotiations were undertaken with Jewish leaders headed by Dr. Chaim
Weizmann, the emerging leader of the Zionist forces and destined to be-
come the first president of the state of Israel. From the middle of 1916
on, these discussions were carried on in great earnestness and with obvious
progress. It should be added for the record that President Woodrow Wil-
son, an acknowledged champion of the Zionist movement, was constantly
consulted and the drafts of the proposed Declaration were submitted to
him for approval. That the Arabs, too, were duly informed of the Balfour
Declaration is made clear by Lloyd George in his book, The Truth about
the Peace Treaties. In it he states:
Through Sir Mark Sykes and Colonel Lawrence we informed the Arab
leaders, King Hussein and his son, Faisal, of our proposals (regarding the
Balfour Declaration). We could not get in touch with the Palestine Arabs
as they were fighting against us
The Arab leaders did not offer any objections to the Declaration so long
as the rights of the Arabs of Palestine were respected Pledges were given
to the non-Jewish population of Palestine who constituted the great majority
of its inhabitants, as well as to the Jews These were the results of conver-
sations which we had with such Arab leaders as we could get in touch with.
There was a two-fold understanding given to them, that the establishment of
a Jewish National Home would not in any way, firstly, affect the civil or
religious rights of the general population of Palestine; secondly, would not
diminish the general prosperity of that population. Those were the only
pledges we gave to the Arabs
"William B. Ziff, The Rape of Palestine, New York, 1938, pp. 530-531.
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A great number of debates were to occur in later years regarding the "true
meaning" of the Balfour Declaration, but at the time the Declaration was
unqualifiedly endorsed by the Allied powers. Statements of approval came
from as far away as China and even the French formally committed them-
selves "to the renaissance of Jewish Nationality." President Wilson echoed
the prevailing sentiment in America when he declared: "The Allied na-
tions, with the fullest concurrence of our own government and people,
are agreed that in Palestine shall be laid the foundations of a Jewish
Commonwealth." (See Doc. 5 for President Wilson's recommendations on
Palestine.) The original favorable attitude of the Arab leaders can best
be determined from a joint agreement signed by Dr. Weizmann and Emir
Faisal in Paris in 1919 (see Doc. 6).
Later Arab claims that Palestine had been promised to them and not
the Jews were based largely on the exchange of letters and negotiations
between King Hussein and Sir Henry McMahon, British High Commis-
sioner in Egypt (see Doc. 3). In answer to these claims, Sir Henry him-
self had this to say in a letter to the London Times on July 23, 1947:
"I feel it my duty to state, and I do so definitely and emphatically that
it was not intended by me in giving this pledge to King Hussein to include
Palestine in the area in which Arab independence was promised. I had also
every reason to believe at the time that the fact that Palestine was not
included in my pledge was well understood by King Hussein." It is no
wonder then that in February, 1919, the Zionist Organization submitted
a special request to the Allied Supreme Council that, in keeping with the
principle that the popular wish of the people involved be honored, the
mandate for Palestine be granted to Great Britain. Their wish was granted
at San Remo on April 25, 1920. It took another two years, however,
before the Mandate, in its final form, was submitted to the League of
Nations (see Doc. 7). The delay was occasioned by intervention on the
part of the American government which had evinced a great interest in
the entire undertaking. The end result of this interest was a "Convention
between the United Kingdom and the United States of America" signed
on December 3, 1924, which forbade any modification in the terms of the
Mandate without American consent. If this was not enough to assure the
Zionist leadership that the future held naught but promise, there was in
the preamble to the Mandate the specific commitment to translate the
Balfour Declaration into practice (see Doc. 7). Thus, when on September
29, 1923, the Palestine Mandate formally came into force the vast major-
ity of those who were interested in the Zionist venture were convinced of
its promise of fulfillment. What followed instead was a generation of frus-
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tration and bitter disappointment culminating in the British White Paper
of 1939 (see Doc. 8). This document completed a cycle for, in effect, it
put the British government in the position of denying an independent
Jewish state in Palestine. In these days of bitter Arab-Jewish warfare in
the Middle East one is prone to forget that by 1939 Britain and not the
Arabs had assumed the role of "villainous enemy" as far as the Zionists
were concerned
Volumes have been written regarding the record of British rejection of
all that was implied in the earlier promises. What lies behind this change
in British attitude? There was, first of all, the complete rejection of the
ideas made explicit in the Mandate by both the British military in Pales-
tine and, more important, by the British Colonial Office. The latter in par-
ticular was convinced that affairs in Palestine should be conducted in the
same tradition of imperial rule which characterized the British dominion
over India and the rest of the Empire. Since the promise of an independent
Jewish state in Palestine stood squarely in the path of such a policy they
did all that was in their power to subvert the Zionist goal. In addition, it
must be added that even then the British Foreign Office already dreamed
of a network of semifeudal Arab states under British hegemony.* Only
a successfully independent Jewish state loomed as a threat to this
undertaking.
What must be said is that despite every obstacle placed in its way,
despite the gradual truncation of Palestine from an area of 45,000 square
miles in 1920-1922 to an area of 10,000 square miles in 1922-1948, des-
pite the British restrictions on immigration and economic development,
despite the barrage of anti-Zionist White Papers, the Zionist experiment
grew ever more successful. Wave after wave of immigrants, legal and il-
legal, developed oases from desert lands. A new communal form, the
Kibbutz, combined Anglo-American political democracy and socialist eco-
nomics with great success. Self-governing bodies within the framework
of the Mandate received the vital experience necessary to the public ad-
ministration of a modern society. The political parties were as mature
and literate as any in the Western World.
The most notable Zionist achievement in this period of trial and stress
was the psychological and political transformation of the Jews. The great
mass of Jews who migrated to Palestine by 1939 the figure had reached
500,000 seemed to thrive in the face of the many challenges placed in their
path. Gone now was the abject creature of the medieval era whose main hope
*For detailed documentation see. William B Ziff, Paul L. Hanna, and Pierre Van
Paassen in Bibliography.
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for salvation lay in messianic redemption. Gone, too, was the rootless mass,
universally cut off from the soil and normal economic productivity. In its
place had emerged a thriving, spirited, and determined people bidding for
recognition as equals in the family of nations. It was this rejuvenated
Jewish community also which gave the Allies their most reliable locally-
derived Middle East fighting contingent during World War II.
The years immediately after the war, 1945-1947, were marked by
unprecedented violence in Palestine and continued diplomatic bickering
over the question of Palestine's future. The Jewish position could be para-
phrased thus: 'There is but one refuge for the Jews who survived the
terrors of Hitlerism Palestine. Therefore, the restrictions on immigration
must be lifted and we must be allowed to progress along the road to in-
dependence. If the British government returns to its promises in the Man-
date we shall not press for immediate statehood. If, however, the British
remain adamant in their refusal to allow our natural flowering we shall
have to establish a Jewish state independent of their wishes."
The Arab reaction to the stated aims of the Zionists can best be gauged
from the remarks made by Azzam Pasha, Secretary of the League of Arab
States, early in 1946 before an Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry:
Our brother has gone to Europe and to the West and come back something
else. He has come back with a totally different conception of things, Western
and not Eastern. That doesn't mean that we are necessarily quarreling with
anyone who comes from the West. But the Jew, our old cousin, coming back
with imperialistic ideas, with materialistic ideas, with reactionary or revolu-
tionary ideas and trying to implement them first by British pressure and then
by American pressure, and then by terrorism on his own part he is not the
old cousin and we do not extend to him a very good welcome. The Zionist,
the new Jew, wants to dominate and he pretends that he has got a particular
civilizing mission with which he returns to a backward, degenerate race in
order to put the elements of progress into an area which wants no progress.
Well, that has been the pretension of every power that wanted to colonize and
aimed at domination The excuse has always been that the people are back-
ward and that he has got a human mission to put them forward The Arabs
simply stand and say NO We are not reactionary and we are not backward.
Even if we are ignorant, the difference between ignorance and knowledge is
ten years in school We are a living, vitally strong nation, we are in our renais-
sance, we are producing as many children as any nation in the world We
still have our brains. We have a heritage of civilization and of spiritual life.
We are not going to allow ourselves to be controlled either by great nations
or small nations or dispersed nations
When the Anglo-American Committee, appointed by President Truman
and British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, recommended that 100,000
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Jews be admitted into Palestine as rapidly as possible and that restrictions
on sale of land to Jews in Palestine be lifted, the government of Prime
Minister Clement Attlee disavowed the report. Hopes of conciliation
threatened to evaporate. Underground Jewish forces began an incessant
harassing of the British in Palestine which the latter proved incapable of
suppressing. Every measure taken by the British, from imprisonment of
Palestine's foremost Jewish leaders to severe military countermeasures and
the interception and sinking of boats, arriving constantly with "illegal"
Jewish refugees, failed to stem the tide of the Jewish uprising. Matters were
not at all eased by the additional announcement by the Arab Higher Com-
mittee in Palestine that as soon as the Mandate should come to an end an
Arab army would drive the Jews out of Pahstine. In February of 1947, after
several last-ditch attempts at conciliation had failed, Mr. Bevin formally
announced that his government had decided to refer the whole problem to
the United Nations.
The urgency of the situation dictated immediate action and it was not
long in coming. A special session of the General Assembly of the United
Nations was called for April 28, 1947, to discuss the Palestine situation.
At this session, the Arabs were represented within the United Nations by
the states of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. The Pales-
tinian Arabs, through the Palestine Arab Higher Committee, and the Jews,
through the Jewish Agency, pleaded their cases before the Political and
Security Committee of the General Assembly. The first bombshell in the
proceedings was thrown by the Soviet United Nations delegate, Andrei
Gromyko who astounded the Assembly by deserting the former Soviet
anti-Zionist position and declaring in favor of a binational state in Pal-
estine. Failing that, he said that the Soviet government would accept
partition as a solution to the Palestine problem. On May 15, a Special
Committee on Palestine presented its majority report favoring the polit-
ical partition of Palestine as the only feasible answer to the entire problem.
It recommended an economic union between the independent Arab and
Jewish states, including a customs union, a joint currency system, joint
economic development schemes, joint operation of ports and airports as
well as interstate railway, highway, and postal services. The committee
further recommended a United Nations trusteeship over Jerusalem and
special safeguarding of the Holy Places. It dealt with the Jewish demand
for free immigration by proposing the admission of 150,000 Jews during
the first two years of transition and an additional 60'?000 per year should
the transition period go beyond two years. A minority report submitted by
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India, Iran, and Yugoslavia recommended a federal state in Palestine akin
to binationalism with severely restricted Jewish immigration.
Speaking for the United States, Secretary of State George Marshall
approved the majority plan. The Russian government did likewise. The
British government rejected both plans. Jewish reaction to the plan was
stated by Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver, spokesman for the Jewish Agency:
If heavy sacrifice is the inescapable condition of a final solution, if it makes
possible the immediate reestablishment of the Jewish State, that ideal for
which a people has ceaselessly striven, then the Jewish Agency is prepared to
recommend the acceptance of the partition solution. That sacrifice would be
the Jewish contribution to the solution of a painful problem and would bear
witness to the Jewish people's spirit of international cooperation and its desire
for peace.
The following comments typify Arab reaction to the plan.
Mr. Mahmoud Fawzi, the Egyptian representative at the United
Nations :
We do not choose to comply with the General Assembly's resolutions on Pal-
estine. The Charter and the United Nations will not fall apart if one more of
the General Assembly's resolutions is not put into effect.
Mr. Adil Arslan of Syria:
My country will never recognize such a decision
Dr. Fadhil Jamali, Foreign Minister of Iraq:
Iraq does not recognize the validity of this decision and will reserve freedom
of action towards its implementation.
The Partition Plan was introduced at the plenary session of the General
Assembly on November 26, 1947, and adopted three days later (see Doc.
10). However, a major flaw in the resolution the absence of provision
for implementing the Partition Plan led rapidly to an even greater de-
terioration of the situation. Shortly after the General Assembly session,
Great Britain announced that it would terminate the Mandate over Pal-
estine on May 15, 1948. It also insisted that until that date it alone would
be responsible for maintaining order in Palestine and would not tolerate
United Nations interference in the administration of that land. The Arab
League, too, made no secret of its opposition to the implementation of the
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Partition Plan. The Arab states and the British government both announ-
ced that British arms would continue to be sent to the Middle East in
fulfillment of "contractual obligations."
Meanwhile, various elements in the American State Department began
to favor a reversal of the American position in Palestine, arguing that
United States support of the Jewish state in Palestine would provide an
opening wedge for the Soviet Union in the Middle East, and that Arab
rulers might cancel American oil concessions as a retributive measure. The
growing strength of this viewpoint was reflected in a series of speeches
made before the Security Council by the American United Nations dele-
gate, Warren R. Austin. On March 19, 1948, Ambassador Austin made
explicit the reversal of the American position in the following proposals
submitted to the United Nations:
1. The plan proposed by the General Assembly is an integral plan which
cannot succeed unless each of its parts can be carried out There seems to be
general agreement that the plan cannot now be implemented by peaceful
means
2. We believe that further steps must be taken immediately not only to
maintain the peace but also to afford a further opportunity to reach an
agreement between the interested parties regarding the future government of
Palestine To this end we believe that a temporary trusteeship for Palestine
should be established under the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations
Such a United Nations trusteeship would be without prejudice to the rights,
claims, or position of the parties concerned or to the character of the eventual
political settlement, which we hope can be achieved without long delay In
our opinion, the Security Council should recommend the establishment of such
a trusteeship to the General Assembly and to the mandatory pouer This
would require an immediate special session of the General Assembly, which
the Security Council should request the Secretary General to convoke under
Article 20 of the Charter.
3 Pending the meeting of the proposed special session of the General
Assembly, we believe that the Security Council should instruct the Palestine
Commission to suspend its efforts to implement the proposed partition plan.
In America, Mr. Austin's statement elicited an extraordinarily vocal nega-
tive public opinion. In the United Nations Mr. Gromyko blamed the
United States for the breakdown in the attempts to solve the Palestine
problem. England readily announced its support of the American stand.
In Palestine, organized anti-British military and terroristic measures were
renewed on a large scale. Conditions became such that Trygvie Lie, Uni-
ted Nations Secretary General, was obliged to call into being another
special General Assembly session on Palestine. The Assembly convened
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on April 16, 1948. The American delegation to the special session sub-
mitted a series of proposals recommending a temporary trusteeship over
Palestine, pending Arab-Jewish agreement on a future government; a
restriction upon Jewish immigration and land purchase (pending such
agreement) ; and election of a legislature (which would necessarily have
an Arab majority). The Soviet Union countered by demanding, as under
the United Nations Charter it had the right to do, a seat on any trusteeship
over Palestine.
So matters stood on the afternoon of Monday, May 14, 1948. At 5:00
P.M. that day the final plenary session of the special session was scheduled
to convene. At exactly 4:06 P.M. the state of Israel declared its inde-
pendence.
The Arab World reacted swiftly. On May 15, the regular armies of
Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon invaded Israel. Their purpose as
stated by Azzam Pasha, Secretary General of the Arab League, was clear:
"There will be a war of extermination and a momentous massacre which
will be spoken of like the Mongolian massacres and the Crusades." One
week after the beginning of hostilities, the Security Council issued the first
of several cease-fire orders which were accepted by Israel and rejected by
the Arabs. The weeks and months that followed were marked by the
establishment and abandonment of several truces. They were also marked
by a series of surprisingly conclusive Israeli military successes. After eight
months of heavy fighting the military phase of the war came to an end
with the crushing defeat of the Egyptian armies which had invaded southern
Israel.
During the months of February, March, April, and July, armistice agree-
ments were reached between Israel and her Arab neighbors. (See Doc. 11.
for Egyptian-Israel armistice agreement.) To date, no further progress
has been made toward permanent treaties of peace. By October of the
same year it had become apparent that the Arab nations were already
arming for a "second round." Thus Mohammed Saleh El-din Bey, a leading
Egyptian statesman and former foreign minister, declared, "The Arabs
intend to annihilate the state of Israel." This cry for revenge remained
consistent in the Arab countries.
April 14, 1950, Akram Hourani, the Defense Minister of Syria,
declared:
The Syrian army is ready to take revenge for the shame of the defeat in
Palestine. We call on Arab countries to unite towards the national war, the
battle of revenge.
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June 17, 1951, Azzam Pasha, Secretary General of the Arab League,
announced:
The United Nations will not solve the Palestine problem but only the Arabs
themselves can do it They are now getting ready and preparing to take back
Palestine . , the day is not far
April 24, 1952, Paris El Khouri, chief Syrian delegate to the United
Nations, stated:
The only way open to the Arabs to achieve a solution of the Palestine problem
is the way of force
January 9, 1953, King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia declared:
Israel to the Arab World is like a cancer to the human body and the only
remedy is to uproot it just like a cancer.
May 8, 1954, Colonel Nasser had this to say:
Israel is an artificial state which must disappear.
And on October 14, 1955, Colonel Nasser added:
There is no sense in talking about peace with Israel. There isn't even the
smallest place for negotiations between the Arabs and Israel
April 11, 1956, the Egyptian government-controlled newspaper Al Gom-
houria remarked:
The only reasonable proposal which Mr Hammarskjold can make is the ob-
literation of Israel from the face of the earth.
These expressions of Arab intent, coupled with their categorical refusal to
translate the uneasy armistice terms into a permanent peace, were among
the major causes of unabated friction in the area. Among other factors
which exacerbated the situation were:
1. The unending series of raids and counterraids along every Arab-
Israeli borderline. The United Nations Security Council has chastised both
Israel and the Arab states on her border for constantly violating the armis-
tice agreements. The United Nation and world public opinion were partic-
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ularly disturbed over several major retaliatory raids conducted by Israel
against Egypt and Syria.
2. The dispute over boundaries. The Arabs have demanded that Israel
return to the boundary lines set by the Partition Plan of 1947. Israel has
refused to consider any major boundary revisions claiming that to do so
would dishonor those who died defending the present boundaries against
aggression.
3. The dispute over water rights. There has been particular bitterness
over harnessing the waters of the Jordan River.
4. Free passage in the Suez Canal. Nothing ever came of a Security
Council order calling upon Egypt to end its blockade of Israel by opening
the canal to Israeli shipping.
5. The status of Jerusalem.
6. The Arab refugees.
With the possible exception of the border clashes, no single issue in
the Middle East prior to the Suez War aroused as much public interest
as the problem of the Arab refugees. It is generally agreed that this is
one of the important obstacles to peaceful settlement of Arab-Israeli
differences. The problem has its origin in the mass Arab exodus from
Palestine which began shortly after the United Nations Partitions Reso-
lution was announced and which continued through the early phases of
the Arab-Israeli War of 1948-1949. The number of Arabs who left Pales-
tine has been estimated as anywhere between 550,000 and 750,000.
Today there are over 900,000 Arab refugees living in several Middle
Eastern lands under the most miserable conditions imaginable. The bulk
of them, some 500,000, are in Jordan; the remainder, with approximation
as to totals, are dispersed as follows: Lebanon, 120,000; Syria, 90,000;
Iraq, 5,000; Gaza 220,000; and a sprinkling in Yemen and Saudi Arabia.
The Arabs have insisted that Israel repatriate all those who wish to
return and compensate the others for their properties. The Arabs have
argued that Israel could settle many of these refugees in the territory it
acquired during the Palestine War beyond the original Palestine boun-
daries.
When Israel declared its independence, the new nation was established
within the boundaries set by the United Nations in its 1947 Partition
Plan. Under the terms of that proposal an area of 5,670 square miles of
the former territory of Palestine was to be set up as an independent
Jewish state. The present territory of Israel 8,048 square miles consists
of that original territory plus 2,378 square miles acquired in the war
waged against the Arab states in 1948-1949. As a result of the same war
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Jordan acquired 2,222 square miles and Egypt assumed control of the
135 square miles which comprise the Gaza Strip.
The Gaza Strip is a narrow rectangular piece of land some six miles
in width extending north of the Egyptian frontier for approximately 26
miles along the Mediterranean coast and includes the town of Gaza. Its
military importance can be gauged by the fact that it is within 35 miles
of Tel Aviv. The resident population is about 90,000. The additional
200,000 Arab refugees who have encamped within the narrow confines of
the strip are almost entirely dependent upon the United Nations Relief
and Works Administration and other international relief agencies. Though
Egyptian representatives at the United Nations often referred to the
Gaza Strip as
a
Egyptian controlled territory,
11
Egypt never actually
annexed the Gaza Strip. It was treated as occupied territory provisionally
administered by the Egyptian military authorities. Thus, in September,
1955, the Cairo Court of Administrative Jurisdiction stated that the
Gaza Strip was outside Egyptian territory and that the Egyptian author-
ities were exercising
a
a kind of control over part of the territory of
Palestine."
Israel has argued that the mass resettlement of obviously hostile Arabs
would be tantamount to inviting a "fifth column" more than half the size
of its own population. The Israelis also point out that the "refugee prob-
lem" is a two-sided affair since Israel has had to absorb, in addition to
the masses of East European Jews, some 400,000 Jewish refugees who
have been forced to emigrate in recent years from Egypt, Yemen, Syria,
Iraq, and other Arab lands. Israel, as has already been noted, is adamant
in its refusal to make any but minor boundary adjustments and consis-
tently points to the fact that Jordan, too, acquired some 2,200 square
miles of additional land as a result of the same Palestine War.
In 1948, Israel offered to accept 100,000 returning Arab refugees as
part of a general peace settlement but, in the absence of such a settle-
ment, has withdrawn the offer. The Israel government has, however,
absorbed some 30,000 illegal Arab immigrants who infiltrated across the
border, and has released most of the $12 million in frozen bank accounts
belonging to Arab refugees. The feeling nevertheless persists within the
councils of the United Nations and elsewhere that, all its arguments to
the contrary notwithstanding, Israel's attitude toward the Arab refugee
has been far too rigid.
The United Nations position can be summarized as a shift from the
view that a compromise was possible between repatriation and resettle-
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ment, to a view in which the emphasis has shifted to resettlement in the
Arab World.
Despite the numerous points of friction many people still believe that
an eventual peace settlement might have been possible were it not for the
dramatic suddenness with which Egypt emerged as a close collaborator
with if not ally of the Soviet Union. The turning point in this history
can be dated as September 27, 1955. At that time Egypt consummated
an arms deal with Czechoslovakia estimated at over $250 million, which
resulted in its assuming the role of a much more powerful leader of an
Arab military entente. It is to the details surrounding the development
of this unew Egypt" that we now turn.
CHAPTER 6
Egypt and the Suez Canal
In July of 1956, when Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal, many observ-
ers condemned this action without realizing that Egypt was doing what
would be legally acceptable for it to do twelve years later. The original
agreement, by some interpretations, might even be construed to permit
the legality of such action as early as 1956. The final agreement for
the management of the Suez Canal, however, provided that the Canal
would be turned over to Egyptian control and ownership 99 years from
the date of its completion (see Doc. 1). Since the Suez Canal began oper-
ation in 1869, under the terms of the agreement it would have been
transferred to Egypt in 1968. Justifying its action in nationalizing the
Canal twelve years early, Egypt cited reasons of national security, econ-
omic necessity, and indemnity for economic deprivations caused by the
construction and operation of the Canal. It was a bold move on the part
of Colonel Gamal Abdul Nasser, insecurely established leader of a bank-
rupt and highly nationalistic people. With one stroke he could hope to
secure the economy of his country and at the same time play upon and
heighten nationalistic fervor.
To be a pawn in the international economic and political game was
not in any sense a new role for the Suez Canal. Its very inception logi-
cally involved immense economic and political complexities. The con-
struction of the Canal was opposed by Great Britain, then maritime
leader of the world, which considered its own economic and political con-
trol to be threatened by the scheme for a short cut to the Indian Ocean.
On the other hand, the venture was fervently supported by France and
other Western European nations who saw in the Canal a resurgence of
the possibilities of power for Western Europe, since the smaller mer-
chant fleets could profit considerably from the shorter route to important
trade centers. Finally pressured into accepting an eventual accomplishment
of the Canal in spite of opposition, Great Britain did the next best thing
from the English point of view and undertook to gain control of the new
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Suez waterway. In effecting this, use was made of an old agreement with
the Ottoman Empire granting Great Britain informal control in the
southern Middle East, and another, in 1882, which permitted formal
occupation of Egypt. Much of the history of the Suez Canal and of
twentieth-century Egypt centers in Britain's political, economic, and mili-
tary maneuvers designed to seize and maintain control of this vitally
important waterway.
When Egypt became a British protectorate at the close of World War I
(see Doc. 2) Britain, with informal international approval, assumed
guardianship of the Canal a responsibility continually complicated by
increasing tension between Egypt and Great Britain over Egyptian inde-
pendence and by the increasing international importance of the Canal in
the modern world.
The culmination of the power struggle between Great Britain and Egypt
came with Egypt's nationalization of the Canal in 1956. In order to ex-
amine Egypt's justifications for such action we must look further into the
beginning of the Canal and the organization of the Suez Canal Company.
The inclusion of Egypt in the affairs of the Suez Canal Company was
a recent development in the management of the Canal. Egypt had sup-
plied almost half of the original cost capital and for ten years supplied
four-fifths of the construction labor for the project. Although in addition
it also maintained the Sweet Water Canal which was necessary to the
function of the Suez, Egypt did not realize any return from its investment.
In debt as a result of these economic drains and domestic mismanage-
ment, Ismail, the Khedive, was forced to sell Egypt's shareholdings in the
Canal Company which amounted to 44 per cent. These shares were pur-
chased in 1875 by the British government in a brilliant move by Disraeli.
Even the 15 per cent of the net profits allotted to Egypt under terms of
the original agreement were transferred to France in part satisfaction
of other debts.
While Egypt was removed from any control over Canal operations and
left to suffer substantial financial loss, the operation of the Canal itself
further threatened the Egyptian economy. Previous overland trade took to
the waterway for transit. Even the new Cairo-Suez Railway had to be
abandoned. The construction and operation of the Canal left Egypt in a
state of bankruptcy and dependence upon Britain, from which she is only
now recovering.
In 1922, Egyptian pressure for independence resulted in the establish-
ment of an independent monarchy in Egypt; but the price of independence
was to reserve to Britain almost the same rights and influence it had
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exerted under the protectoratea defense of Egypt and the Canal and
the security of the British government and British military installations
in Egypt. Egypt's increasing resentment of British control,
and Egyptian
pressure for a voice in the operation of the Canal led
to bitter disputes
which were temporarily eased by the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936, de-
creasing British control over Egypt but continuing British protection of
the Canal. Britain managed, indeed, to maintain substantial control of
Egyptian affairs until the disruptions caused by World War II. The
exigencies of the war and some pro-Axis sentiment in Egypt again strained
Anglo-Egyptian relations.
At the close of World War II attempts by Great Britain to bring the
government of Egypt again securely under its control were met by violent
anti-British demonstrations. Egypt demanded removal of all British forces
and military installations (almost a billion dollars in military installations
and some 84,000 troops), union with the Sudan, and control of the Canal,
From 1944 until the last British troops left Egypt in 1956 relations be-
tween the two countries gradually deteriorated. Though they were close
to agreement at times, political changes in Egypt or Great Britain would
again result in further breaches. Throughout this period, however, Egypt
continued to win concessions. Some British troops were evacuated and
military bases consolidated in the Suez area, and in 1949 extensive con-
cessions were made to Egypt by the Suez Canal Company, admitting more
Egyptians to management of the Canal and providing further sharing of
profit from the operation of the Canal.
In spite of such concessions Egypt's nationalistic determination in-
creased, while Britain was unwilling to concede complete defeat in Egypt.
The controversy was debated before the Security Council without resolu-
tion. Egypt even appealed, without success, to the United States to re-
place Great Britain in Egypt. Under pressure from complications such
as the Arab-Israeli war, the Egyptian blockade of Israeli shipping, and the
heightened significance of Suez in the Cold War, and with the encourage-
ment of other Arab nations, Egypt repudiated all political ties with the
West. Further, it abrogated all Anglo-Egyptian treaties. Refusing to re-
cognize the abrogation, Great Britain, with the support of the United
States, took steps to defend its remaining strength in Egypt. Egypt inter-
fered with British canal shipping, and Britain replied with military
strength. Violent clashes took place between British troops and Egyp-
tian demonstrators. There was considerable property destruction and loss
of life on both sides The 1952 coup by which the Egyptian army took
control of the government and ousted King Farouk quieted hostilities
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temporarily, but it soon became clear that the new government would
consolidate by utilizing and emphasizing nationalistic tensions. Further
demonstrations and bitterness finally resulted in an agreement on the
withdrawal of British troops (see Doc. 15). The last British troops left
Suez in June of 1956.
Egyptian claims of economic deprivation as a result of the Canal were
in large part true, even though increased Egyptian authority in the Suez
Canal Company since the late 1940's had begun to produce financial return.
Egypt's claim to national security as further justification for the na-
tionalization of the Canal is intimately bound up with its struggles against
Great Britain for self-realization as a nation. Foreign control of the Canal
brought continual foreign intervention in the national life of the country.
Egypt learned in its struggles with Great Britain that it was virtually
helpless as long as foreign military vessels could line the Suez against it.
Egypt went to war with Israel in 1948, confident of a quick and easy
victory, only to be pushed back until Israel was within striking distance
of the Canal. Great Britain came to the defense of Egypt by suggesting
that a threat to the Canal would bring military intervention on the part
of Great Britain.
With the failure of its armies, Egypt utilized its last resource against
Israel it denied Israel's right to the use of the Canal and together with
Saudi Arabia closed off Israel's only other southern sea exit through the
Gulf of Aqaba. Although Article I of the Suez Canal Convention clearly
states that the Canal shall be open to all ships of all nations in peace or
war, Egypt defended her action on the basis of Article X, which provides
that the terms of the convention shall not hinder Egypt in measures
necessary to her self-defense (see Doc. 1).
It is in the American tradition to sympathize with peoples struggling
against foreign domination for full realization of political rights. We can
be sympathetic with Egyptian goals so long as Egypt does not, in the
pursuit of its national rights, violate the security of other nations. It be-
comes a more involved question when, in view of Cold War politics, free
transit of the Suez is necessary to defend Western democracy. Nor can we
count on the reliability of a government based upon dictatorship.
A great deal of Egypt's resources in recent years has gone into the
purchase of arms from the West and from the Soviet Union, but Egypt's
poor economic situation prior to the nationalization of the Canal was not
altogether due to intensive military mobilization. Egypt had a simple
agrarian economy for centuries. Prior to British control, the economy was
one of primary subsistence, capable of supporting only a small, stable
58 MIDDLE EAST IN CRISIS
population. British control and British capital established for Egypt a
one-crop economy. That one crop was cotton. Desirous of greatly increased
crop yields for purposes of export, Britain regulated the Nile waters
through dams and irrigation projects. Although the uncontrolled annual
Nile floods were not a reliable method for crop irrigation, each flood left
behind it a deposit of rich silt that continually replenished the soil ex-
hausted from the year's planting. British dams and irrigation provided
instead a regular water supply that temporarily increased crop yields prof-
itably. Because of these very dams, however, the land, no longer re-
plenished by annual deposits of rich silt from Nile flood waters, grew
poor and unyielding. As might be expected, during the period of increased
crop yields, Egypt also developed one of the highest rates of population
increase in the world The fellaheen, the Egyptian peasant class, were
soon overcrowded, but were too poor to buy fertilizers for their now worn-
out soil. Egypt's resources, already diminished by the Suez Canal, were
inadequate to restore the disrupted economy, so that its fortunes came to
depend more and more upon the fluctuations of the world cotton market.
Egypt's economic position remained much the same throughout the
early years of the twentieth century. Limited industrialization and utiliza-
tion of the few natural resources available improved the situation some-
what, but by 1955 the economic position was still a desperate one and
President Nasser determined upon a complete restoration of Egyptian eco-
nomy. Reviving an Egyptian dream of previous centuries, he announced a
proposal for the building of a tremendous dam across the Nile at Aswan,
a vast irrigation and power project which would cost an estimated $1.3
billion dollars. Nasser appealed to the West for aid and in December of
1955 was offered by Washington and London $70 million in outright
grants and $200 million more in loans, with assurance of more to come.
In his desire to consolidate the Arab World under his leadership, Nasser,
playing upon anticolonial, anti-Western fervor, turned also to Russia for
aid with the dam. It was during this period that Egypt contracted with
Czechoslovakia to purchase considerable shipments of arms and planes.
Finally on July 19, 1956, Egypt announced to the West that it was now
ready to accept the West's offei of aid in the matter of the Aswan project.
Washington replied with a refusal, echoed by London, which registered
doubt of Egypt's financial ability to undertake the project "in present
circumstances." Two days later Russia announced that it too had no inten-
tion of offering aid to finance the dam. It was five days after that, on July
26, that Nasser in a violent anti-Western speech proclaimed the nationali-
zation of the Suez Canal (see Docs. 18 and 19).
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Some experts judge the Aswan dam project itself to be unsound and
are of the opinion that any solution to power and irrigation problems
along the Nile would necessitate a series of developments extending back
into the Sudan in order to include the sources of the river. This would
require certain agreements between Egypt and the Sudan. Moreover, nei-
ther the Sudanese, nor the Ethiopians, from whose territories spring the
main tributaries of the Nile, had agreed to Egypt's proposal for a division
of the Nile waters. The refusal of London and Washington was not based
on these criticisms, however. It was a diplomatic stroke designed to
undermine Nasser's power.
The Suez Canal was the one asset remaining to an economically un-
sound Egypt, and Nasser promptly utilized this one remaining advantage.
Egypt assumed control of the Canal with promises of complete compensa-
tion to shareholders if all the Suez Canal Company assets were surren-
dered to the Egyptian government. France and Britain's answer was to
freeze the assets both of the Suez Canal Company and of Egypt itself. As
the issue was brought before the United Nations, Nasser warned that any
intervention would bring about the closing of the Canal.
Thus the matter stood until October 29, 1956, when Israel broke the
political deadlock by invading Egypt's Sinai Peninsula for the announced
purpose of clearing out Egyptian "commando" nests said to be respon-
sible for increasing raids on the Israeli frontier. Within twenty-four hours,
Great Britain and France without United Nations sanction, and report-
edly without the knowledge of the United States, issued an ultimatum
to the contending parties which called for a cease-fire in twelve hours or
British and French troops would intervene. Israel accepted. Egypt refused.
British and French forces then entered the area along the Suez Canal and
bombed Egyptian military installations. In reply to this action Egypt sank
hulks to block the Canal and Syria blew up the oil pipelines which crossed
its territory from Iraq. Within a week British and French forces suc-
ceeded in occupying two-fifths of the Suez Canal area. Israel occupied
both the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip. A further complication was
offered by Russia and Red China who threatened to send "volunteer"
troops to Egypt.
In the United Nations, Security Council action was deadlocked by Bri-
tish and French vetoes. The issue, then referred to the General Assembly,
was debated in an emergency session called to discuss both the crisis in
the Middle East and the Hungarian Civil War. The result was an order
requiring both a cease-fire and the withdrawal of British, French, and
Israeli troops from the Suez area. The order was to be enforced by a
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United Nations Emergency Force consisting of troops from small neutral
countries, but it was not until December 22 that the British and French
completed the removal of their troops. A month later Israel had withdrawn
from all but the Gaza Strip, though it was March 4 when finally, under
threat of world sanctions, the Israeli forces vacated this violently contested
strip oi territory and the United Nations forces moved in to safeguard
the frontier.
The arguments advanced by the antagonists in the dispute are to be
found in Documents 20-28, which consist of speeches before the United
Nations both in criticism and in defense of the Anglo-French-Israeli ac-
tion. Document 29 includes the major United Nations Middle Eastern
resolutions offered during this period
If, as many contend, the Anglo-French action was taken merely in de-
fense of the Suez Canal, it resulted not so much in defense as in damage
to the Canal and the disruption of oil transmission through major Middle
East pipelines. If the action was a measure taken in prevention of a major
war, at least this objective was gained since no major war developed from
a sequence of events which can surely be termed a major world crisis. But
if, as some observers suggest, British-French intervention was a bold move
made in collaboration with Israel to destroy Nasser's power, restore Anglo-
French control of the Suez, and recoup economic losses in the Middle East,
it failed indeed Egypt continues to control the Suez Canal and Nasser
emerged in a stronger position than before, while Britain and France suf-
fered world-wide censure. Moreover, anti-Western and anti-Israeli feeling
has been increased throughout the Middle East.
The report to the United States Senate from the Senate Committees
on Foreign Relations and Armed Services, dated February 14, 1957, is
illustrative of the gravity with which the United States government viewed
this crisis in the Middle East. The following is a selection from that report:
Soviet bloc economic or technical assistance has been extended to Egypt, Su-
dan, Syria, Turkey, and Yemen and has been offered to Iran, Israel, Leb-
anon, Libya, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia Soviet bloc arms have been furnished
to Egypt, Syria, and Yemen, and have been offered to Saudi Arabia and
Sudan
Concurrently with the burgeoning Soviet political and economic activity in
the Middle East, there has been a complete destruction of the British and
French position in the area This position was given its final blow by the
Anglo-French invasion of Egypt, but it had been in decline long before
The net result of these and other events of recent years is that the situa-
tion in the Middle East is very dangerous. Syria has moved much closer to
the Soviet bloc. Jordan is faced with chaos Egypt has mortgaged its future
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cotton crop to pay for Communist arms, large quantities of which have been
lost through capture or destruction Egypt has also lost the revenues of the
Suez Canal Iraq, Iran, and Saudi Arabia are suffering from the loss of oil
revenues brought about by blockage of the Canal.
Bearing in mind this survey of the many tensions and complexities which
have contributed to the crisis in the Middle East, let us review briefly
the philosophies underlying the response of the United States to these
problems.
CHAPTER 7
The Shaping of United States Foreign Policy
Creating a foreign policy for the United States is one of the most difficult
tasks which faces any presidential administration. Beginning with Presi-
dent Washington, each Chief Executive has had to meet the dual respon-
sibility of maintaining a foreign policy in keeping with the American ideal
as interpreted in his time, while simultaneously placating political oppo-
sition within and without his own party. This dual undertaking calls for
a constant combination of the proverbial wisdom of Solomon with the
patience of Job. With the recrudescence of violent nationalism in every
section of the globe and the parallel emergence of a much broader Ameri-
can political leadership, the task has become immeasurably more difficult.
The development of United States foreign policy has taken place within
the context of an ideological struggle which has been classified by poli-
tical scientists as "realism" versus "idealism." Typical of the "idealistic"
approach are the following quotations from President Woodrow Wilson
and President Franklin D. Roosevelt.
In an address delivered in Mobile, Alabama, on October 27, 1913,
President Woodrow Wilson declared:
We dare not turn from the principle that morality and not expediency is the
thing that must guide us, and that we will never condone iniquity because it
is most convenient to do so.
In his message to Congress on January 6, 1941, President Franklin D.
Roosevelt expressed the now-famous concept of the "four freedoms."
We are committed to the proposition that principles of morality and consid-
erations for our own security will never permit us to acquiesce in a peace
dictated by aggressors and sponsored by appeasers. We know that enduring
peace cannot be bought at the cost of other people's freedom . . .
In the future days, which we seek to make secure, we look forward to a
world founded upon essential human freedoms. The first is freedom of speech
and expression everywhere in the world
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The second is freedom of every person to worship God in his own way . . .
everywhere in the world.
The third is freedom from want . everywhere in the world.
The fourth is freedom from fear . . anywhere in the world.
. . Our support goes to those who struggle to gain those rights or keep
them.
Representative of the viewpoint of political "realism" are the following
quotations from Alexander Hamilton and the contemporary political ana-
lyst, Hans J. Morgenthau. In his Padficus Paper No. 3, July, 1793,
Alexander Hamilton asserted:
Self-preservation is the first duty of a nation .... Indeed, the rule of
morality in this respect is not precisely the same between nations as between
individuals. The duty of making its own welfare the guide of its actions, is
much stronger upon the former than upon the latter; in proportion to the
greater magnitude and importance of national compared with individual hap-
piness, and to the greater permanency of the effects of national than of
individual conduct
Hans J. Morgenthau wrote as follows (see Bibliography):
The fundamental error which has thwarted American foreign policy in thought
and action is the antithesis of national interest and moral principles. The
equation of political moralism with morality and of political realism with
immorality is itself untenable. The choice is not between moral principles and
the national interest devoid of moral dignity, but between one set of moral
principles, divorced from political reality, and another set of moral prin-
ciples derived from political reality. The basic fact of international politics
is the absence of a society able to protect the existence, and to promote the
interests, of the individual nations. For the individual nations to take care of
their own national interests is, then, a political necessity. There can be no
moral duty to neglect them; for as the international society is at present
constituted, the consistent neglect of the national interest can only lead to
national suicide. Yet it can be shown that there exists even a positive moral
duty for the individual nation to take care of its national interests.
Self-preservation for the individual as well as for societies is not only a bio-
logical and psychological necessity, but in the absence of an overriding moral
obligation a moral duty as well. . . .
It becomes obvious that each of these approaches to making foreign
policy is based upon a series of tacit assumptions of its own. It becomes
further evident that each of these approaches is laden with its own value-
judgments. It is necessary, therefore, to examine both the "realistic" and
"idealistic" viewpoints in order to determine their basic soundness. At
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the outset it would seem that the "realistic" viewpoint advocates dealing
with each issue on its own merits and reaching conclusions on the basis
of power politics. The "idealistic'
1
view, on the other hand, seems to im-
ply that some formal moral criterion must be established as an a priori
basis for policy determination. Thus, the latter brings forth Atlantic Char-
ters while the former shies away from
u
utopian" manifestoes. The "real-
ist" bases his approach upon the acceptance of a prevailing Hobbesian
conflict among nations. Strife rather than harmony is seen as, or taken to
be, the general rule in international relations. In the absence of an "over-
awing power" the goal of valid diplomacy and statesmanship is a com-
paratively limited one. It consists of the limitation of struggles and the
restriction of their scope. Hence, the emergence of the "containment"
policy under the authorship of Mr. Kennan (see Bibliography). Here,
as always, the "realist" seeks not the Utopian society which he believes
can exist only on a blueprint, but rather the means of attaining a balance
of power and an adjustment to existing conditions. There is, therefore,
within his approach constant emphasis upon checks and balances, compro-
mise, and maintenance of a flexible bargaining position. There is, in ad-
dition, frank acknowledgment that in international diplomacy there often
exists a discrepancy between means and ends. Above all, there is the re-
current theme that the struggle for power is permanent and ever present
and that the best we can do is try to limit the overconcentration of power
and relieve the tensions which make for war. Britain, for example, for
over one hundred years maintained peace in Europe through a carefully
controlled balance of power.
The political "idealist" on the other hand, starts from the assumption
that power politics is not only an abnormal but also a passing phase in
mankind's history, and that it is essentially a cynical distortion and cor-
ruption of history which is particularly out of place in our shrunken globe
where the alternative to "one world" is truly no world. It ascribes all
great controversies in history to the clash between incompatible ideals and
principles rather than an ubiquitous yearning for power. On the level of
practical alternatives to power politics the political "idealist" would usu-
ally posit one of several alternatives. These include universal world govern-
ment, the foreswearing of relations with "bad" countries, or some form of
neutralism or isolationism.
Political commentators are pretty much in agreement that regardless of
whether one is essentially an "idealist" or a "realist" there exists a certain
underlying consensus as to the ends and means of American foreign policy.
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There is agreement in other words that both schools adhere to a broad
policy which includes the following:
1. the containment of the Soviet Union and its outdistancing in the
race for competitive coexistence;
2. establishment of a peaceful world order in which American ideolog-
ical and material interests are secure
;
3. the recognition that a reasonable reconciliation of individual freedom
and mass welfare is possible.
There is also general agreement that the means toward these ends must
not contradict the general rules of what we consider fair play.
The history of United States foreign relations, for reasons discussed
below, has often been under the sway of the "idealistic" rather than the
"realistic" approach. Thus, for example, we find the refusal to recognize
first the Soviet Union and then Red China on the grounds that they are
"evil and corrupt powers."
Thus too, so many of our wars are fought to eliminate and extirpate the
"infidels and evildoers." When we go into battle, our terms become "un-
conditional surrender" and our mottoes become "make the world safe for
democracy." The implication is that, once evil men are destroyed, evil too
will disappear. It is against this background that two classic documents
in American history, each of which has become a guiding principle for
generations of "idealists," becomes clear.
President George Washington's Farewell Address on September 17, 1796,
advised:
The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is, in extending
our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as
possible.
. . Why . . . entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European
ambition, rivalship, interest, humor, or caprice? . . .
It is our policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of
the foreign world.
Thomas Jefferson wrote to President James Monroe on October 24, 1823:
Our first fundamental maxim should be, never to entangle ourselves in the
broils of Europe Our second, never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with cis-
Atlantic [on this side of the Atlantic] affairs America, North and South,
has a set of interests distinct from those of Europe, and peculiarly her own.
She would therefore have a system of her own, separate and apart from that
of Europe.
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In the development of foreign policy, a democratic nation faces one of
its most striking and difficult dilemmas. The executive position must some-
how represent or reflect the consensus of the electorate. But the electorate
is often contradictory and moody. Certainly the advantages of a foreign
policy, fluid enough to reflect these contradictions, are offset by the dis-
advantages of the resulting uncertainty. With so many involved in the
creation of a foreign policy, and so many more affected by its direction,
it is sometimes to be wondered that any policy can clearly reflect the "will
of the people." And yet, if it is to be truly democratic then somehow it
must. Thus, for example, we find emerging within the formation of con-
temporary United States foreign policy an attempt at eclecticism a com-
bining of both the "realistic" and "idealistic" approach.
Let us examine two statements which reflect this new approach and then
proceed to an analysis of the specific obstacles which stand in the way of
its fulfillment. The first of these is from an address to the nation by Presi-
dent Dwight D. Eisenhower which was delivered on April 16, 1953.
It reads as follows:
The way chosen by the United States was plainly marked by a few clear
precepts, which govern its conduct in world affairs
First: no people on earth can be held, as a people, to be an enemy, for all
humanity shares the common hunger for peace and fellowship and justice
Second" no nation's security and well-being can be lastingly achieved in
isolation but only in effective cooperation with fellow nations.
Third: any nation's right to a form of government and an economic system
of its own choosing is inalienable.
Fourth: any nation's attempt to dictate to other nations their form of
government is indefensible.
And fifth, a nation's hope of lasting peace cannot be firmly based upon
a race in armaments but rather upon just relations and honest understanding
with all other nations.
For the second quotation we turn to the words of Mr. George Kennan
(see Bibliography):
It is clear that the United States cannot expect in the foreseeable future to
enjoy political intimacy with the Soviet regime. It must continue to regard the
Soviet Union as a rival, not a partner, in the political arena. It must continue
to expect that Soviet policies will reflect no abstract love of peace and stabil-
ity, no real faith in the possibility of a permanent happy coexistence of the
Socialist capitalist worlds, but rather a cautious, persistent pressure toward
the disruption and weakening of all rival influence and rival power.
Balanced against this are the facts that Russia, as opposed to the Western
world in general, is still by far the weaker party, that Soviet policy is highly
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flexible, and that Soviet society may well contain deficiencies which will even-
tually weaken its own total potential This would of itself warrant the United
States entering with reasonable confidence upon a policy of firm containment,
designed to confront the Russians with unalterable counterforce at every point
where they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and
stable world.
How then, as a nation are we prepared to meet the demands of such a
foreign policy? It is a commonplace among writers on the United States
to note that we have taken on very reluctantly the risky role of world
leadership. The inevitable remark has also been made that the American
rise to the pinnacle has been accompanied by the concomitant rise of a
ruthless, amoral, power-hungry Soviet Union. The question therefore nat-
urally arises as to how capable we are of making the necessary decisions
which will achieve for us the maximum national security. That these de-
cisions are vital not only to us but to the rest of the world as well is ap-
parent in the relationships between a successful American foreign policy
and the well-being, political and economic, of the entire free world. The
root of the problem lies in the relationship between the need for incisive
and intelligent decision-making on the part an informed leadership and a
democratic myth that insists that the people as a whole, in their inherent
wisdom, can make the decisions vital to their survival.
Thus we are faced with the question of whether the mass of the Ameri-
can people can judge wisely the complex and often remote problems of
contemporary foreign policy. The question is complicated by the tradi-
tional pattern of American abstention from foreign "problems" except in
periods of great stress. The pattern of American life finds the average
American citizen deeply involved in private pursuits. In fact, it is in just
this involvement that men like T. V. Smith insist one finds the secret of
American freedom. Be that as it may, we nevertheless find that the average
American develops views on political matters in a ratio to their direct re-
lationship and effect upon him. As a result, his main interests, politically
speaking, lie in such matters as tax laws, social security, and wage and
price legislation. It is only on rare occasions that he is aroused to the
degree that he forms opinions relative to foreign policy. As a result, we
often find a marked instability and a sharp fluctuation characterizing these
moods. We come face to face then with the dual problem of how to make
the public alert, informed, and active in policy making, and how to make
official leadership responsible to the public. No less a problem is posed by
the perpetual Executive-Congressional struggle over program direction and
leadership which is a normal result of the very structure of our govern-
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ment as set up under the Constitution. This struggle
has become further
complicated over the years by the constant demands
of conflicting pres-
sure groups. The average citizen who wants to form an intelligent opinion
about foreign policy not only needs to know what the Chief Executive and
the Congress are striving to achieve, but also what pressure groups
are
behind what policy and for what reasons.
We need to take all these points of view into consideration, because we
come finally to the realization that as American citizens we are called
upon today, perhaps more than ever before in
our history, to participate
in the making of decisions affecting not only our immediate lives but the
fate of Western civilization. Typical of this responsibility is the need for
policy formulation in the Middle East.
A reaction to the pressures of world tension resulting from the Middle
Eastern crisis was a necessity, but the Eisenhower Doctrine (see Docs.
30-33) certainly was not the only possible reaction to these pressures.
Documents 34-36 are examples of alternative American proposals, while
Documents 37-43 present Middle Eastern policy statements from other
nations.
In the light of the succession of crises following upon the promulgation
of the Eisenhower Doctrine, one cannot help but ask whether it served
its purpose at all. We need only be reminded that Lebanon alone of the
Arab nations requested aid under its terms. The hindsight of the "post
mortem" analyst begs the question of what would have been the history
of events in the Middle East if a policy other than that which emerged
early in 1957 had been in force. In any case, the intervention in Lebanon
did occur, as did the re-entry of British troops into Jordan. These are the
cold facts. But the big questions remain.
Where would the "idealists'
1
now direct us? What role would the "real-
ists" demand of us? Of what importance and political effect will be the
propaganda and votes of the interested pressure groups in this country?
Shall we
l
'go it alone" or cast our lot in a policy of collective security?
Is
our foreign policy as it now stands a valid representation of public opin-
ion? In a world which refuses to remain static, is United States foreign
policy flexible enough to cope with emergencies as they arise?
In the American democracy, foreign policy must, in the long run, re-
flect the viewpoint of the majority. In the words of Paul H. Appleby,
"Every expression of opinion on public affairs in the barber shop or
beauty parlor, in a taxicab, at a club meeting, at a party, union meeting,
farm organization meeting, or wherever is a contribution to the climate
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of opinion within which the government acts in its constant effort to achieve
or maintain consent. Every withholding of expression similarly is a vote."
To the citizen who wishes to inform himself and to make his opinions
felt in the shaping of our Middle Eastern policy this analysis and the
collection of documents that follows are respectfully dedicated.

SELECTED DOCUMENTS

SECTION 1
Historical Background
Convention on the Free Navigation of the Suez Canal:
The European Powers and the Ottoman Empire
October 29, 1888
Austria, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Russia, Spam, Great
Britain, France, and the Ottoman Empire
ART I The Suez Maritime Canal shall always be free and open, in time of war as
in time of peace, to every vessel of commerce or of war, without distinction of flag.
Consequently, the High Contracting Parties agree not in any way to interfere
with the free use of the Canal, in time of war as in time of peace.
The Canal shall never be subjected to the exercise of the right of blockade.
ART. II. The High Contracting Parties, recognizing that the Fresh-Water Canal
is indispensable to the Maritime Canal, take note of the engagements of His High-
ness the Khedive towards the Universal Suez Canal Company as regards the Fresh-
Water Canal; which engagements are stipulated in a Convention bearing date the
18th March, 1863, containing an expose and four Articles.
They undertake not to interfere in any way with the security of that Canal
and its branches, the working of which shall not be exposed to any attempt at
obstruction.
ART. III. The High Contracting Parties likewise undertake to respect the plant,
establishments, buildings, and works of the Maritime Canal and of the Fresh-Water
Canal.
ART. IV. The Maritime Canal remaining open in time of war as a free passage,
even to the ships of war of belligerents, according to the terms of Article I of the
present Treaty, the High Contracting Parties agree that no right of war, no act
of hostility, nor any act having for its object to obstruct the free navigation of the
Canal, shall be committed in the Canal and its ports of access, as well as within
a radius of 3 marine miles from those ports, even though the Ottoman Empire
should be one of the belligerent Powers.
Vessels of war of belligerents shall not revictual or take in stores in the Canal
and its ports of access, except in so far as may be strictly necessary. The transit of
the aforesaid vessels through the Canal shall be effected with the least possible
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delay, in accordance with the Regulations in force, and without any other intermis-
sion than that resulting from the necessities of the service.
Their stay at Port Sai'd and in the roadstead of Suez shall not exceed twenty-
four hours, except in case of distress. In such case they shall be bound to leave
as soon as possible. An interval of twenty-four hours shall always elapse between
the sailing of a belligerent ship from one of the ports of access and the departure
of a ship belonging to the hostile Power.
ART. V. In time of war belligerent Powers shall not disembark nor embark
within the Canal and its ports of access either troops, munitions, or materials of
war. But in case of an accidental hindrance in the Canal, men may be embarked
or disembarked at the ports of access by detachments not exceeding 1,000 men,
with a corresponding amount of war material
ART. VI. Prizes shall be subjected, in all respects, to the same rules as the
vessels of war of belligerents.
ART. VII. The Powers shall not keep any vessel of war in the waters of the
Canal (including Lake Timsah and the Bitter Lakes).
Nevertheless, they may station vessels of war in the ports of access of Port
Said and Suez, the number of which shall not exceed two for each Power.
This right shall not be exercised by belligerents.
ART. VIII, The Agents in Egypt of the Signatory Powers of the present Treaty
shall be charged to watch over its execution In case of any event threatening the
security or the free passage of the Canal, they shall meet on the summons of three
of their number under the presidency of their Doyen, in order to proceed to the
necessary verifications. They shall inform the Khedivial Government of the danger
which they may have perceived, in order that the Government may take proper
steps to insure the protection and the free use of the Canal. Under any circum-
stances, they shall meet once a year to take note of the due execution of the Treaty.
The last-mentioned meetings shall take place under the presidency of a Special
Commissioner nominated for that purpose by the Imperial Ottoman Government. A
Commissioner of the Khedive may also take part in the meeting, and may preside
over it in case of the absence of the Ottoman Commissioner
They shall especially demand the suppression of any work or the dispersion of
any assemblage on either bank of the Canal, the object or effect of which might
be to interfere with the liberty and the entire security of the navigation.
ART IX, The Egyptian Government shall, within the limits of its powers result-
ing from the Firmans, and under the conditions provided for in the present Treaty,
take the necessary measures for insuring the execution of the said Treaty.
In case the Egyptian Government should not have sufficient means at its disposal,
it shall call upon the Imperial Ottoman Government, which shall take the necessary
measures to respond to such appeal; shall give notice thereof to the Signatory
Powers of the Declaration of London of the 17th March, 1885; and shall, if
necessary, ;concert with them on the subject.
The provisions of Articles IV, V, VII, and VIII shall not interfere with the
measures which shall be taken in virtue of the present Article
ART X. Similarly, the provision of Articles IV, V, VII, and VIII shall not
interfere with the measures which His Majesty the Sultan and His Highness the
Khedive, in the name of His Imperial Majesty, and within the limits of the Fir-
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mans granted, might find it necessary to take for securing by their own forces the
defence of Egypt and the maintenance of public order
In case His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, or His Highness the Khedive, should
find it necessary to avail themselves of the exceptions for which this Article
provides, the Signatory Powers of the Declaration of London shall be notified
thereof by the Imperial Ottoman Government.
It is likewise understood that the provisions of the four Articles aforesaid shall
in no case occasion any obstacle to the measures which the Imperial Ottoman
Government may think it necessary to take in order to insure by its own forces the
defence of its other possessions situated on the eastern coast of the Red Sea.
ART. XL The measures which shall be taken in the cases provided for by
Articles IX and X of the present Treaty shall not interfere with the free use of the
Canal. In the same cases, the erection of permanent fortifications contrary to the
provisions of Article VIII is prohibited
ART XII. The High Contracting Parties, by application of the principle of
equality as regards the free use of the Canal, a principle which forms one of the
bases of the present Treaty, agree that none of them shall endeavour to obtain
with respect to the Canal territorial or commercial advantages or privileges in any
international arrangements which may be concluded. Moreover, the rights of Turkey
as the territorial Power are reserved.
ART. XIII. With the exception of the obligations expressly provided by the
clauses of the present Treaty, the sovereign rights of His Imperial Majesty the
Sultan, and the rights and immunities of His Highness the Khedive, resulting
from the Firmans, are in no way affected
ART XIV The High Contracting Parties agree that the engagements resulting
from the present Treaty shall not be limited by the duration of the Acts of Con-
cession of the Universal Suez Canal Company.
ART. XV The stipulations of the present Treaty shall not interfere with the
sanitary measures in force in Egypt.
ART. XVI. The High Contracting Parties undertake to bring the present Treaty
to the Knowledge of the States which have not signed it, inviting them to accede
to it.
Establishment of the British Protectorate Over Egypt
December 18-19, 1914
PROCLAMATION OF PROTECTORATE, 18 DECEMBER 1914
His Britannic Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs gives notice that,
in view of the state of war arising out of the action of Turkey, Egypt is placed
under the protection of His Majesty and will henceforth constitute a British
Protectorate.
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The suzerainty of Turkey over Egypt is thus terminated, and His Majesty's
Government will adopt all measures necessary for the defence of Egypt, and
protect its inhabitants and interests
DEPOSITION OF KHEDIVE ABBAS HILMI II, 19 DECEMBER 1914
His Britannic Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs gives notice that,
in view of the action of His Highness Abbas Hilmi Pasha, lately Khedive of Egypt,
who has adhered to the King's enemies, His Majesty's Government have seen fit
to depose him from the Khediviate, and that high dignity has been offered, with
the title of Sultan of Egypt, to His Highness Prince Hussein Kamel Pasha, eldest
living Prince of the family of Mohammed Ali, and has been accepted by him
NOTE ON THE PROTECTORATE BY ACTING HIGH COMMISSIONER MILNE CHEETHAM
TO SULTAN HUSAYN KAMIL, 19 DECEMBER 1914
I am instructed by His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
to bring to the notice of your Highness the circumstances piecedmg the outbreak
of war between His Britannic Majesty and the Sultan of Turkey and the changes
which the war entails in the status of Egypt.
In the Ottoman Cabinet there were two parties. On the one side was a moderate
party, mindful of the sympathy extended by Great Britain to every effort towards
reform in Turkey, who recognized that in the war in which His Majesty was
already engaged no Turkish interests were concerned, and welcomed the assurance
of His Majesty and his Allies that neither in Egypt nor elsewhere would the war
be used as a pretext for any action injurious to Ottoman interests. On the other
side a band of unscrupulous military adventurers looked to find in a war of aggres-
sion, waged in concert with His Majesty's enemies, the means of retrieving the
disasters, military, financial, and economic, into which they had already plunged
their country. Hoping to the last that wiser counsels might prevail, His Majesty
and his Allies, in spite of repeated violations of their rights, abstained from retal-
iatory action until compelled thereto by the crossing of the Egyptian frontier by
armed bands and by unprovoked attacks on Russian open ports by the Turkish
naval forces under German officers.
His Majesty's Government are in possession of ample evidence that ever since
the outbreak of war with Germany His Highness Abbas Hilmi Pasha, late Khedive
of Egypt, has definitely thrown in his lot with His Majesty's enemies.
From the facts above set out, it results that the rights over Egypt, whether of
the Sultan, or of the late Khedive, are forfeit to His Majesty.
His Majesty's Government have already, through the General Officer Command-
ing His Majesty's Forces in Egypt, accepted exclusive responsibility for the de-
fence of Egypt in the present war It remains to lay down the form of the future
Government of the country, freed, as I have stated, from all rights of suzerainty
or other rights heretofore claimed by the Ottoman Government.
Of the rights thus accruing to His Majesty, no less than of those exercised in
Egypt during the last thirty years of reform, His Majesty's Government regard
themselves as trustees for the inhabitants of Egypt. And His Majesty's Govern-
ment have decided that Great Britain can best fulfil the responsibilities she has
incurred toward Egypt by the formal declaration of a British Protectorate, and
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by the government of the country under such Protectorate by a Prince of the
Khedivial family.
In these circumstances I am instructed by His Majesty's Government to inform
your Highness that, by reason of your age and experience, you have been chosen as
the Prince of the family of Mehemet Ali most worthy to occupy the Khedivial posi-
tion, with the title and style of the Sultan of Egypt; and, in inviting your Highness
to accept the responsibilities of your high office, I am to give you the formal assur-
ance that Great Britain accepts the fullest responsibility for the defence of the
territories under your Highness against all aggression whencesoever coming; and
His Majesty's Government authorize me to declare that after the establishment
of the British Protectorate now announced all Egyptian subjects wherever they may
be will be entitled to receive the protection of His Majesty's Government
With the Ottoman suzerainty there will disappear the restrictions heretofore
placed by the Ottoman firmans upon the numbers and organisation of your High-
ness's army and upon the grant by your Highness of honorific distinctions.
As regards foreign relations, His Majesty's Government deem it most consistent
with the new responsibilities assumed by Great Britain that the relations between
your Highness 's Government and the representatives of foreign Powers should
henceforth be conducted through His Majesty's representative in Cairo.
His Majesty's Government have repeatedly placed on record that the system
of treaties, known as the Capitulations, by which your Highness 's Government is
bound, are no longer in harmony with the development of the country; but, in the
opinion of His Majesty's Government, the revision of those treaties may most
conveniently be postponed until the end of the present war
In the field of internal administration, I am to remind your Highness that, in con-
sonance with the traditions of British policy, it has been the aim of His Majesty's
Government, while working through and in the closest association with the consti-
tuted Egyptian authorities, to secure individual liberty, to promote the spread of
education, to further the development of the natural resources of the country, and,
in such measure as the degree of enlightenment of public opinion may permit, to
associate the governed in the task of government. Not only is it the intention of His
Majesty's Government to remain faithful to such policy, but they are convinced
that the clearer definition of Great Britain's position in the country will accelerate
progress towards self-government.
The religious convictions of Egyptian subjects will be scrupulously respected as
are those of His Majesty's own subjects, whatever their creed. Nor need I affirm
to your Highness that, in declaring Egypt free from any duty of obedience to
those who have usurped political power at Constantinople, His Majesty's Govern-
ment are animated by no hostility towards the Caliphate The past history of Egypt
shows, indeed, that the loyalty of Egyptian Mahommedans towards the Caliphate
is independent of any political bends between E^ypt and Constantinople.
The strengthening and progress of Mahommedan institutions in Egypt is natu-
rally a matter in which His Majesty's Government take a deep interest and with
which your Highness will be specially concerned, and in carrying out such reforms
as may be considered necessary, your Highness may count upon the sympathetic
support of His Majesty's Government.
I am to add that His Majesty's Government rely with confidence upon the
loyalty, the good sense, and self-restraint of Egyptian subjects to facilitate the
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task of the General Officer Commanding His Majesty's Forces, who is entrusted
with the maintenance of internal order, and with the prevention of the rendering
of aid to the enemy.
The Htisayit-McMahoii Correspondence
July 14, 1915-March 10, 1916
FROM SHAJRIF HUSAYN, 14 JULY 1915
Whereas the whole of the Arab nation without any exception have decided in
these last years to live, and to accomplish their freedom, and grasp the reins of their
administration both in theory and practice, and whereas they have found and felt
that it is to the interest of the Government of Great Britain to support them and
aid them to the attainment of their firm and lawful intentions (which are based
upon the maintenance of the honour and dignity of their life) without any ulterior
motives whatsoever unconnected with this object;
And whereas it is to their (the Arabs') interest also to prefer the assistance of
the Government of Great Britain in consideration of their geographical position
and economic interests, and also of the attitude of the above-mentioned Govern-
ment, which is known to both nations and therefore need not be emphasized;
For these reasons the Arab nation see fit to limit themselves, as time is short,
to asking the Government of Great Britain, if it should think fit, for the approval,
through her deputy or representative, of the following fundamental propositions,
leaving out all things considered secondary in comparison with these, so that it may
prepare all means necessary for attaining this noble purpose, until such time as it
finds occasion for making the actual negotiations.
Firstly. England to acknowledge the independence of the Arab countries,
bounded on the north by Mersina and Adana up to the 37 of latitude, on which
degree fall Birijik, Urfa, Mardin, Midiat, Jezirat (Ibn 'Umar), Amadia, up to
the border of Persia; on the east by the borders of Persia up to the Gulf of Basra,
on the south by the Indian Ocean, with the exception of the position of Aden to
remain as it is
;
on the west by the Red Sea, the Mediterranean Sea up to Mersina.
England to approve of the proclamation of an Arab Khalifate of Islam.
Secondly. The Arab Government of the Sherif to acknowledge that England
shall have the preference in all economic enterprises in the Arab countries when-
ever conditions of enterprises are otherwise equal.
Thirdly. For the security of this Arab independence and the certainty of such
preference of economic enterprises, both high contracting parties to offer mutual
assistance, to the best ability of their military and naval forces, to face any foreign
Power which may attack either party. Peace not to be decided without agreement
of both parties.
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Fourthly. If one of the parties enters upon an aggressive conflict, the other
party to assume a neutral attitude, and in case of such party wishing the other to
join forces, both to meet and discuss the conditions.
Fifthly England to acknowledge the abolition of foreign privileges in the Arab
countries, and to assist the Government of the Sherif in an International Conven-
tion for confirming such abolition.
Sixthly. Articles 3 and 4 of this treaty to remain in vigour for fifteen years, and,
if either wishes it to be renewed, one year's notice before lapse of treaty to be given.
Consequently, and as the whole of the Arab nation have (praise be to God)
agreed and united for the attainment, at all costs and finally, of this noble object,
they beg the Government of Great Britain to answer them positively or negatively
in a period of thirty days after receiving this intimation; and if this period should
lapse before they receive an answer, they reserve to themselves complete freedom
of action. Moreover, we (the Sherif's family) will consider ourselves free in word
and deed from the bonds of our previous declaration which we made through
Ali Effendi
FROM SIR HENRY MCMAHON, 24 OCTOBER 1915
I have received your letter of the 29th Shawal, 1333, with much pleasure and
your expressions of friendliness and sincerity have given me the greatest satisfaction
I regret that you should have received from my last letter the impression that I
regarded the question of the limits and boundaries with coldness and hesitation;
such was not the case, but it appeared to me that the time had not yet come when
that question could be discussed in a conclusive manner.
I have realised, however, from your last letter that you regard this question as
one of vital and urgent importance. I have, therefore, lost no time in informing the
Government of Great Britain of the contents of your letter, and it is with great
pleasure that I communicate to you on their behalf the following statement, which
I am confident you will receive with satisfaction.
The two districts of Mersina and Alexandretta and portions of Syria lying to the
west of the districts of Damascus, Horns, Hama and Aleppo cannot be said to be
purely Arab, and should be excluded from the limits demanded.
With the above modification, and without prejudice of our existing treaties with
Arab chiefs, we accept those limits.
As for those regions lying within those frontiers wherein Great Britain is free to
act without detriment to the interests of her ally, France, I am empowered in the
name of the Government of Great Britain to give the following assurances and
make the following reply to your letter:
(1) Subject to the above modifications, Great Britain is prepared to recognize
and support the independence of the Arabs in all the regions within the limits
demanded by the Sherif of Mecca.
(2) Great Britain will guarantee the Holy Places against all external aggression
and will recognise their inviolability.
(3) When the situation admits, Great Britain will give to the Arabs her advice
and will assist them to establish what may appear to be the most suitable forms of
government in those various territories.
(4) On the other hand, it is understood that the Arabs have decided to seek the
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advice and guidance of Great Britain only, and that such European advisers and
officials as may be required for the formation of a sound form of administration
will be British.
(5) With regard to the vilayets of Bagdad and Basra, the Arabs will recognise
that the established position and interests of Great Britain necessitate special ad-
ministrative arrangements in order to secure these territories from foreign aggres-
sion, to promote the welfare of the local populations and to safeguard our mutual
economic interests.
I am convinced that this declaration will assure you beyond all possible doubt of
the sympathy of Great Britain towards the aspirations of her friends the Arabs and
will result in a firm and lasting alliance, the immediate results of which will be the
expulsion of the Turks from the Arab countries and the freeing of the Arab peoples
from the Turkish yoke, which for so many years has pressed heavily upon them.
I have confined myself in this letter to the more vital and important questions,
and if there are any other matters dealt with in your letters which I have omitted
to mention, we may discuss them at some convenient date in the future.
It was with very great relief and satisfaction that I heard of the safe arrival of
the Holy Carpet and the accompanying offerings which, thanks to the clearness
of your directions and the excellence of your arrangements, were landed without
trouble or mishap in spite of the dangers and difficulties occasioned by the present
sad war May God soon bring a lasting peace and freedom to all peoples!
I am sending this letter by the hand of your trusted and excellent messenger,
Sheikh Mohammed Ibn Arif Ibn Uraifan, and he will inform you of the various
matters of interest, but of less vital importance, which I have not mentioned in
this letter.
FROM SHARIF HUSAYN, 1 JANUARY 1916
We received from the bearer your letter, dated the 9th Safar(the 14th Decem-
ber, 1915), with great respect and honour, and I have understood its contents,
which caused me the greatest pleasure and satisfaction, as it removed that which
had made me uneasy.
Your honour will have realised, after the arrival of Mohammed (Faroki) Sherif
and his interview with you, that all our procedure up to the present was of no per-
sonal inclination or the like, which would have been wholly unintelligible, but that
everything was the result of the decisions and desires of our peoples, and that we
are but transmitters and executants of such decisions and desires in the position
they (our people) have pressed upon us.
These truths are, in my opinion, very important and deserve your honour's
special attention and consideration.
With regard to what had been stated in your honoured communication concerning
El Iraq as to the matter of compensation for the period of occupation, we, in order
to strengthen the confidence of Great Britain in our attitude and in our words and
actions, really and veritably, and in order to give her evidence of our certainty
and assurance in trusting her glorious Government, leave the determination of the
amount to the perception of her wisdom and justice.
As regards the northern parts and their coasts, we have already stated in our
previous letter what were the utmost possible modifications, and all this was only
done so to fulfil those aspirations whose attainment is desired by the will of the
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Blessed and Supreme God It is this same feeling and desire which impelled us to
avoid what may possibly injure the alliance of Great Britain and France and the
agreement made between them during the present wars and calamities ; yet we find
it our duty that the eminent minister should be sure that, at the first opportunity
after this war is finished, we shall ask you (what we avert our eyes from to-day)
for what we now leave to France in Beirut and its coasts
I do not find it necessary to draw your attention to the fact that our plan is of
greater security to the interests and protection of the rights of Great Britain than
it is to us, and will necessarily be so whatever may happen, so that Great Britain
may finally see her friends in that contentment and advancement which she is en-
deavouring to establish for them now, especially as her Allies being neighbours to
us will be the germ of difficulties and discussion with which there will be no peace-
ful conditions In addition to which the citizens of Beirut will decidedly never
accept such dismemberment, and they may oblige us to undertake new measures
which may exercise Great Britain, certainly not less than her present troubles, be-
cause of our belief and certainty in the reciprocity and indeed the identity of our
interests, which is the only cause that caused us never to care to negotiate with
any other Power but you. Consequently, it is impossible to allow any derogation
that gives France, or any other Power, a span of land in those regions.
I declare this, and I have a strong belief, which the living will inherit from the
dead, in the declarations which you gave in the conclusion of your honoured letter
Therefore, the honourable and eminent Minister should believe and be sure, to-
gether with Great Britain, that we still remain firm to our resolution which Storrs
learnt from us two years ago, for which we await the opportunity suitable to our
situation, especially in view of that action the time of which has now come near
and which destiny drives towards us with great haste and clearness, so that we and
those who are of our opinion may have reasons for such action against any criti-
cisms or responsibilities imposed upon us in future.
Your expression "we do not want to push you to any hasty action which might
jeopardise the success of your aim" does not need any more explanation except
what we may ask for, when necessary, such as arms, ammunition, &c
I deem this sufficient, as I have occupied much of your Honour's time. I beg to
offer you my great veneration and respect.
FROM SIR HENRY MCMAHON, 25 JANUARY 1916
We have received with great pleasure and satisfaction your letter of the 25th Safar
(the 1st January) at the hands of your trusty messenger, who has also transmitted
to us your verbal messages.
We fully realise and entirely appreciate the motives which guide you in this im-
portant question, and we know well that you are acting entirely in the interests of
the Arab peoples and with no thought beyond their welfare
We take note of your remarks concerning the vilayet of Bagdad, and will take
the question into careful consideration when the enemy has been defeated and the
time for peaceful settlement arrives.
As regards the northern parts, we note with satisfaction your desire to avoid any-
thing which might possibly injure the alliance of Great Britain and France. It is,
as you know, our fixed determination that nothing shall be permitted to interfere
in the slightest degree with our united prosecution of this war to a victorious con-
82 Historical Background
elusion. Moreover, when the victory has been won, the friendship of Great Britain
and France will become yet more firm and enduring, cemented by the blood of
Englishmen and Frenchmen who have died side by side fighting for the cause of
right and liberty
In this great cause Arabia is now associated, and God grant that the result of
our mutual efforts and co-operation will bind us in a lasting friendship to the
mutual welfare and happiness of us all.
We are greatly pleased to hear of the action you are taking to win all the Arabs
over to our joint cause, and to dissuade them from giving any assistance to our
enemies, and we leave it to your discretion to seize the most favourable moment
for further and more decided measures
You will doubtless inform us by the bearer of this letter of any manner in which
we can assist you and your requests will always receive our immediate consideration.
You will have heard how El Sayed Ahmed el Sherif el Senussi has been beguiled
by evil advice into hostile action, and it will be a great grief to you to know that
he has been so far forgetful of the interests of the Arabs as to throw in his lot
with our enemies Misfortune has now overtaken him, and we trust that this
will show him his error and lead him to peace for the sake of his poor misguided
followers
We are sending this letter by the hand of your good messenger, who will also
bring to you all our news.
The British Balfour Declaration and Allied Statements
June 4November, 1917
CAMBON LETTER TO SOKOLOW, 4 JUNE 1919
You were good enough to present the project to which you are devoting your
efforts, which has for its object the development of Jewish colonization in Palestine
You consider that, circumstances permitting, and the independence of the Holy
Places being safeguarded on the other hand, it would be a deed of justice and of
reparation to assist, by the protection of the Allied Powers, in the renaissance of the
Jewish nationality in that Land from which the people of Israel were exiled so
many centuries ago.
The French Government, which entered this present war to defend a people
wrongfully attacked, and which continues the struggle to assure victory of right
over might, can but feel sympathy for your cause, the triumph of which is bound
up with that of the Allies.
I am happy to give you herewith such assurance
OFFICIAL ZIONIST FORMULA, 18 JULY 1917
H M Government, after considering the aims of the Zionist Organisation, ac-
cepts the principle of recognising Palestine as the National Home of the Jewish
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people and the right of the Jewish people to build up its National life in Palestine
under a protection to be established at the conclusion of Peace, following upon the
successful issue of the war
H.M. Government regards as essential for the realisation of this principle the
grant of internal autonomy to the Jewish nationality in Palestine, freedom of im-
migration for Jews, and the establishment of a Jewish National Colonising Corpora-
tion for the re-settlement and economic development of the country.
The conditions and forms of the internal autonomy and a charter for the
Jewish National Colonising Corporation should, in the view of H M Government,
be elaborated in detail and determined with the representatives of the Zionist
Organisation.
THE BALFOUR DECLARATION, 2 NOVEMBER 1917
I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of his Majesty's Govern-
ment, the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which
has been submitted to and approved by the Cabinet:
His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a
national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate
the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be
done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish
communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any
other country
I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the
Zionist Federation
Tentative Recommendations for President Wilson:
Intelligence Section, American Delegation to the
Peace Conference
January 21, 1919
MESOPOTAMIA
(1) It is recommended that there be established a Mesopotamian state.
The Mesopotamian area, as defined on map 20, is a racial unit. There is Arab
linguistic unity south of a line drawn from Alexandretta to the Persian border
Above this line live Arabs, Armenians, Turks, Kurds and Assyrians, each group
speaking a distinct language. Below this line there is comparatively a much higher
degree of unity It is essential to the development of the great irrigation projects
below Baghdad that the headwaters of the Tigris River, and as much of the Euph-
rates as possible, should be under a single administration. The welfare of the foot-
hills of Kurdistan and of the great steppe region of Mesopotamia is bound up with
the irrigable lowlands of the Tigris and Euphrates basin.
To separate the headwater area of the Tigris and Euphrates drainage basins from
the irrigated valley floors and lowlands further down-stream would be to create
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sources of dispute and render doubly difficult the task of establishing a suitable
government
The southern border of the area lies at the edge of the Arabian desert, where new
relationships come in and different political treatment
(2) It is recommended that there be applied to the Mesopotamian state the
mandatory principle, but no recommendation is made as to the Power to be selected
to carry out this principle.
(3) It is recommended that no solution be adopted which would preclude the
incorporation of this state in an Arab confederation, if a desire for such incorpora-
tion should take actual form in Mesopotamia
Nothing should be done to preclude the possibility of the future development of
an Arab confederation, including Mesopotamia, as an alternate solution which
would be desirable
SYRIA
(1) It is recommended that there be established a Syrian state
While Syria belongs to the Arab-speaking world, it has an unusually large Euro-
pean population, close commercial and cultural relations with Europe, a strong
Christian element and a sedentary mode of life It should therefore be separated
at the outset from the nomad Arab area.
Its eastern boundary has been drawn with these considerations in mind, and runs
just beyond the border of the sown land, so as to include all of the grain-growing
regions, of which the Hauran, below Damascus, is the richest. The northern
boundary of Syria is quite artificial, and indeed this boundary could not be drawn
on racial lines
The new state would have a population of about 400,000, and would about
equal in area the state of Bulgaria.
(2) It is recommended that there be applied to the Syrian state the mandatory
principle, but no recommendation is made as to the Power to be selected to carry
out this principle.
(3) It is recommended that no obstacle be interposed against the final incorpor-
ation of the Syrian state in an Arab confederation, if the tendency toward this
solution should develop in the country.
There is a possibility of the future development of an Arab confederation which
will include all of the Arab-speaking portions of the former Turkish Empire The
present strength of this Arab movement is hard to gauge. It would be the best
solution from the standpoint of the welfare and development of the Arab states
PALESTINE
(1) It is recommended that there be established a separate state of Palestine
The separation of the Palestinian area from Syria finds justification in the reli-
gious experience of mankind The Jewish and Christian churches were born in
Palestine, and Jerusalem was for long years, at different periods, the capital of
each And while the relation of the Mohammedans to Palestine is not so intimate,
from the beginning they have regarded Jerusalem as a holy place. Only by estab-
lishing Palestine as a separate state can justice be done to these great facts.
As drawn upon the map, the new state would control its own source of water
power and irrigation, on Mount Hermon in the east to the Jordan; a feature of
5
|
Tentative Recommendations for President Wilson 85
great importance since the success of the new state would depend upon the
possibilities of agricultural development.
(2) It is recommended that this state be placed under Great Britain as a
mandatory of the League of Nations.
Palestine would obviously need wise and firm guidance Its population is without
political experience, is racially composite, and could easily become distracted by
fanaticism and bitter religious differences
The success of Great Britain in dealing with similar situations, her relation to
Egypt, and her administrative achievements since General Allenby freed Palestine
from the Turk, all indicate her as the logical mandatory.
(3) It is recommended that the Jews be invited to return to Palestine and settle
there, being assured by the Conference of all proper assistance in so doing that
may be consistent with the protection of the personal (especially the religious)
and the property rights of the non-Jewish population, and being further assured
that it will be the policy of the League of Nations to recognize Palestine as a
Jewish state as sooon as it is a Jewish state in fact
It is right that Palestine should become a Jewish state, if the Jews, being given
the full opportunity, make it such. It was the cradle and home of their vital race,
which has made large spiritual contributions to mankind, and is the only land in
which they can hope to find a home of their own; they being in this last respect
unique among significant peoples
At present, however, the Jews form barely a sixth of the total population of
700,000 in Palestine, and whether they are to form a majority, or even a plurality,
of the population in the future state remains uncertain. Palestine, in short, is far
from being a Jewish country now England, as mandatory, can be relied on to give
the Jews the privileged position they should have without sacrificing the rights of
non-Jews.
(4) It is recommended that the holy places and religious rights of all creeds
in Palestine be placed under the protection of the League of Nations and its
mandatory.
The basis for this recommendation is self-evident.
ARABIA
(1) It is recommended that the desert portion of the Arabian peninsula, exclu-
sive of the agricultural areas of Syria and of the Euphrates and Tigris valleys, be
treated as a separate block.
In regard to this large desert area of Arabia, it is unwise to take decisive action
at present. The Kingdom of Hedjaz under the Cherif of Mecca is at the present
time the strongest in the group of Arabian tribal states; nevertheless it is not so
powerful that a successful single Arab confederation can be built around it It is
only this week that the Hedjaz forces have been able to recapture their own city
of Medina.
(2) It is recommended that in regard to the present tribal states, numbering
over twenty, which exist in the peninsula, no definite action be taken.
The chieftains of the inner desert tribes, especially Ibn Saud, are absolutely
opposed to extension on the part of the king of Hedjaz. The sheikhs of Asir and
Yemen would look with equal hostility on the consolidation of his power,
(3) It is recommended that the area with regard to which no definite action
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shall be taken be that bounded on the north by the Euphrates River from the
bend where it turns southeast to a point just below the town of Hit, and from that
point onward by a line which stretches out into the desert, ending at the Persian
Gulf below Koweit, and on the west by the Red Sea, the eastern boundary of
Palestine, and a line through the desert delimiting the agricultural portions of Syria
The boundaries of this Arab bloc, in which no definite action can be taken, are
so drawn as to distinguish the desert tribal civilization from the civilization of the
sedentary Arabs of the irrigable lands of the Tigris and Euphrates valleys, below
Baghdad, and of the fertile and very productive lands of the Syrian Arabs, from
Aleppo down to a point below Damascus. In the north the desert tribes must be
given access to the Euphrates river from Hit to the northward bend of the river,
for the purpose of watering their flocks
(4) It is recommended that the policing of the Red Sea, Indian Ocean, and
Persian Gulf Coasts of Arabia, and the border lands behind these, be left to the
British Empire
The Power which understands best how to handle the Arabs is the British Em-
pire By controlling the coastal areas and the markets along the edge of the desert
at which the desert tribes must trade, the British Indian Office has been able to
exercise some influence over the inland tribes.
(5) It is recommended that in spite of the political prominence of the King of
the Hedjaz, he be not aided to establish an artificial and unwelcomed dominion
over tribes unwilling to accept his rule
The King of the Hedjaz and his sons should not receive support in an attempt
to establish an artificial domination over tribes of about similar strength. If, how-
ever, it can be shown that the movement for Arab unity is natural and real, and
that such unity can be developed without the use of force, the movement should
be given encouragement and support
The proposal of the delegates of the King of the Hedjaz that a mixed commission
be sent to Syria to learn the actual desires of the Syrians and report to the peace
conference, is entirely fair and should receive support.
The 1919 Weizmann and Feisal Agreement:
Discussed by Dr. Chaim Weizmann
June 10, 1936
The present disturbances in Palestine have given renewed currency to the story
that the promise to set up a National Home for the Jewish people in Palestine
was inconsistent with promises made to the Arabs during the War. I desire here
to refer to one aspect only of this matter namely, the attitude adopted at the
Peace Conference by the Arab Delegation itself towards the establishment of the
Jewish National Home in Palestine
The leading figure among the Arab representatives was Emir Feisal, later King
of Iraq Working with T. E Lawrence, he appeared before the Supreme Council
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of the Conference, to whom he submitted the Arab claims to an independent
national existence I had myself met him in June, 1918, at Amman, and on many
subsequent occasions I had conversations with him and with Lawrence on the
subject of Zionism and Palestine conversations which led to the friendship which
lasted many years between King Feisal and myself.
When Feisal came to Europe in 1919 we submitted to him our plans. Both
Feisal and Lawrence approved of them, and early in 1919 these conversations
culminated in the Treaty of Friendship, a copy of which is appended. The text
of that Treaty was approved by Lawrence, who discussed it with Feisal.
The agreement, the original of which is in my possession, opens as follows*
His Royal Highness the Emir Feisal, representing and acting on behalf of
the Arab Kingdom of Kedjaz, and Dr Chaim Weizmann, representing and
acting on behalf of the Zionist Organization, mindful of the racial kinship and
ancient bonds existing between the Arabs and the Jewish people, and realizing
that the surest means of working out the consummation of their national as-
pirations is through the closest possible collaboration in the development of
the Arab State and Palestine, and being desirous further of confirming the
good understanding which exists between them, have agreed upon the following
articles:
The Articles (some of which have been summarized) were,
Article I. The Arab State and Palestine in all their relations and under-
takings shall be controlled by the most cordial good will and understanding,
and to this end Arab and Jewish duly accredited agents shall be established
and maintained in the respective territories
Article II provided for the determination of the boundaries between the
Arab State and Palestine
Article III In the establishment of the Constitution and Administration
of Palestine all such measures shall be adopted as will afford the fullest
guarantees for carrying into effect the British Government's Declaration of
November 2, 1917.
Article IV All necessary measures shall be taken to encourage and stimu-
late immigration of Jews into Palestine on a large scale, and as quickly as
possible to settle Jewish immigrants on the land through closer settlement
and intensive cultivation of the soil. In taking such measures the Arab peasant
and tenant farmers shall be protected in their rights, and shall be assisted in
forwarding their economic development
Article V provided for full religious freedom
Article VI The Mohamedan Holy Places shall be under Mohamedan
control.
In Article VII the Zionist Organization undertook to assist the Arab State
with the advice of its economic experts They agreed in Article VIII to act in
accord on the matters embraced in the Pact before the Peace Congress, and
in Article IX to submit any dispute to the British Government's arbitration.
Feisal signed the pact in London on January 3, 1919, with a reservation in
Arabic (a translation of which was attached in Lawrence's own handwriting and
is given below in facsimile) making his obligations under the pact dependent on
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the fulfillment by the British Government of the demands put forward in the Arab
Memorandum of June 4, 1919 It is significant, too, that when, on January 29,
1919, Feisal addressed the Supreme Council of the Conference on the subject of
the Arab claims, and asked for the independence of all Arabic-speaking peoples
in Asia, with regard to Palestine he made an exception in the following terms-
On account of its universal character, I shall leave Palestine on one side
for the mutual consideration of all parties interested With this exception, I
ask for the independence of the Arabic areas enumerated in the Memorandum
I may add that in a letter addressed to Professor Felix Frankfurter and dated
March 1, 1919, the Emir Feisal expressed the deepest sympathy with the Zionist
movement
The Mandate for Palestine
July 24, 1922
The Council of the League of Nations.
Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have agreed, for the purpose of giving
effect to the provisions of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations,
to entrust to a Mandatory selected by the said Powers the administration of the
territory of Palestine, which formerly belonged to the Turkish Empire, within
such boundaries as may be fixed by them , and
Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have also agreed that the Mandatory
should be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on
November 2nd, 1917, by the Government of His Britannic Majesty, and adopted
by the said Powers, in favour of the establishment in Palestine of a national home
for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing should be done
which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish com-
munities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any
other country; and
Whereas recognition has thereby been given to the historical connection of the
Jewish people with Palestine and to the grounds for reconstituting their national
home in that country; and
Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have selected His Britannic Majesty as
the Mandatory for Palestine; and
Whereas the mandate in respect of Palestine has been formulated in the follow-
ing terms and submitted to the Council of the League for approval, and
Whereas His Britannic Majesty has accepted the mandate in respect of
Palestine and undertaken to exercise it on behalf of the League of Nations in
conformity with the following provisions; and
Whereas by the afore-mentioned Article 22 (paragraph 8), it is provided that
7 The Mandate for Palestine 89
the degree of authority, control or administration to be exercised by the Manda-
tory, not having been previously agreed upon by the Members of the League, shall
be explicitly defined by the Council of the League of Nations ;
Confirming the said mandate, defines its terms as follows :
ART. 1. The Mandatory shall have full powers of legislation and of administra-
tion, save as they may be limited by the terms of this mandate.
ART. 2. The Mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country under such
political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment
of the Jewish national home, as laid down in the preamble, and the development
of self-governing institutions, and also for safeguarding the civil and religious
rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion.
ART. 3. The Mandatory shall, so far as circumstances permit, encourage local
autonomy.
ART. 4 An appropriate Jewish agency shall be recognised as a public body for
the purpose of advising and co-operating with the Administration of Palestine in
such economic, social and other matters as may affect the establishment of the
Jewish national home and the interests of the Jewish population in Palestine, and,
subject always to the control of the Administration, to assist and take part in
the development of the country.
The Zionist organisation, so long as its organisation and constitution are in the
opinion of the Mandatory appropriate, shall be recognised as such agency It shall
take steps in consultation with His Britannic Majesty's Government to secure the
co-operation of all Jews who are willing to assist in the establishment of the Jewish
national home
ART 5. The Mandatory shall be responsible for seeing that no Palestine terri-
tory shall be ceded or leased to, or in any way placed under the control of, the
Government of any Foreign Power.
ART 6. The Administration of Palestine, while ensuring that the rights and
position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced, shall facilitate
Jewish immigration under suitable conditions and shall encourage, in co-operation
with the Jewish agency referred to in Article 4, close settlement by Jews on the
land, including State lands and waste lands not required for public purposes.
ART 7. The Administration of Palestine shall be responsible for enacting a
nationality law. There shall be included in this law provisions framed so as to
facilitate the acquisition of Palestinian citizenship by Jews who take up their
permanent residence in Palestine.
ART 8. The privileges and immunities of foreigners, including the benefits of
consular jurisdiction and protection as formerly enjoyed by Capitulation or usage in
the Ottoman Empire, shall not be applicable in Palestine.
Unless the Powers whose nationals enjoyed the afore-mentioned privileges and
immunities on August 1st, 1914, shall have previously renounced the right to their
reestablishment, or shall have agreed to their non-application for a specified period,
these privileges, and immunities shall, at the expiration of the mandate, be im-
mediately re-established in their entirety or with such modifications as may have
been agreed upon between the Powers concerned.
ART. 9. The Mandatory shall be responsible for seeing that the judicial system
established in Palestine shall assure to foreigners, as well as to natives, a complete
guarantee of their rights.
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Respect for the personal status of the various peoples and communities and
for their religious interests shall be fully guaranteed In particular, the control and
administration of Wakfs shall be exercised in accordance with religious law and
the dispositions of the founders.
ART 10. Pending the making of special extradition agreements relating to
Palestine, the extradition treaties in force between the Mandatory and other
foreign Powers shall apply to Palestine
ART 11. The Administration of Palestine shall take all necessary measures to
safeguard the interests of the community in connection with the development of
the country, and, subject to any international obligations accepted by the Manda-
tory, shall have full power to provide for public ownership or control of any of
the natural resources of the country or of the public works, services and utilities
established or to be established therein. It shall introduce a land system appro-
priate to the needs of the country, having regard, among other things, to the
desirability of promoting the close settlement and intensive cultivation of the land
The Administration may arrange with the Jewish agency mentioned in Article 4
to construct or operate, upon fair and equitable terms, any public works, services
and utilities, and to develop any of the natural resources of the country, in so far
as these matters are not directly undertaken by the Administration Any such
arrangements shall provide that no profits distributed by such agency, directly or
indirectly, shall exceed a reasonable rate of interest on the capital, and any
further profits shall be utilised by it for the benefit of the country in a manner
approved by the Administration.
ART. 12. The Mandatory shall be entrusted with the control of the foreign rela-
tions of Palestine and the right to issue exequaturs to consuls appointed by
foreign Powers He shall also be entitled to afford diplomatic and consular protec-
tion to citizens of Palestine when outside its territorial limits.
ART. 13 All responsibility in connection with the Holy Places and religious
buildings or sites in Palestine, including that of preserving existing rights and of
securing free access to the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites and the free
exercise of worship, while ensuring the requirements of public order and decorum,
is assumed by the Mandatory, who shall be responsible solely to the League of
Nations in all matters connected herewith, provided that nothing in this article
shall prevent the Mandatory from entering into such arrangements as he may
deem reasonable with the Administration for the purpose of carrying the provisions
of this article into effect, and provided also that nothing in this mandate shall be
construed as conferring upon the Mandatory authority to interfere with the fabric
or the management of purely Moslem sacred shrines, the immunities of which are
guaranteed.
ART 14. A special Commission shall be appointed by the Mandatory to study,
define and determine the rights and claims in connection with the Holy Places
and the rights and claims relating to the different religious communities in Palestine
The method of nomination, the composition and the functions of this Commission
shall be submitted to the Council of the League for its approval, and the Com-
mission shall not be appointed or enter upon its functions without the approval of
the Council
ART 15 The Mandatory shall see that complete freedom of conscience and the
free exercise of all forms of worship, subject only to the maintenance of public
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order and morals, are ensured to all. No discrimination of any kind shall be made
between the inhabitants of Palestine on the ground of race, religion or language.
No person shall be excluded from Palestine on the sole ground of his religious
belief.
The right of each community to maintain its own schools for the education of
its own members in its own language, while conforming to such educational require-
ments of a general nature as the Administration may impose, shall not be denied
or impaired.
ART 16 The Mandatory shall be responsible for exercising such supervision
over religious or eleemosynary bodies of all faiths in Palestine as may be required
for the maintenance of public order and good government. Subject to such super-
vision, no measures shall be taken in Palestine to obstruct or interfere with the en-
terprise of such bodies or to discriminate against any representative or member of
them on the ground of his religion or nationality.
ART 17 The Administration of Palestine may organise on a voluntary basis the
forces necessary for the preservation of peace and order, and also for the defence
of the country, subject, however, to the supervision of the Mandatory, but shall
not use them for purposes other than those above specified save with the consent
of the Mandatory Except for such purposes, no military, naval or air forces shall
be raised or maintained by the Administration of Palestine.
Nothing in this article shall preclude the Administration of Palestine from con-
tributing to the cost of the maintenance of the forces of the Mandatory in
Palestine
The Mandatory shall be entitled at all times to use the roads, railways and ports
of Palestine for the movement of armed forces and the carriage of fuel and supplies
ART. 18. The Mandatory shall see that there is no discrimination in Palestine
against the nationals of any State Member of the League of Nations (including
companies incorporated under its laws) as compared with those of the Mandatory
or of any foreign State in matters concerning taxation, commerce or navigation,
the exercise of industries or professions, or in the treatment of merchant vessels
or civil aircraft Similarly, there shall be no discrimination in Palestine against
goods originating in or destined for any of the said States, and there shall be
freedom of transit under equitable conditions across the mandated area.
Subject as aforesaid and to the other provisions of this mandate, the Adminis-
tration of Palestine may, on the advice of the Mandatory, impose such taxes and
customs duties as it may consider necessary, and take such steps as it may think
best to promote the development of the natural resources of the country and to
safeguard the interests of the population It may also, on the advice of the Man-
datory, conclude a special customs agreement with any State the territory of which
in 1914 was wholly included in Asiatic Turkey or Arabia.
ART. 19. The Mandatory shall adhere on behalf of the Administration of
Palestine to any general international conventions already existing, or which may
be concluded hereafter with the approval of the League of Nations, respecting the
slave traffic, the traffic in arms and ammunition, or the traffic in drugs, or relating
to commercial equality, freedom of transit and navigation, aerial navigation and
postal, telegraphic and wireless communication or literary, artistic or industrial
property
ART 20. The Mandatory shall co-operate on behalf of the Administration of
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Palestine, so far as religious, social and other conditions may permit, in the execu-
tion of any common policy adopted by the League of Nations for preventing and
combating disease, including diseases of plants and animals.
ART 21. The Mandatory shall secure the enactment within twelve months from
this date, and shall ensure the execution of a Law of Antiquities based on the
following rules This law shall ensure equality of treatment in the matter of exca-
vations and archseological research to the nations of all States Members of the
League of Nations.
(l; "Antiquity" means any construction or any product of human activity
earlier than the year AD 1 700
(2) The law for the protection of antiquities shall proceed by encouragement
rather than by threat
Any person who, having discovered an antiquity without being furnished with
the authorisation referred to in paragraph 5, reports the same to an official of the
competent Department, shall be rewarded according to the value of the discovery
(3) No antiquity may be disposed of except to the competent Department,
unless this Department renounces the acquisition of any such antiquity.
No antiquity may leave the country without an export licence from the said
Department
(4) Any person who maliciously or negligently destroys or damages an antiquity
shall be liable to a penalty to be fixed.
(5) No clearing of ground or digging with the object of rinding antiquities shall
be permitted, under penalty of fine, except to persons authorised by the competent
Department
(6) Equitable terms shall be fixed for expropriation, temporary or permanent,
of lands which might be of historical or archseological interest.
(7) Authorisation to excavate shall only be granted to persons who show suffi-
cient guarantees of archseological experience. The Administration of Palestine shall
not, in granting these authorisations, act in such a way as to exclude scholars of
any nation without good grounds.
(8) The proceeds of excavations may be divided between the excavator and
the competent Department in a proportion fixed by that Department. If division
seems impossible for scientific reasons, the excavator shall receive a fair indemnity
in lieu of a part of the find.
ART. 22. English, Arabic and Hebrew shall be the official languages of Palestine.
Any statement or inscription in Arabic on stamps or money in Palestine shall be
repeated in Hebrew, and any statement or inscription in Hebrew shall be repeated
in Arabic.
ART. 23 The Administration of Palestine shall recognise the holy days of the
respective communities in Palestine as legal days of rest for the members of such
communities.
ART 24. The Mandatory shall make to the Council of the League of Nations an
annual report to the satisfaction of the Council as to the measures taken during
the year to carry out the provisions of the mandate. Copies of all laws and regula-
tions promulgated or issued during the year shall be communicated with the report.
ART. 25. In the territories lying between the Jordan and the eastern boundary of
Palestine as ultimately determined, the Mandatory shall be entitled, with the con-
sent of the Council of the League of Nations, to postpone or withhold application
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of such provisions of this mandate as he may consider inapplicable to the existing
local conditions, and to make such provision for the administration of the terri-
tories as he may consider suitable to those conditions, provided that no action shall
be taken which is inconsistent with the provisions of Articles IS, 16 and 18.
ART 26 The Mandatory agrees that, if any dispute whatever should arise
between the Mandatory and another Member of the League of Nations relating to
the interpretation or the application of the provisions of the mandate, such
dispute, if it cannot be settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to the Permanent
Court of International Justice provided for by Article 14 of the Covenant of the
League of Nations.
ART. 27. The consent of the Council of the League of Nations is required for
any modification of the terms of this mandate.
ART 28 In the event of the termination of the mandate hereby conferred upon
the Mandatory, the Council of the League of Nations shall make such arrangements
as may be deemed necessary for safeguarding in perpetuity, under guarantee of
the League, the rights secured by Articles 13 and 14, and shall use its influence for
securing, under the guarantee of the League, that the Government of Palestine will
fully honour the financial obligations legitimately incurred by the Administration
of Palestine during the period of the mandate, including the rights of public
servants to pensions or gratuities.
British Policy on Palestine
May 17, 1939
In the Statement of Palestine, issued on 9th November, 1938, His Majesty's
Government announced their intention to invite representatives of the Arabs of
Palestine, of certain neighbouring countries and of the Jewish Agency to confer
with them in London regarding future policy It was their sincere hope that, as a
result of full, free and frank discussion, some understanding might be reached.
Conferences recently took place with Arab and Jewish delegations, lasting for a
period of several weeks, and served the purpose of a complete exchange of views
between British Ministers and the Arab and Jewish representatives. In the light
of the discussions as well as of the situation in Palestine and of the Reports of
the Royal Commission and the Partition Commission, certain proposals were
formulated by His Majesty's Government and were laid before the Arab and
Jewish delegations as the basis of an agreed settlement. Neither the Arab nor the
Jewish delegations felt able to accept these proposals, and the conferences there-
fore did not result in an agreement. Accordingly His Majesty's Government are
free to formulate their own policy, and after careful consideration they have
decided to adhere generally to the proposals which were finally submitted to, and
discussed with, the Arab and Jewish delegations.
2. The Mandate for Palestine, the terms of which were confirmed by the Council
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of the League of Nations in 1922, has governed the policy of successive British
Governments for nearly 20 years. It embodies the Balfour Declaration and
imposes on the Mandatory four main obligations. These obligations are set out in
Articles 2, 6 and 13 of the Mandate There is no dispute regarding the interpreta-
tion of one of these obligations, that touching the protection of and access to the
Holy Places and religious buildings or sites. The other three main obligations are
generally as follows
(i) To place the country under such political, administrative and economic
conditions as will secure the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the
Jewish people, to facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions, and to
encourage, in co-operation with the Jewish Agency, close settlement by Jews on
the land
(ii) To safeguard the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine
irrespective of race and religion, and, whilst facilitating Jewish immigration and
settlement, to ensure that the rights and position of other sections of the population
are not prejudiced
(iii) To place the country under such political, administrative and economic con-
ditions as will secure the development of self-governing institutions
3 The Royal Commission and previous Commissions of Enquiry have drawn
attention to the ambiguity of certain expressions in the Mandate, such as the
expression "a national home for the Jewish people," and they have found in this
ambiguity and the resulting uncertainty as to the objectives of policy a fundamental
cause of unrest and hostility between Arabs and Jews His Majesty's Government
are convinced that in the interests of the peace and well-being of the whole people
of Palestine a clear definition of policy and objectives is essential The proposal
of partition recommended by the Royal Commission would have afforded such
clarity, but the establishment of self-supporting independent Arab and Jewish
States within Palestine has been found to be impracticable It has therefore been
necessary for His Majesty's Government to devise an alternative policy which
will, consistently with their obligations to Arabs and Jews, meet the needs of the
situation in Palestine Their views and proposals are set forth below under the
three heads, (I) The Constitution, (II) Immigration, and (III) Land.
I THE CONSTITUTION
4. It has been urged that the expression "a national home for the Jewish
people" offered a prospect that Palestine might in due course become a Jewish
State or Commonwealth. His Majesty's Government do not wish to contest the
view, which was expressed by the Royal Commission, that the Zionist leaders at
the time of the issue of the Balfour Declaration recognized that an ultimate Jewish
State was not precluded by the terms of the Declaration But, with the Royal
Commission, His Majesty's Government believe that the framers of the Mandate
in which the Balfour Declaration was embodied could not have intended that
Palestine should be converted into a Jewish State against the will of the Arab
population of the country. That Palestine was not to be converted into a Jewish
State might be held to be implied in the passage from the Command Paper of
1922 which reads as follows:
u
Unauthorized statements have been made to the effect that the purpose in
view is to create a wholly Jewish Palestine. Phrases have been used such as that
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'Palestine is to become as Jewish as England is English.' His Majesty's Govern-
ment regard any such expectation as impracticable and have no such aim in view.
Nor have they at any time contemplated . . the disappearance or the sub-
ordination of the Arabic population, language or culture in Palestine. They would
draw attention to the fact that the terms of the (Balfour) Declaration referred to
do not contemplate that Palestine as a whole should be converted into a Jewish
National Home, but that such a Home should be founded in Palestine! 3
But this statement has not removed doubts, and His Majesty's Government
therefore now declare unequivocally that it is not part of their policy that
Palestine should become a Jewish State. They would indeed regard it as contrary
to their obligations to the Arabs under the Mandate, as well as to the assurances
which have been given to the Arab people in the past, that the Arab population
of Palestine should be made the subjects of a Jewish State against their will.
5. The nature of the Jewish National Home in Palestine was further described
in the Command Paper of 1922 as follows:
"During the last two or three generations the Jews have recreated in Palestine
a community, now numbering 80,000, of whom about one-fourth are fanners or
workers upon the land. This community has its own political organs, an elected
assembly for the direction of its domestic concerns; elected councils in the towns;
and an organisation for the control of its schools. It has its elected Chief Rabbi-
nate and Rabbinical Council for the direction of its religious affairs. Its business is
conducted in Hebrew as a vernacular language, and a Hebrew press serves its
needs. It has its distinctive intellectual life and displays considerable economic
activity. This community, then, with its town and country population, its political,
religious and social organisations, its own language, its own customs, its own life,
has in fact 'national' characteristics. When it is asked what is meant by the develop-
ment of the Jewish National Home in Palestine, it may be answered that it is not
the imposition of a Jewish nationality upon the inhabitants of Palestine as a whole,
but the further development of the existing Jewish community, with the assist-
ance of Jews in other parts of the world, in order that it may become a centre in
which the Jewish people as a whole may take, on grounds of religion and race, an
interest and a pride. But in order that this community should have the best
prospect of free development and provide a full opportunity for the Jewish people
to display its capacities, it is essential that it should know that it is in Palestine
as of right and not on sufferance That is the reason why it is necessary that the
existence of a Jewish National Home in Palestine should be internationally guaran-
teed, and that it should be formally recognized to rest upon ancient historic
connection."
6. His Majesty's Government adhere to this interpretation of the Declaration of
1917 and regard it as an authoritative and comprehensive description of the char-
acter of the Jewish National Home in Palestine. It envisaged the further develop-
ment of the existing Jewish community with the assistance of Jews in other parts
of the world Evidence that His Majesty's Government have been carrying out
their obligation in this respect is to be found in the facts that, since the statement
of 1922 was published, more than 300,000 Jews have immigrated to Palestine, and
that the population of the National Home has risen to some 450,000, or approach-
ing a third of the entire population of the country. Nor has the Jewish community
failed to take full advantage of the opportunities given to it The growth of the
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Jewish National Home and its achievements in many fields are a remarkable
constructive effort which must command the admiration of the world and must
be, in particular, a source of pride to the Jewish people
7 In the recent discussions the Arab delegations have repeated the contention
that Palestine was included within the area in which Sir Henry McMahon, on
behalf of the British Government, in October, 1915, undertook to recognise and
support Arab independence The validity of this claim, based on the terms of the
correspondence which passed between Sir Henry McMahon and the Sharif of
Mecca, was thoroughly and carefully investigated by British and Arab representa-
tives during the recent conferences in London Their Report, which has been
published, states that both the Arab and the British representatives endeavoured
to understand the point of view of the other party but that they were unable to
reach agreement upon an interpretation of the correspondence There is no need
to summarize here the arguments presented by each side. His Majesty's Govern-
ment regret the misunderstandings which have arisen as regards some of the
phrases used For their part they can only adhere, for the reasons given by their
representatives in the Report, to the view that the whole of Palestine west of
Jordan was excluded from Sir Henry McMahon's pledge, and they therefore
cannot agree that the McMahon correspondence forms a just basis for the claim
that Palestine should be converted into an Arab State
8 His Majesty's Government are charged as the Mandatory authority "to
secure the development of self-governing institutions" in Palestine Apart from
this specific obligation, they would regard it as contrary to the whole spirit of
the Mandate system that the population of Palestine should remain for ever under
Mandatory tutelage It is proper that the people of the country should as early
as possible enjoy the rights of self-government which are exercised by the people
of neighbouring countries His Majesty's Government are unable at present to
foresee the exact constitutional forms which government in Palestine will eventually
take, but their objective is self-government, and they desire to see established
ultimately an independent Palestine State. It should be a State in which the two
peoples in Palestine, Arabs and Jews, share authority in government in such a
way that the essential interests of each are secured.
9 The establishment of an independent State and the complete relinquishment
of Mandatory control in Palestine would require such relations between the Arabs
and the Jews as would make good government possible. Moreover, the growth of
self-governing institutions in Palestine, as in other countries, must be an evolu-
tionary process. A transitional period will be required before independence is
achieved, throughout which ultimate responsibility for the Government of the
country will be retained by his Majesty's Government as the Mandatory authority,
while the people of the country are taking an increasing share in the Government,
and understanding and co-operation amongst them are growing. It will be the
constant endeavour of His Majesty's Government to promote good relations
between the Arabs and the Jews.
10. In the light of these considerations His Majesty's Government make the
following declaration of their intentions regarding the future government of
Palestine
(Y) The objective of His Majesty's Government is the establishment within
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ten years of an independent Palestine State in such treaty relations with the United
Kingdom as will provide satisfactorily for the commercial and strategic require-
ments of both countries in the future This proposal for the establishment of the
independent State would involve consultation with the Council of the League of
Nations with a view to the termination of the Mandate.
(2) The independent State should be one in which Arabs and Jews share in
government in such a way as to ensure that the essential interests of each com-
munity are safeguarded.
(3) The establishment of the independent State will be preceded by a transi-
tional period throughout which His Majesty's Government will retain responsibility
for the government of the country During the transitional period the people of
Palestine will be given an increasing part in the government of their country Both
sections of the population will have an opportunity to participate in the ma-
chinery of government, and the process will be carried on whether or not they
both avail themselves of it
(4) As soon as peace and order have been sufficiently restored in Palestine
steps will be taken to carry out this policy of giving the people of Palestine an
increasing part in the government of their country, the objective being to place
Palestinians in charge of all the Departments of Government, with the assistance
of British advisers and subject to the control of the High Commissioner. With this
object in view His Majesty's Government will be prepared immediately to arrange
that Palestinians shall be placed in charge of certain Departments, with British
advisers. The Palestinian heads of Departments will sit on the Executive Council,
which advises the High Commissioner. Arab and Jewish representatives will be
invited to serve as heads of Departments approximately in proportion to their
respective populations The number of Palestinians in charge of Departments will
be increased as circumstances permit until all heads of Departments are Pales-
tinians, exercising the administrative and advisory functions which are at present
performed by British officials. When that stage is reached consideration will be
given to the question of converting the Executive Council into a Council of
Ministers with a consequential change in the status and functions of the Palestin-
ian heads of Departments.
(5) His Majesty's Government make no proposals at this stage regarding the
establishment of an elective legislature Nevertheless they would regard this as an
appropriate constitutional development, and, should public opinion in Palestine
hereafter show itself in favour of such a development, they will be prepared,
provided that local conditions permit, to establish the necessary machinery
(6) At the end of five years from the restoration of peace and order, an appro-
priate body representative of the people of Palestine and of His Majesty's Gov-
ernment will be set up to review the working of the constitutional arrangements
during the transitional period and to consider and make recommendations regarding
the constitution of the independent Palestine State
(7) His Majesty's Government will require to be satisfied that in the treaty
contemplated by sub-paragraph (1) or in the constitution contemplated by sub-
paragraph (6) adequate provision has been made for:
(a) the security of, and freedom of access to, the Holy Places, and the
protection of the interests and property of the various religious bodies.
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(6) the protection of the different communities in Palestine in accordance
with the obligations of His Majesty's Government to both Arabs and Jews
and for the special position in Palestine of the Jewish National Home
(c) such requirements to meet the strategic situation as may be regarded
as necessary by His Majesty's Government in the light of the circumstances
then existing
His Majesty's Government will also require to be satisfied that the interests of
certain foreign countries in Palestine, for the preservation of which they are at
present responsible, are adequately safeguarded.
(8) His Majesty's Government will do everything in their power to create
conditions which will enable the independent Palestine State to come into being
within ten years. If, at the end of ten years, it appears to His Majesty's Govern-
ment that, contrary to their hope, circumstances require the postponement of the
establishment of the independent State, they will consult with representatives of
the people of Palestine, the Council of the League of Nations and the neighbouring
Arab States before deciding on such a postponement If His Majesty's Govern-
ment come to the conclusion that postponement is unavoidable, they will invite the
co-operation of these parties in framing plans for the future with a view to
achieving the desired objective at the earliest possible date.
11. During the transitional period steps will be taken to increase the powers
and responsibilities of municipal corporations and local councils
II IMMIGRATION
12. Under Article 6 of the 'Mandate, the Administration of Palestine, "while
ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not
prejudiced," is required to "facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable condi-
tions." Beyond this, the extent to which Jewish immigration into Palestine is to
be permitted is nowhere defined in the Mandate But in the Command Paper of
1922 it was laid down that for the fulfilment of the policy of establishing a Jewish
National Home:
"It is necessary that the Jewish community in Palestine should be able to in-
crease its numbers by immigration This immigration cannot be so great in volume
as to exceed whatever may be the economic capacity of the country at the time
to absorb new arrivals It is essential to ensure that the immigrants should not be
a burden upon the people of Palestine as a whole, and that they should not deprive
any section of the present population of their employment.
33
In practice, from that date onwards until recent times, the economic absorptive
capacity of the country has been treated as the sole limiting factor, and in the
letter which Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, as Prime Minister, sent to Dr Weizmann
in February 1931 it was laid down as a matter of policy that economic absorptive
capacity was the sole criterion. This interpretation has been supported by resolu-
tions of the Permanent Mandates Commission. But His Majesty's Government
do not read either the Statement of Policy of 1922 or the letter of 1931 as imply-
ing that the Mandate requires them, for all time and in all circumstances, to
facilitate the immigration of Jews into Palestine subject only to consideration of the
country's economic absorptive capacity. Nor do they find anything in the Mandate
or in subsequent Statements of Policy to support the view that the establishment
of a Jewish National Home in Palestine cannot be effected unless immigration is
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allowed to continue indefinitely If immigration has an adverse effect on the eco-
nomic position in the country, it should clearly be restricted; and equally, if it
has a seriously damaging effect on the political position in the country, that is a
factor that should not be ignored Although it is not difficult to contend that the large
number of Jewish immigrants who have been admitted so far have been absorbed
economically, the fear of the Arabs that this influx will continue indefinitely until the
Jewish population is in a position to dominate them has produced consequences which
are extremely grave for Jews and Arabs alike and for the peace and prosperity of
Palestine The lamentable disturbances of the past three years are only the latest and
most sustained manifestation of this intense Arab apprehension The methods em-
ployed by Arab terrorists against fellow-Arabs and Jews alike must receive unquali-
fied condemnation But it cannot be denied that fear of indefinite Jewish immigration
is widespread amongst the Arab population and that this fear has made possible
disturbances which have given a serious setback to economic progress, depleted the
Palestine exchequer, rendered life and property insecure, and produced a bitterness
between the Arab and Jewish populations which is deplorable between citizens of
the same country. If in these circumstances immigration is continued up to the
economic absorptive capacity of the country, regardless of all other considerations,
a fatal enmity between the two peoples will be perpetuated, and the situation in
Palestine may become a permanent source of friction amongst all peoples in the
Near and Middle East. His Majesty's Government cannot take the view that
either their obligations under the Mandate, or considerations of common sense
and justice, require that they should ignore these circumstances in framing immi-
gration policy.
13. In the view of the Royal Commission, the association of the policy of the
Balfour Declaration with the Mandate system implied the belief that Arab
hostility to the former would sooner or later be overcome. It has been the hope of
British Governments ever since the Balfour Declaration was issued that in time the
Arab population, recognizing the advantages to be derived from Jewish settlement
and development in Palestine, would become reconciled to the further growth of
the Jewish National Home. This hope has not been fulfilled. The alternatives
before His Majesty's Government are either (i) to seek to expand the Jewish
National Home indefinitely by immigration, against the strongly expressed will
of the Arab people of the country, or (ii) to permit further expansion of the
Jewish National Home by immigration only if the Arabs are prepared to acquiesce
in it. The former policy means rule by force. Apart from other considerations,
such a policy seems to His Majesty's Government to be contrary to the whole
spirit of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, as well as to their
specific obligations to the Arabs in the Palestine Mandate. Moreover, the relations
between the Arabs and the Jews in Palestine must be based sooner or later on
mutual tolerance and goodwill; the peace, security and progress of the Jewish
National Home itself require this. Therefore His Majesty's Government, after
earnest consideration, and taking into account the extent to which the growth of
the Jewish National Home has been facilitated over the last twenty years, have
decided that the time has come to adopt in principle the second of the alternatives
referred to above.
14. It has been urged that all further Jewish immigration into Palestine should
be stopped forthwith. His Majesty's Government cannot accept such a proposal.
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It would damage the whole of the financial and economic system of Palestine and
thus affect adversely the interests of Arabs and Jeus alike Moreover, in the view
of His Majesty's Government, abruptly to stop further immigration would be un-
just to the Jewish National Home But, above all, His Majesty's Government are
conscious of the present unhappy plight of large numbers of Jews who seek a refuge
from certain European countries, and they believe that Palestine can and should
make a further contribution to the solution of this pressing world problem In all
these circumstances, they believe that they will be acting consistently with their
Mandatory7 obligations to both Arabs and Jews, and in the manner best calculated
to serve the interests of the whole people of Palestine, by adopting the following
proposals regarding immigration
(1) Jewish immigration during the next five years will be at a rate which, if
economic absorptive capacity permits, will bring the Jewish population up to ap-
proximately one-third of the total population of the country Taking into account
the expected natural increase of the Arab and Jewish populations, and the number
of illegal Jewish immigrants now in the country, this would allow of the admission,
as from the beginning of April this year, of some 75,000 immigrants over the next
five years. These immigrants would, subject to the criterion of economic absorptive
capacity, be admitted as follows.
(0) For each of the next five years a quota of 10000 Jewish immigrants will
be allowed, on the understanding that a shortage in any one year may be added
to the quotas for subsequent years, within the five-year period, if economic
absorptive capacity permits
(b) In addition, as a contribution towards the solution of the Jewish refugee
problem, 25,000 refugees will be admitted as soon as the High Commissioner
is satisfied that adequate provision for their maintenance is ensured, special
consideration being given to refugee children and dependants
(2) The existing machinery for ascertaining economic absorptive capacity will
be retained, and the High Commissioner will have the ultimate responsibility for
deciding the limits of economic capacity Before each periodic decision is taken,
Jewish and Arab representatives will be consulted
(3) After the period of five years no further Jewish immigration will be
permitted unless the Arabs of Palestine are prepared to acquiesce in it.
(4) His Majesty's Government are determined to check illegal immigration,
and further preventive measures are being adopted. The numbers of any Jewish il-
legal immigrants who. despite these measures, may succeed in coming into the
country and cannot be deported will be deducted from the yearly quotas
15. His Majesty's Government are satisfied that, when the immigration over
five years which is now contemplated has taken place, they will not be justified
in facilitating, nor will they be under any obligation to facilitate, the further de-
velopment of the Jewish National Home by immigration regardless of the wishes
of the Arab population.
III. LAND
16 The Administration of Palestine is required, under Article 6 of the Mandate,
"while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are
not prejudiced," to encourage "close settlement by Jews on the land," and no re-
striction has been imposed hitherto on the transfer of land from Arabs to Jews.
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The Reports of several expert Commissions have indicated that, owing to the natu-
ral growth of the Arab population and the steady sale in recent years of Arab land
to Jews, there is now in certain areas no room for further transfers of Arab land
whilst in some other areas such transfers of land must be restricted if Arab culti-
vators are to maintain their existing standard of life and a considerable landless
Arab population is not soon to be created. In these circumstances, the High Com-
missioner will be given general powers to prohibit and regulate transfers of land.
These powers will date from the publication of this statement of policy and the
High Commissioner will retain them throughout the transitional period.
17 The policy of the Government will be directed towards the development of
the land and the improvement, where possible, of methods of cultivation In the
light of such development it will be open to the High Commissioner, should he be
satisfied that the "rights and position" of the Arab population will be duly pre-
served, to review and modify any orders passed relating to the prohibition or
restriction of the transfer of land.
18 In framing these proposals His Majesty's Government have sincerely en-
deavoured to act in strict accordance with their obligations under the Mandate to
both the Arabs and the Jews. The vagueness of the phrases employed in some
instances to describe these obligations has led to controversy and has made the
task of interpretation difficult. His Majesty's Government cannot hope to satisfy
the partisans of one party or the other in such controversy as the Mandate has
aroused Their purpose is to be just as between the two peoples in Palestine whose
destinies in that country have been affected by the great events of recent years, and
who, since they live side by side, must learn to practise mutual tolerance, goodwill
and co-operation. In looking to the future, His Majesty's Government are not blind
to the fact that some events of the past make the task of creating these relations
difficult; but they are encouraged by the knowledge that at many times and in
many places in Palestine during recent years the Arab and Jewish inhabitants
have lived in friendship together Each community has much to contribute to the
welfare of their common land, and each must earnestly desire peace in which to
assist in increasing the well-being of the whole people of the country. The respon-
sibility which falls on them, no less than upon His Majesty's Government, to co-
operate together to ensure peace is all the more solemn because their country is
revered by many millions of Moslems, Jews and Christians throughout the world
who pray for peace in Palestine and for the happiness of her people.
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Pact of the League of Arab States
March 22, 1945
His Excellency the President of the Syrian Republic;
His Royal Highness the Amir of Trans-Jordan ;
His Majesty the King of Iraq;
His Majesty the King of Saudi Arabia,
His Excellency the President of the Lebanese Republic;
His Majesty the King of Egypt;
His Majesty the King of the Yemen;
Who, after having exchanged their plenary powers, which were found to be in
good and due form, have agreed upon the following provisions'
ART 1. The League of Arab States is composed of the independent Arab States
which have signed this Pact
Any independent Arab State has the right to become a member of the League.
If it desires to do so, it shall submit a request which will be deposited with the
Permanent Secretariat General and submitted to the Council at the first meeting
held after submission of the request
ART 2 The League has as its purpose the strengthening of the relations be-
tween the member states; the coordination of their policies in order to achieve
cooperation between them and to safeguard their independence and sovereignty;
and a general concern with the affairs and interests of the Arab countries It has
also as its purpose the close cooperation of the member states, with due regard to
the organization and circumstances of each state, on the following matters
A. Economic and financial affairs, including commercial relations, customs,
currency, and questions of agriculture and industry
B Communications, this includes railroads, roads, aviation, navigation, telegraphs,
and posts.
C. Cultural affairs.
D Nationality, passports, visas, execution of judgments, and extradition of
criminals.
E Social affairs.
F. Health problems.
ART 3. The League shall possess a Council composed of the representatives of
the member states of the League; each state shall have a single vote, irrespective
of the number of its representatives.
It shall be the task of the Council to achieve the realization of the objectives
of the League and to supervise the execution of agreements which the member
states have concluded on the questions enumerated in the preceding article, or on
any other questions
It likewise shall be the Council's task to decide upon the means by which the
9
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League is to cooperate with the international bodies to be created in the future
in order to guarantee security and peace and regulate economic and social relations.
ART 4 For each of the questions listed in Article 2 there shall be set up a
special committee in which the member states of the League shall be represented.
These committees shall be charged with the task of laying down the principles
and extent of cooperation. Such principles shall be formulated as draft agreements,
to be presented to the Council for examination preparatory to their submission to
the aforesaid states
Representatives of the other Arab countries may take part in the work of the
aforesaid committees.The Council shall determine the conditions under which these
representatives may be permitted to participate and the rules governing such
representation.
ART 5. Any resort to force in order to resolve disputes arising between two
or more member states of the League is prohibited If there should arise among
them a difference which does not concern a state's independence, sovereignty, or
territorial integrity, and if the parties to the dispute have recourse to the Council
for the settlement of this difference, the decision of the Council shall then be
enforceable and obligatory.
In such a case, the states between whom the difference has arisen shall not
participate in the deliberations and decisions of the Council.
The Council shall mediate in all differences which threaten to lead to war be-
tween two member states, or a member state and a third state, with a view to
bringing about their reconciliation.
Decisions of arbitration and mediation shall be taken by majority vote.
ART. 6. In case of aggression or threat of aggression by one state against a
member state, the state which has been attacked or threatened with aggression may
demand the immediate convocation of the Council
The Council shall by unanimous decision determine the measures necessary to
repulse the aggression If the aggressor is a member state, his vote shall not be
counted in determining unanimity.
If, as a result of the attack, the government of the state attacked finds itself
unable to communicate with the Council, that state's representative in the Council
shall have the right to request the convocation of the Council for the purpose in-
dicated in the foregoing paragraph. In the event that this representative is unable
to communicate with the Council, any member state of the League shall have the
right to request the convocation of the Council.
ART 7. Unanimous decisions of the Council shall be binding upon all member
states of the League; majority decisions shall be binding only upon those states
which have accepted them.
In either case the decisions of the Council shall be enforced in each member
state according to its respective basic laws.
ART. 8. Each member state shall respect the systems of government estab-
lished in the other member states and regard them as exclusive concerns of those
states. Each shall pledge to abstain from any action calculated to change established
systems of government.
ART 9. States of the League which desire to establish closer cooperation and
stronger bonds than are provided by this Pact may conclude agreements to that end.
Treaties and agreements already concluded or to be concluded in the futuie
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between a member state and another state shall not be binding or restrictive upon
other members
ART. 10. The permanent seat of the League of Arab States is established in
Cairo. The Council may, however, assemble at any other place it may designate.
ART. 11 The Council of the League shall convene in ordinary session twice a
year, in March and in October It shall convene in extraordinary session upon the
request of two member states of the League whenever the need arises
ART 12 The League shall have a permanent Secretariat-General which shall
consist of a Secretary-General, Assistant Secretaries, and an appropiate number of
officials.
The Council of the League shall establish an administrative i emulation for the
of two-thirds of the states of the League The Secretary-General, with the approval
of the Council shall appoint the Assistant Secretaries and the principal officials of
the League.
The Council of the League shall appoint the Secretary-General by a majority for
the functions of the Secretariat-General and matters relating to the Staff.
The Secretary-General shall have the rank of Ambassador and the Assistant
Secretaries that of Ministers Plenipotentiary
The first Secretary-General of the League is named in an Annex to this Pact.
ART 13 The Secretary-General shall prepare the draft of the budget of the
League and shall submit it to the Council for approval before the beginning of each
fiscal year.
The Council shall fix the share of the expenses to be borne by each state of the
League. This share may be reconsidered if necessary.
ART. 14. The members of the Council of the League as well as the members
of the committees and the officials who are to be designated in the administrative
regulation shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunity when engaged in the
exercise of their functions
The buildings occupied by the organs of the League shall be inviolable.
ART. 15. The first meeting of the Council shall be convened at the invitation
of the head of the Egyptian Government Thereafter it shall be convened at the
invitation of the Secretary-General.
The representatives of the member states of the League shall alternately assume
the presidency of the Council at each of its ordinary sessions.
ART. 16. Except in cases specifically indicated in this Pact, a majority vote
of the Council shall be sufficient to make enforceable decisions on the following
matters:
A. Matters relating to personnel.
B. Adoption of the budget of the League.
C. Establishment of the administrative regulations for the Council, the com-
mittees, and the Secretariat General.
D. Decisions to adjourn the sessions.
ART. 17. Each member state of the League shall deposit with the Secretariat-
General one copy of every treaty or agreement concluded or to be concluded in
the future between itself and another member state of the League or a third state.
ART 18 If a member state contemplates withdrawal from the League, it
shall inform the Council of its intention one year before such withdrawal is to
go into effect.
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The Council of the League may consider any state which fails to fulfill its ob-
ligations under this Pact as having become separated from the League, this to go
into effect upon a unanimous decision of the states, not counting the state concerned.
ART 19. This Pact may be amended with the consent of two-thirds of the
states belonging to the League, especially in order to make firmer and stronger
the ties between the member states, to create an Arab Tribunal of Arbitration,
and to regulate the relations of the League with any international bodies to be
created in the future to guarantee security and peace.
Final action on an amendment cannot be taken prior to the session following
the session in which the motion was initiated.
If a state does not accept such an amendment it may withdraw at such time as
the amendment goes into effect, without being bound by the provisions of the
preceding article.
ART. 20. This Pact and its Annexes shall be ratified according to the basic
laws in force among the High Contracting Parties.
The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Secretariat-General
of the Council and the Pact shall become operative as regards each ratifying state
fifteen days after the Secretary-General has received the instruments of ratification
from four states.
This Pact has been drawn up in Cairo in the Arabic language on this 8th day
of Rabi' II, thirteen hundred and sixty-four (March 22, 1945), in one copy which
shall be deposited in the safe keeping of the Secretariat-General.
An identical copy shall be delivered to each state of the League.
[Here follow the signatures]
(1) Annex Regarding Palestine
Since the termination of the last great war the rule of the Ottoman Empire
over the Arab countries, among them Palestine, which had become detached from
that Empire, has come to an end. She has come to be autonomous, not subordinate
to any other state.
The Treaty of Lausanne proclaimed that her future was to be settled by the
parties concerned.
However, even though she was as yet unable to control her own affairs, the
Covenant of the League (of Nations) in 1919 made provision for a regime based
upon recognition of her independence.
Her international existence and independence in the legal sense cannot, there-
fore, be questioned, any more than could the independence of the other Arab
countries.
Although the outward manifestations of this independence have remained ob-
scured for reasons beyond her control, this should not be allowed to interfere
with her participation in the work of the Council of the League.
The States signatory to the Pact of the Arab League are therefore of the
opinion that, considering the special circumstances of Palestine and until that
country can effectively exercise its independence, the Council of the League should
take charge of the selection of an Arab representative from Palestine to take part
in its work.
(2) Annex Regarding Cooperation With Countries Which Are Not Members of
the Council of the League
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Whereas the member states of the League will have to deal in the Council as
well as in the committees with matters which will benefit and affect the Arab
world at large;
And whereas the Council has to take into account the aspirations of the Arab
countries which are not members of the Council and has to work toward their
realization
;
Now therefore, it particularly behooves the states signatory to the Pact of the
Arab League to enjoin the Council of the League, when considering the admission
of those countries to participation in the committees referred to in the Pact, that
it should do its utmost to cooperate with them, and furthermore, that it should
spare no effort to learn their needs and understand their aspirations and hopes;
and that it should work thenceforth for their best interests and the safeguarding
of their future with all the political means at its disposal
(3) Annex Regarding the Appointment of a Secretary-General of the League
The states signatory to this Pact have agreed to appoint His Excellency Abd-
ul-Rahman 'Assam Bey, to be the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States.
This appointment is made for two years The Council of the League shall
hereafter determine the new regulations for the Secretariat-General.
Resolution on the Partition of Palestine:
United Nations General Assembly
November 29, 1947
The General Assembly,
Having met in special session at the request of the mandatory Power to consti-
tute and instruct a special committee to prepare for the consideration of the
question of the future government of Palestine at the second regular session;
Having constituted a Special Committee and instructed it to investigate all
questions and issues relevant to the problem of Palestine, and to prepare proposals
for the solution of the problem, and
Having received and examined the report of the Special Committee (document
A/364) including a number of unanimous recommendations and a plan of partition
with economic union approved by the majority of the Special Committee,
Considers that the present situation in Palestine is one which is likely to impair
the general welfare and friendly relations among nations;
Takes note of the declaration by the mandatory Power that it plans to complete
its evacuation of Palestine by 1 August 1948;
Recommends to the United Kingdom, as the mandatory Power for Palestine,
and to all other Members of the United Nations the adoption and implementation,
with regard to the future government of Palestine, of the Plan of Partition with
Economic Union set out below;
Requests that
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(a) The Security Council take the necessary measures as provided for in the
plan for its implementation;
(b) The Security Council consider if circumstances during the transitional period
require such consideration, whether the situation in Palestine constitutes a threat
to the peace. If it decides that such a threat exists, and in order to maintain interna-
tional peace and security, the Security Council should supplement the authorization
of the General Assembly by taking measures, under Articles 39 and 41 of the
Charter, to empower the United Nations Commission, as provided in this resolution,
to exercise in Palestine the functions which are assigned to it by this resolution;
(c) The Security Council determine as a threat to the peace, breach of the
peace or act of aggression, in accordance with Article 39 of the Charter, any
attempt to alter by force the settlement envisaged by this resolution;
(d) The Trusteeship Council be informed of the responsibilities envisaged for
it in this plan;
Calls upon the inhabitants of Palestine to take such steps as may be necessary
on their part to put this plan into effect;
Appeals to all Governments and all peoples to refrain from taking any action
which might hamper or delay the carrying out of these recommendations. . . .
PLAN OF PARTITION WITH ECONOMIC UNION
PART I. FUTURE CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT OF PALESTINE
A TERMINATION OF MANDATE, PARTITION AND INDEPENDENCE
1. The Mandate for Palestine shall terminate as soon as possible but in any case
not later than 1 August 1948.
2. The armed forces of the mandatory Power shall be progressively withdrawn
from Palestine, the withdrawal to be completed as soon as possible but in any
case not later than 1 August 1948.
The mandatory Power shall advise the Commission, as far in advance as possible,
of its intention to terminate the Mandate and to evacuate each area.
The mandatory Power shall use its best endeavours to ensure that an area sit-
uated in the territory of the Jewish State, including a seaport and hinterland
adequate to provide facilities for a substantial immigration, shall be evacuated
at the earliest possible date and in any event not later than 1 February 1948.
3. Independent Arab and Jewish States and the Special International Regime
for the City of Jerusalem, set forth in part III of this plan, shall come into exis-
tence in Palestine two months after the evacuation of the armed forces of the
mandatory Power has been completed but in any case not later than 1 October 1948.
The boundaries of the Arab State, the Jewish State, and the City of Jerusalem
shall be as described in parts II and III below.
4. The period between the adoption by the General Assembly of its recommen-
dation on the question of Palestine and the establishment of the independence of
the Arab and Jewish States shall be a transitional period.
B. STEPS PREPARATORY TO INDEPENDENCE
1. A Commission shall be set up consisting of one representative of each of
five Member States. The Members represented on the Commission shall be elected
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by the General Assembly on as broad a basis, geographically and otherwise, as
possible
2. The administration of Palestine shall, as the mandatory Power withdraws its
armed forces, be progressively turned over to the Commission, which shall act in
conformity with the recommendations of the General Assembly, under the guidance
of the Security Council The mandatory Power shall to the fullest possible extent
cordinate its plans for withdrawal with the plans of the Commission to take over
and administer areas which have been evacuated
In the discharge of this administrative responsibility the Commission shall have
authority to issue necessary regulations and take other measures as required
The mandatory Power shall not take any action to prevent, obstruct or delay
the implementation by the Ccmmissicn of die measures recommended by the
General Assembly
3. On its arrival in Palestine the Commission shall proceed to carry out measures
for the establishment of the frontiers of the Arab and Jewish States and the City
of Jerusalem in accordance with the general lines of the recommendations of the
General Assembly on the partition of Palestine Nevertheless, the boundaries as
described in part II of this plan are to be modified in such a way that village
areas as a rule will not be divided by state boundaries unless pressing reasons make
that necessary.
4 The Commission, after consultation with the democratic parties and other
public organizations of the Arab and Jewish States, shall select and establish in
each State as rapidly as possible a Provisional Council of Government The activi-
ties of both the Arab and Jewish Provisional Councils of Government shall be
carried out under the general direction of the Commission
If by 1 April 1948 a Provisional Council of Government cannot be selected for
either of the States, or, if selected, cannot carry out its functions, the Commission
shall communicate that fact to the Security Council for such action with respect
to that State as the Security Council may deem proper, and to the Secretary-
General for the communication to the Members of the United Nations.
5. Subject to the provisions of these recommendations, during the transitional
period the Provisional Councils of Government, acting under the Commission, shall
have full authority in the areas under their control, including authority over matters
of immigration and land regulation.
6. The Provisional Council of Government of each State, acting under the Com-
mission, shall progressively receive from the Commission full responsibility for the
administration of that State in the period between the termination of the Mandate
and the establishment of the State's independence.
7. The Commission shall instruct the Provisional Councils of Government of
both the Arab and Jewish States, after their formation, to proceed to the establish-
ment of administrative organs of government, central and local
8 The Provisional Council of Government of each State shall, within the shortest
time possible, recruit an armed militia from the residents of that State, sufficient
in number to maintain internal order and to prevent frontier clashes
This armed militia in each State shall, for operational purposes, be under the
command of Jewish or Arab officers resident in that State, but general political
and military control, including the choice of the militia's High Command, shall be
exercised by the Commission.
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9 The Provisional Council of Government of each State shall, not later than
two months after the withrawal of the armed forces of the mandatory Power, hold
elections to the Constituent Assembly which shall be conducted on democratic lines.
The election regulations in each State shall be drawn up by the Provisional
Council of Government and approved by the Commission Qualified voters for
each State for this election shall be persons over eighteen years of age who are.
(a) Palestinian citizens residing in that State and (b) Arabs and Jews residing
in the State, although not Palestinian citizens, who, before voting, have signed a
notice of intention to become citizens of such State
Arabs and Jews residing in the City of Jerusalem who have signed a notice of
intention to become citizens, the Arabs of the Arab State and the Jews of the
Jewish State, shall be entitled to vote in the Arab and Jewish States respectively.
Women may vote and be elected to the Constituent Assemblies.
During the transitional period no Jew shall be permitted to establish residence
in the area of the proposed Arab State, and no Arab shall be permitted to estab-
lish residence in the area of the proposed Jewish State, except by special leave
of the Commission
10. The Constituent Assembly of each State shall draft a democratic constitu-
tion for its State and choose a provisional government to succeed the Provisional
Council of Government appointed by the Commission The constitutions of the
States shall embody chapters 1 and 2 of the Declaration provided for in section C
below and include inter alia provisions for.
(a) Establishing in each State a legislative body elected by universal suffrage
and by secret ballot on the basis of proportional representation, and an executive
body responsible to the legislature;
(6) Settling all international disputes in which the State may be involved by
peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice,
are not endangered;
(c] Accepting the obligation of the State to refrain in its international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political inde-
pendence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of
the United nations;
(d] Guaranteeing to all persons equal and non-discriminatory rights in civil,
political, economic and religious matters and the enjoyment of human rights and
fundamental freedoms, including freedom cf religion, languages, speech and publica-
tion education, assembly and association;
(e] Preserving freedom of transit and visit for all residents and citizens of the
other State in Palestine and the City of Jerusalem, subject to considerations of
national security, provided that each State shall control residence within its
borders.
11. The Commission shall appoint a preparatory economic commission of three
members to make whatever arrangements are possible for economic co-operation,
with a view7 to establishing, as soon as practicable, the Economic Union and the
Joint Economic Board, as provided in section D below.
12. During the period between the adoption of the recommendations on the
question of Palestine by the General Assemblv and the termination of the Man-
date, the mandatory Power in Palestine shall maintain full responsibility for
administration in areas from which it has not withdrawn its armed forces. The
110 Historical Background
Commission shall assist the mandatory Power in the carrying out of these functions
Similarly the mandatory Power shall co-operate with the Commission in the
execution of its functions
13. With a view to ensuring that there shall be continuity in the functioning of
administrative services and that, on the withdrawal of the armed forces of the
mandatory Power, the whole administration shall be in the charge of the Pro-
visional Councils and the Joint Economic Board, respectively, acting under the
Commission; there shall be a progressive transfer, from the mandatory Power to
the Commission, of responsibility for all the functions of government, including
that of maintaining law and order in the areas from which the forces of the man-
datory Power have been withdrawn
14. The Commission shall be guided in its activities by the recommendations
of the General Assembly and by such instructions as the Security Council may
consider necessary to issue
The measures taken by the Commission, within the recommendations of the
General Assembly, shall become immediately effective unless the Commission has
previously received contrary instructions from the Security Council
The Commission shall render periodic monthly progress reports, or more
frequently if desirable, to the Security Council
15 The Commission shall make its final report to the next regular session of
the General Assembly and to the Security Council simultaneously
C DECLARATION
A declaration shall be made to the United Nations by the provisional government
of each proposed State before independence It shall contain inter alia the following
clauses :
General provision
The stipulations contained in the declaration are recognized as fundamental laws
of the State and no law, regulation or official action shall conflict or interfere with
these stipulations, nor shall any law, regulation or official action prevail over them
Chapter 1
Holy Places, religious buildings and sites
1 Existing rights in respect of Holy Places and religious buildings or sites shall
not be denied or impaired,
2. In so far as Holy Places are concerned, the liberty of access, visit and transit
shall be guaranteed, in conformity with existing rights, to all residents and citizens
of the other State and of the City of Jerusalem, as well as to aliens, without distinc-
tion as to nationality, subject to requirements of national security, public order and
decorum.
Similarly, freedom of worship shall be guaranteed in conformity with existing
rights, subject to the maintenance of public order and decorum
3 Holy Places and religious buildings or sites shall be preserved No act shall be
permitted which may in any way impair their sacred character. If at any time it ap-
pears to the Government that any particular Holy Place, religious building or site is
in need of urgent repair, the Government may call upon the community or com-
10 Resolution on the Partition of Palestine 111
munities concerned to carry out such repair The Government may carry it out
itself at the expense of the community or communities concerned if no action is
taken within a reasonable time.
4. No taxation shall be levied in respect of any Holy Place, religious building or
site which was exempt from taxation on the date of the creation of the State
No change in the incidence of such taxation shall be made which would either
discriminate between the owners or occupiers of Holy Places, religious buildings or
sites, or would place such owners or occupiers in a position less favourable in rela-
tion to the general incidence of taxation than existed at the time of the adoption
of the Assembly's recommendations
5 The Governor of the City of Jerusalem shall have the right to determine
whether the provisions of the Constitution of the State in relation to Holy Places,
religious buildings and sites within the borders of the State and the religious rights
appertaining thereto, are being properly applied and respected, and to make
decisions on the basis of existing rights in cases of disputes which may arise
between the different religious communities or the rites of a religious community
with respect to such places, buildings and sites. He shall receive full co-operation
and such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the exercise of his func-
tions in the State.
Chapter 2
Religious and minority rights
1 Freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship, subject
only to the maintenance of public order and morals, shall be ensured to all
2. No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants on the
ground of race, religion, language or sex
3. All persons within the jurisdiction of the State shall be entitled to equal pro-
tection of the laws.
4. The family law and personal status of the various minorities and their religious
interests, including endowments, shall be respected
5. Except as may be required for the maintenance of public order and good
government, no measure shall be taken to obstruct or interfere with the enterprise
of religious or charitable bodies of all faiths or to discriminate against any repre-
sentative or member of these bodies on the ground of his religion or nationality.
6. The State shall ensure adequate primary and secondary education for the Arab
and Jewish minority respectively, in its own language and its cultural traditions
The right of each community to maintain its own schools for the education of its
own members in its own language, which conforming to such educational requirements
of a general nature as the State may impose, shall not be denied or impaired. For-
eign educational establishments shall continue their activity on the basis of their
existing rights.
7 No restriction shall be imposed on the free use by any citizen of the state of
any language in private intercourse, in commerce in religion, in the Press or in
publications of any kind, or at public meetings.
1
1 The following; stipulation shall be added to the declaration concerning the Jewish
State: "In the Jewish State adequate facilities shall be given to Arabic-speaking
citizens for the use of their language, either orally or in writing, in the legislature,
before the Courts and in the administration."
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8 No expropriation of land owned by an Arab in the Jewish State (by a Jew in
the Arab State ) - shall be allowed except for public purposes In all cases of ex-
propriation full compensation as fixed by the Supreme Court shall be paid previous
to dispossession.
Chapter 3
Citizenship, international conventions and financial obligations
1. Citizenship Palestinian citizens residing in Palestine outside
the City of Jer-
usalem, as well as Arabs and Jews who, not holding Palestinian citizenship, reside
in Palestine outside the City of Jerusalem shall, upon the recognition of independ-
ence, become citizens of the State in which they are resident and enjoy full civil
and political rights. Persons over the age of eighteen years may opt within one year
from the date of recognition of independence of the State in which they reside for
citizenship of the other State, providing that no Arab residing in the area of the
proposed Arab State shall have the right to opt for citizenship in the proposed
Jewish State and no Jew residing in the proposed Jewish State shall have the right
to opt for citizenship in the proposed Arab State The exercise of this right of
option will be taken to include the wives and children under eighteen years of age
of persons so opting.
Arabs residing in the area of the proposed Jewish State and Jews residing in the
area of the proposed Arab State who have signed a notice of intention to opt for
citizenship of the other State shall be eligible to vote in the elections to the Con-
stituent Assembly of that State, but not in the elections to the Constituent Assembly
of the State in which they reside.
2 International conventions (a) The State shall be bound by all the interna-
tional agreements and conventions, both general and special, to which Palestine has
become a party Subject to any right of denunciation provided for therein, such
agreements and conventions shall be respected by the State throughout the period
for which they were concluded.
(b) Any dispute about the applicability and continued validity of international
conventions or treaties signed or adhered to by the mandatory Power on behalf
of Palestine shall be referred to the International Court of Justice in accordance
with the provisions of the Statute of the Court.
3. Financial obligations, (a) The State shall respect and fulfil all financial
obligations of whatever nature assumed on behalf of Palestine by the mandatory
Power during the exercise of the Mandate and recognized by the State. This provi-
sion includes the right of public servants to pensions, compensation or gratuities.
(b) These obligations shall be fulfilled through participation in the Joint Eco-
nomic Board in respect of those obligations applicable to Palestine as a whole, and
individually in respect of those applicable to, and fairly apportionable between, the
States.
(c) A Court of Claims, affiliated with the Joint Economic Board, and composed
of one member appointed by the United Nations, one representative of the United
-
In the declaration concerning the Arab State, the words "by an Arab in the Jewish
State" should be replaced by the words "by a Jew in the Arab State."
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Kingdom and one representative of the State concerned, should be established Any
dispute between the United Kingdom and the State respecting claims not recognized
by the latter should be referred to that Court
(d) Commercial concessions granted in respect of any part of Palestine prior to
the adoption of the resolution by the General Assembly shall continue to be valid
according to their terms, unless modified by agreement between the concession-
holder and the State.
B BOUNDARIES OF THE CITY
The City of Jerusalem shall include the present municipality of Jerusalem plus
the surrounding villages and towns, the most eastern of which shall be Abu Dis;
the most southern, Bethelehem, the most western, Ein Karirn (including also the
built-up area of Motsa ) ; and the most northern ShuTat, as indicated on the at-
tached sketch-map (annex B).
C. STATUTE OF THE CITY
The Trusteeship Council shall, within five months of the approval of the present
plan, elaborate and approve a detailed Statute of the City which shall contain inter
alia the substance of the following provisions .
1. Government machinery; special objectives The Administering Authority in
discharging its administrative obligations shall pursue the following special ob-
jectives :
(f) To protect and to preserve the unique spiritual and religious interests located
in the city of the three great monotheistic faiths throughout the world, Christian,
Jewish and Moslem; to this end to ensure that order and peace, and especially
religious peace, reign in Jerusalem.
(b) To foster co-operation among all the inhabitants of the city in their own
interests as well as in order to encourage and support the peaceful development of
the mutual relations between the two Palestinian peoples throughout the Holy Land;
to promote the security, well-being and any constructive measures of development
of the residents, having regard to the special circumstances and customs of the
various peoples and communities
2. Governor and administrative staff. A Governor of the City of Jerusalem shall
be appointed by the Trusteeship Council and shall be responsible to it. He shall be
selected on the basis of special qualifications and without regard to nationality He
shall not, however, be a citizen of either State in Palestine.
The Governor shall represent the United Nations in the City and shall exercise
on their behalf all powers of administration, including the conduct of external af-
fairs. He shall be assisted by an administrative staff classed as international officers
in the meaning of Article 100 of the Charter and chosen whenever practicable from
the residents of the city and of the rest of Palestine on a non-discriminatory basis.
A detailed plan for the organization of the administration of the city shall be sub-
mitted by the Governor to the Trusteeship Council and duly approved by it.
3. Local autonomy, (a] The existing local autonomous units in the territory of
the city (villages, townships and municipalities) shall enjoy wide powers of local
government and administration.
(b) The Governor shall study and submit for the consideration and decision of
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the Trusteeship Council a plan for the establishment of special town units consisting,
respectively, of the Jewish and Arab sections of new Jerusalem The new town
units shall continue to form part of the present municipality of Jerusalem
4 Security measures (a) The City of Jerusalem shall be demilitarized; its
neutrality shall be declared and preserved, and no para-military formations, exer-
cises or activities shall be permitted within its borders
(6) Should the administration of the City of Jerusalem be seriously obstructed
or prevented by the non-co-operation or interference of ,one or more sections of the
population, the Governor shall have authority to take such measures as may be
necessary to restore the effective functioning of the administration
(c) To assist in the maintenance of internal law and order and especially for the
protection of the Holy Places and religious buildings and sites m the city, the
Governor shall organize a special police force of adequate strength, the members of
\\hich shall be recruited outside of Palestine The Governor shall be empowered to
direct such budgetary provision as may be necessary for the maintenance of this
force
5 Legislative organization A Legislative Council, elected by adult residents of
the city irrespective of nationality on the basis of universal and secret suffrage and
proportional representation, shall have powers of legislation and taxation No legis-
lative measures shall, however, conflict or interfere with the provisions which will
be set forth in the Statute of the City, nor shall any law, regulation, or official action
prevail over them The Statute shall grant to the Governor a right of vetoing bills
inconsistent with the provisions referred to in the preceding sentence. It shall also
empower him to promulgate temporary ordinances in case the Council fails to adopt
in time a bill deemed essential to the normal functioning of the administration.
6 Administration oj justice The Statute shall provide for the establishment of
an independent judiciary system, including a court of appeal All the inhabitants of
the City shall be subject to it
7 Economic union and economic regime. The City of Jerusalem shall be included
in the Economic Union of Palestine and be bound by all stipulations of the under-
taking and of any treaties issued therefrom, as well as by the decisions of the Joint
Economic Board. The headquarters of the Economic Board shall be established in
the territory of the City.
The Statute shall provide for the regulation of economic matters not falling
within the regime of the Economic Union, on the basis of equal treatment and non-
discrimination for all Members of the United Nations and their nationals.
8 Freedom oj transit and visit ; control of residents Subject to considerations of
security, and of economic welfare as determined by the Governor under the direc-
tions of the Trusteeship Council, freedom of entry into, and residence within, the
borders of the City shall be guaranteed for the residents or citizens of the Arab and
Jewish States Immigration into, and residence within, the borders of the city for
nationals of other States shall be controlled by the Governor under the directions
of the Trusteeship Council.
9. Relations with the Arab and Jewish States Representatives of the Arab and
Jewish States shall be accredited to the Governor of the City and charged with the
protection of the interests of their States and nationals in connexion with the inter-
national administration of the City
10 Official languages. Arabic and Hebrew shall be the official languages of the
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city. This will not preclude the adoption of one or more additional working lan-
guages, as may be required
11. Citizenship All the residents shall become ipso facto citizens of the City of
Jerusalem unless they opt for citizenship of the State of which they have been citi-
zens or, if Arabs or Jews, have filed notice of intention to become citizens of the
Arab or Jewish State respectively, according to part I, section B, paragraph 9, of
this plan.
The Trusteeship Council shall mak arrangements for consular protection of the
citizens of the City outside its territory.
12 Freedoms of citizens, (a) Subject only to the requirements of public order
and morals, the inhabitants of the City shall be ensured the enjoyment of human
rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of conscience, religion and
worship, language, education, speech and Press, assembly and association, and
petition.
(b) No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants on the
grounds of race, religion, language or sex.
(c) All persons within the City shall be entitled to equal protection of the laws.
(d) The family law and personal status of the various persons and communities
and their religious interests, including endowments, shall be respected.
(e) Except as may be required for the maintenance of public order and good
government, no measures shall be taken to obstruct or interfere with the enterprise
of religious or charitable bodies of all faiths or to discriminate against any repre-
sentative or member of these bodies on the ground of his religion or nationality
(/) The City shall ensure adequate primary and secondary education for the
Arab and Jewish communities respectively, in their own languages and in accord-
ance with their cultural traditions.
The right of each community to maintain its own schools for the education of
its own members in its own language, while conforming to such educational re-
quirements of a general nature as the City may impose, shall not be denied or
impaired/ Foreign educational establishments shall continue their activity on the
basis of their existing rights
(g) No restriction shall be imposed on the free use by any inhabitant of the City
of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, in religion, in the Press or in
publications of any kind, or at public meetings.
13. Holy Places, (a) Existing rights in respect of Holy Places and religious build-
ings or sites shall not be denied or impaired
(b) Free access to the Holy Places and religious buildings or sites and the free
exercise of worship shall be secured in conformity with existing rights and subject to
the requirements of public order and decorum
(c) Holy Places and religious buildings or sites shall be preserved. No act shall be
permitted which may in any way impair their sacred character If at any time it ap-
pears to the Governor that any particular Holy Place, religious building or site is in
need of urgent repair, the Governor may call upon the community or communities
concerned to carry out such repairs. The Governor may carry it out himself at the
expense of the community or communities concerned if no action is taken within a
reasonable time.
(d) No taxation shall be levied in respect of any Holy Place, religious building
or site which was exempt from taxation on the date of the creation of the City. No
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change in the incidence of such taxation shall be made which would either discrim-
inate between the owners or occupiers of Holy Places, religious buildings or sites, or
would place such owners or occupiers in a position less favourable in relation to the
general incidence of taxation than existed at the time of the adoption of the
Assembly's recommendations
14 Special powers of the Governor in respect of the Holy Places, religious
buildings and sites in the City and in any part of Palestine (a) The protection of
the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites located in the City of Jerusalem shall
be a special concern of the Governor
() With relation to such places, buildings and sites in Palestine outside the city,
the Governor shall determine on the ground of powers granted to him by the
Constitutions of both States whether the provisions of the Constitutions of the Arab
and Jewish States in Palestine dealing therewith and the religious rights appertain-
ing thereto are being properly applied and respected
(c) The Governor shall also be empowered to make decisions on the basis of
existing rights in cases of disputes which may arise between the different religious
communities or the rights of a religious community in respect of the Holy Places,
religious buildings and sites in any part of Palestine
In this task he may be assisted by a consultative council of representatives of
different denominations acting in an advisory capacity
D, DURATION OF THE SPECIAL REGIME
The Statute elaborated by the Trusteeship Council on the aforementioned prin-
ciples shall come into force not later than 1 October 1948 It shall remain in force
in the first instance for a period of ten years, unless the Trusteeship Council finds it
necessary to undertake a re-examination of these provisions at an earlier date. After
the expiration of this period the whole scheme shall be subject to re-examination
by the Trusteeship Council in the light of the experience acquired with its function-
ing. The residents of the City shall be then free to express by means of a referen-
dum their washes as to possible modifications of the regime of the City
PART IV. CAPITULATIONS
States whose nationals have in the past enjoyed in Palestine the privileges and
immunities of foreigners, including the benefits of consular jurisdiction and pro-
tection, as formerly enjoyed by capitulation or usage in the Ottoman Empire, are
invited to renounce any right pertaining to them to the reestablishment of such
privileges and immunities in the proposed Arab and Jewish States and the City of
Jerusalem,
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Egyptian-Israeli Armistice Agreement
February 24, 1949
PREAMBLE
The Parties to the present Agreement, responding to the Security Council resolu-
tion of 16 November 1948 calling upon them, as a further provisional measure
under Article 40 of the Charter of the United Nations and in order to facilitate the
transition from the present truce to permanent peace in Palestine, to negotiate an
Armistice; having decided to enter into negotiations under United Nations Chair-
manship concerning the implementation of the Security Council resolutions of 4 and
16 November 1948; and having appointed representatives empowered to negotiate
and conclude an Armistice Agreement;
The undersigned representatives, in the full authority entrusted to them by their
respective Governments, have agreed upon the following provisions:
ART, I. With a view to promoting the return to permanent peace in Pales-
tine and in recognition of the importance in this regard of mutual assurances con-
cerning the future military operations of the Parties, the following principles, which
shall be fully observed by both Parties during the Armistice, are hereby affirmed;
1. The injunction of the Security Council against resort to military force in the
settlement of the Palestine question shall henceforth be scrupulously respected by
both Parties
2. No aggressive action by the armed forces land, sea, or air of either Party
shall be undertaken, planned, or threatened against the people or the armed forces
of the other; it being understood that the use of the term "planned" in this context
has no bearing on normal staff planning as generally practiced in military organiza-
tions.
3. The right of each Party to its security and freedom from fear of attack by
the armed forces of the other shall be fully respected.
4. The establishment of an armistice between the armed forces of the two Parties
is accepted as an indispensable step toward the liquidation of armed conflict and the
restoration of peace in Palestine.
ART II. 1. In pursuance of the foregoing principles and of the resolutions of the
Security Council of 4 and 16 November 1948, a general armistice between the armed
forces of the two Parties land, sea and air is hereby established.
2. No element of the land, sea or air military or para-military forces of either
Party, including non-regular forces, shall commit any warlike or hostile act against
the military or para-military forces of the other Party, or against civilians in ter-
ritory under the control of that Party; or shall advance beyond or pass over for
any purpose whatsoever the Armistice Demarcation Line set forth in Article VI of
this Agreement except as provided in Article III of this Agreement; and elsewhere
shall not violate the international frontier; or enter into or pass through the air
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space of the other Party or through the waters within three miles
of the coastline
of the other Party
ART III 1 In pursuance of the Security Council's resolution of 4 November
1948, and with a view to the implementation of the Security Council's resolution
of 16 November 1948, the Egyptian Military Forces in the AL FALUJA area shall
be withdrawn.
2 This withdrawal shall begin on the day after that which follows the signing of
this Agreement, at 0500 hours, GMT, and shall be beyond the Egypt-Palestine
frontier
3. The withdrawal shall be under the supervision of the United Nations and in
accordance with the Plan of Withdrawal set forth in Annex I to this Agreement.
ART. IV With specific reference to the implementation of the resolutions of
the Security Council of 4 and 16 November 1948, the following principles and pur-
poses are affirmed.
1 The principle that no military or political advantage should be gained under
the truce ordered by the Security Council is recognized
2. It is also recognized that the basic purposes and spirit of the Armistice would
not be served by the restoration of previously held military positions, changes from
those now held other than as specifically provided for in this Agreement, or by the
advance of the military forces of either side beyond positions held at the time this
Armistice Agreement is signed
3. It is further recognized that rights, claims or interests of a non-military char-
acter in the area of Palestine covered by this Agreement may be asserted by either
Party, and that these, by mutual agreement being excluded from the Armistice
negotiations, shall be, at the discretion of the Parties, the subject of later settlement.
It is emphasized that it is not the purpose of this Agreement to establish, to recog-
nize, to strengthen, or to weaken or nullify, in any way, any territorial, custodial or
other rights, claims or interests which may be asserted by either Party in the area
of Palestine or any part or locality thereof covered by this Agreement, whether
such asserted rights, claims or interests derive from Security Council resolutions,
including the resolution of 4 November 1948 and the Memorandum of 13 Novem-
ber 1948 for its implementation, or from any other source The provisions of this
Agreement are dictated exclusively by military considerations and are valid only for
the period of the Armistice.
ART, V. 1. The line described in Article VI of this Agreement shall be designated
as the Armistice Demarcation Line and is delineated in pursuance of the purpose
and intent of the resolutions of the Security Council of 4 and 16 November 1948
2 The Armistice Demarcation Line is not to be construed in any sense as a po-
litical or territorial boundary, and is delineated without prejudice to rights, claims
and positions of either Party to the Armistice as regards ultimate settlement of the
Palestine question
3. The basic purpose of the Armistice Demarcation Line is to delineate the line
beyond which the armed forces of the respective Parties shall not move except as
provided in Article III of this Agreement
4. Rules and regulations of the armed forces of the Parties, which prohibit civil-
ians from crossing the fighting lines or entering the area between the lines, shall
remain in effect after the signing of this Agreement with application to the Armis-
tice Demarcation Line defined in Article VI.
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ART. VI. 1. In the GAZA-RAFAH area the Armistice Demarcation Line shall be
as delineated in paragraph 2 B (i) of the Memorandum of 13 November 194S on
the implementation of the Security Council resolution of 4 November 1948, namely
by a line from the coast at the mouth of the Wadi Has! m an easterly direction
through Deir Suneid and across the Gaza-Al Majdal Highway to a point 3 kilo-
metres east of the Highway, then in a southerly direction parallel to the Gaza-Al
Madjal Highway, and continuing thus to the Egyptian frontier
2. Within this line Egyptian forces shall nowhere advance beyond their present
positions, and this shall include Beit Hanun and its surrounding area from which
Israeli forces shall be withdrawn to north of the Armistice Demarcation Line, and
any other positions within the line delineated in paragraph 1 shall be evacuated by
Israeli forces as set forth in paragraph 3.
3 Israeli outposts, each limited to platoon strength, may be maintained in this
area at the following points: Deir Suneid, on the north side of the Wadi (MR
10751090); 700 SW of Saad (MR 10500982); Sulphur Quarries (MR 09870924
Tali-Jamma (MR 09720887); and KH AL Ma 'in (MR 09320821). The Israeli
outpost maintained at the Cemetery (MR 08160723) shall be evacuated on the day
after that which follows the signing of this Agreement The Israeli outpost at Hill
79 (MR 10451017) shall be evacuated not later than four weeks following the day
on which this Agreement is signed Following the evacuation of the above outposts,
new Israeli outpost may be established at MR 08360700, and at a point due east of
Hill 79 east of the Armistice Demarcation Line
4. In the BETHLEHEM-HEBRON area, wherever positions are held by Egyptian
forces, the provisions of this Agreement shall apply to the forces of both Parties in
each locality, except that the demarcation of the Armistice Line and reciprocal ar-
rangements for withdrawal and reduction of forces shall be undertaken in such
manner as may be decided by the Parties, at such time as an Armistice Agreement
may be concluded covering military forces in that area other than those of the
Parties to this Agreement, or sooner at the will of the Parties
ART. VII. 1 It is recognized by the Parties to this Agreement that in certain
sectors of the total area involved, the proximity of the forces of a third party not
covered by this Agreement makes impractical the full application of all provisions
of the Agreement to such sectors. For this reason alone, therefore, and pending the
conclusion of an Armistice Agreement in place of the existing truce with that third
party, the provisions of this Agreement relating to reciprocal reduction and with-
drawal of forces shall apply only to the western front and not to the eastern front.
2. The areas comprising the western and eastern fronts shall be as denned by the
United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization, on the basis
of the deployment of forces against each other and past military activity or the
future possibility thereof in the area This definition of the western and eastern
fronts is set forth in Annex II of this Agreement.
3. In the area of the western front under Egyptian control, Egyptian defensive
forces only may be maintained. All other Egyptian forces shall be withdrawn from
this area to a point or points no further east than El Arish-Abou Aoueigila.
4. In the area of the western front under Israeli control, Israeli defensive forces
only, which shall be based on the settlements, may be maintained. All other Israeli
forces shall be withdrawn from this area to a point or points north of the line de-
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lineated in paragraph 2 A of the Memorandum of 13 November 1948 on the im-
plementation of the resolution of the Security Council of 4 November 1948
5 The defensive forces referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4 above shall be as de-
fined m Annex III to this Agreement
ART VIII 1 The area comprising the village of El Auja and vicinity, as defined
in paragraph 2 of this Article, shall be demilitarized, and both Egyptian and Israeli
armed forces shall be totally excluded therefrom The Chairman of the Mixed
Armistice Commission established in Article X of this Agreement and United
Nations Observers attached to the Commission shall be responsible for ensuring
the full implementation of this provision
2 The area thus demilitarized shall be as follows From a point on the Egypt-
Palestine frontier five (5; kilometres northwest of the intersection of the Rafah-El
Auja road and the frontier (MR 08750468), south-east to Khashm El Mamdud
(MR 09650414), thence south-east to Hill 405 (MR 10780285), thence south-west
to a point on the Egypt-Palestine frontier live (5) kilometres south-east of the
intersection of the old railway tracks and the frontier (MR 09950145), thence
returning north-west along the Egypt-Palestine frontier to the point of origin
3. On the Egyptian side of the frontier, facing the El Auja area, no Egyptian
defensive positions shall be closer to El Auja than El Qouseima and Abou Aoueigila.
4 The road Taba-Qouseima-Auja shall not be employed by any military forces
whatsoever for the purpose of entering Palestine
5 The movement of armed forces of either Party to this Agreement into any
part of the area defined in paragraph 2 of this Article, for any purpose, or failure
by either Party to respect or fulfil any of the other provisions of this Article, when
confirmed by the United Nations representatives, shall constitute a flagrant viola-
tion of this Agreement
ART. IX All prisoners of war detained by either Party to this Agreement and
belonging to the armed forces, regular or irregular, of the other Party shall be
exchanged as follows
1. The exchange of prisoners of war shall be under United Nations supervision
and control throughout The exchange shall begin within ten days after the signing
of this Agreement and shall be completed not later than twenty-one days following.
Upon the signing of this Agreement, the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Com-
mission established in Article X of this Agreement, in consultation with the appro-
priate military authorities of the Parties, shall formulate a plan for the exchange
of prisoners of war within the above period, defining the date and places of ex-
change and all other relevant details
2. Prisoners of war against whom a penal prosecution may be pending, as well
as those sentenced for crime or other offence, shall be included in this exchange of
prisoners
3. All articles of personal use, valuables, letters, documents, identification marks,
and other personal affects of whatever nature, belonging to prisoners of war who are
being exchanged, shall be returned to them, or, if they have escaped or died, to the
Party to whose armed forces they belonged.
4. All matters not specifically regulated in this Agreement shall be decided in
accordance with the principles laid down in the International Convention relating
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, signed at Geneva on 27 July 1929.
5. The Mixed Armistice Commission established in Article X of this Agreement
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shall assume responsibility for locating missing persons, \\hether military or civilian,
within the areas controlled by each Party, to facilitate their expeditious exchange.
Each Party undertakes to extend to the Commission full co-operation and assist-
ance in the discharge of this function
ART X 1. The execution of the provisions of this Agreement shall be super-
vised by a Mixed Armistice Commission composed of seven members, of whom
each Party to this Agreement shall designate three, and whose Chairman shall be
the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization or a senior
officer from the Observer personnel of that Organization designed by him following
consultation with both Parties to this Agreement
2 The Mixed Armistice Commission shall maintain its headquarters at El Auja,
and shall hold its meetings at such places and at such times as it may deem neces-
sary for the effective conduct of its work
3 The Mixed Armistice Commission shall be convened in its first meeting by
the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization not later
than one week following the signing of this Agreement.
4 Decisions of the Mixed Armistice Commission, to the extent possible, shall
be based on the principle of unanimity. In the absence of unanimity, decisions shall
be taken by a majority vote of the members of the Commission present and voting.
On questions of principle, appeal shall lie to a Special Committee, composed of the
United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization and one mem-
ber each of the Egyptian and Israeli Delegations to the Armistice Conference at
Rhodes or some other senior officer, whose decisions on all such questions shall be
final. If no appeal against a decision of the Commission is filed within one week
from the date of said decision, that decision shall be taken as final. Appeals to the
Special Committee shall be presented to the United Nations Chief of Staff of the
Truce Supervision Organization, who shall convene the Committee at the earliest
possible date.
5. The Mixed Armistice Commission shall formulate its own rules of procedure.
Meetings shall be held only after due notice to the members by the Chairman. The
quorum for its meetings shall be a majority of its members
6. The Commission shall be empowered to employ Observers, who may be from
among the military organizations of the Parties or from the military personnel of
the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, or from both, in such numbers
as may be considered essential to the performance of its functions. In the event
United Nations Observers should be so employed, they shall remain under the com-
mand of the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization.
Assignments of a general or special nature given to United Nations Observers at-
tached to the Mixed Armistice Commission shall be subject to approval by the
United Nations Chief of Staff or his designated representative on the Commission,
whichever is serving as Chairman.
7. Claims or complaints presented by either Party relating to the application of
this Agreement shall be referred immediately to the Mixed Armistice Commission
through its Chairman. The Commission shall take such action on all such claims or
complaints by means of its observation and investigation machinery as it may deem
appropriate, with a view to equitable and mutually satisfactory settlement.
8. Where interpretation of the meaning of a particular provision of this Agree-
ment is at issue, the Commission's interpretation shall prevail, subject to the right
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of appeal as provided in paragraph 4. The Commission, m its discretion and as
the need arises, may from time to time recommend to the Parties modifications in
the provisions of this Agreement.
9 The Mixed Armistice Commission shall submit to both Parties reports on its
activities as frequently as it may consider necessary A copy of each such report
shall be presented to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for transmission
to the appropriate organ or agency of the United Nations.
10. Members of the Commission and its Observers shall be accorded such free-
dom of movement and access in the areas covered by this Agreement as the Com-
mission may determine to be necessary, provided that when such decisions of the
Commission are reached by a majority vote United Nations Observers only shall
be employed.
11. The expenses of the Commission, other than those relating to United Nations
Observers, shall be apportioned in equal shares between the two Parties to this
Agreement
ART XI. No provision of this Agreement shall in any way prejudice the rights,
claims and positions of either Party hereto in the ultimate peaceful settlement of
the Palestine question.
ART XII The present Agreement is not subject to ratification and shall come
into force immediately upon being signed.
2 This Agreement, having been negotiated and concluded in pursuance of the
resolution of the Security Council of 16 November 1948 calling for the establish-
ment of an armistice in order to eliminate the threat to the peace in Palestine and
to facilitate the transition from the present truce to permanent peace in Palestine,
shall remain in force until a peaceful settlement between the parties is achieved,
except as provided in paragraph 3 of this Article.
3 The Parties to this Agreement may, by mutual consent, revise this Agreement
or any of its provisions, or may suspend its application, other than Articles I and II,
at any time In the absence of mutual agreement and after this Agreement has
been in effect for one year from the date of its signing, either of the Parties may
call upon the Secretary-General of the United Nations to convoke a conference of
representatives of the two Parties for the purpose of reviewing, revising or sus-
pending any of the provisions of this Agreement other than Articles I and II. Par-
ticipation in such conference shall be obligatory upon the Parties
4. If the conference provided for in paragraph 3 of this Article does not result
in an agreed solution of a point in dispute, either Party may bring the matter
before the Security Council of the United Nations for the relief sought on the
grounds that this Agreement has been concluded in pursuance of Security action
toward the end of achieving peace in Palestine
5 This Agreement supersedes the Egyptian-Israeli General Cease-Fire Agree-
ment entered into by the Parties on 24 January 1949
6. This Agreement is signed in quintuplicate, of which one copy shall be retained
by each Party, two copies communicated to the Secretary-General of the United
Nations for transmission to the Security Council and to the United Nations Con-
ciliation Commission on Palestine, and one copy to the Acting Mediator on
Palestine
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Treaty Between the States of the Arab League
April 13, 1950
The Governments of:
The Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan
The Syrian Republic
The Kingdom of Iraq
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
The Lebanese Republic
The Kingdom of Egypt
The Motawakilite Kingdom of Yemen
In view of the desire of the above-mentioned Governments to consolidate rela-
tions between the States of the Arab League; to maintain their independence and
their mutual heritage, in accordance with the desire of their peoples, to cooperate
for the realization of mutual defense and the maintenance of security and peace
according to the principles of both the Arab League Pact and the United Nations
Charter together with the aims of the said Pacts; and to consolidate stability and
security and provide means of welfare and development in the countries.
The following government delegates of . . . , having been duly accredited and
fully authorized by their respective governments, approve the following:
ART. 1. The Contracting States, in an effort to maintain and stabilize peace and
security, hereby confirm their desire to settle their international disputes by peace-
ful means, whether such disputes concern relations among themselves or with other
Powers.
ART. 2 The Contracting States consider any (act of) armed aggression made
against any one or more of them or their armed forces, to be directed against them
all. Therefore, in accordance with the right of self-defense, individually and collec-
tively they undertake to go without delay to the aid of the State or States against
which such an act of aggression is made, and immediately to take, individually and
collectively, all steps available, including the use of armed force, to repel the
aggression and restore security and peace In conformity with Article 6 of the
Arab League Pact and Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, the Arab League
Council and U N. Security Council shall be notified of such act of aggression and
the means and procedure taken to check it.
ART 3 At the invitation of any one of the signatories of this Treaty the Con-
tracting States shall hold consultations whenever there are reasonable grounds for
the belief that the territorial integrity, independence, or security of any one of the
parties is threatened. In the event of the threat of war or the existence of an
international emergency, the Contracting States shall immediately proceed to unify
their plans and defensive measures, as the situation may demand
ART. 4. The Contracting States, desiring to implement fully the above obliga-
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tions and effectively carry them out, shall cooperate in consolidating and coordinat-
ing their armed forces, and shall participate according to their resources and needs
in preparing individual and collective means of defense to repulse the
said armed
aggression
ART 5 A Permanent Military Commission composed of representatives of the
General Staffs of the armies of the Contracting States shall be formed to draw up
plans of joint defense and their implementation. The duties of the Permanent
Military Commission which are set forth in an Annex attached to this Treaty,
include the drafting of necessary reports on the method of cooperation and partici-
pation mentioned in Article 4 The Permanent Military Commission shall submit
to the Joint Defense Council, provided hereuhder in Article 6, reports dealing with
questions within its province
ART 6 A Joint Defense Council under the supervision of the Arab League
Council shall be formed to deal with all matters concerning the implementations
of the provisions of Articles 2, 3, 4, and 5 of this Treaty It shall be assisted in
the performance of its task by the Permanent Military Commission referred to
in Article 5 The Joint Defense Council shall consist of the Foreign Ministers and
the Defense Ministers of the Contracting States or their representatives Decisions
taken by a two-thirds majority shall be binding on all the Contracting States
ART. 7 The Contracting States, in order to fulfill the aims of this Treaty, and
to bring about security and prosperity in the Arab countries, and in an effort to
raise the standard of living in them, undertake to cooperate in the development
of their economies and the exploitation of their natural resources; to facilitate the
exchange of their respective agricultural and industrial products; and generally to
organize and coordinate their economic activities and to conclude the necessary
inter-Arab agreements to realize such aims.
ART. 8 An Economic Council consisting of the Ministers in charge of economic
affairs, or their representatives if necessary, shall be formed by the Contracting
States to submit recommendations for the realization of all such aims as are set
forth in the previous article The Council may, in the performance of its duties,
seek the cooperation of the Committee for Financial and Economic Affairs referred
to in Article 4 of the Arab League Pact.
ART. 9 The Annex to this Treaty shall be considered an integral and indivisible
part of it.
ART. 10 The Contracting States undertake to conclude no international agree-
ments which may be contradictory to the provisions of this Treaty, nor to act, in
their international relations, in a way which may be contrary to the aims of this
Treaty.
ART. 11 No provision of this Treaty shall in any way affect, or is intended to
affect any of the rights or obligations devolving upon the Contracting States from
the United Nations Charter or the responsibilities borne by the United Nations
Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.
ART. 12 After a lapse of 10 years from the date of the ratification of this
Treaty any one of the Contracting States may withdraw from it, providing 12
months' notice is previously given to the Secretariat-General of the Arab League.
The Secretariat-General of the League shall inform the other Contracting States of
such notice.
ART, 13. This Treaty shall be ratified by each Contracting State according to
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the constitutional procedure of its own government The Treaty shall come into
force for the ratifying States 15 days after the receipt by the Secretariat-General
of the instruments of ratification from at least four States. This Treaty is drafted
in Arabic in Cairo on April 13, 1950 One signed copy shall be deposited with the
Secretariat-General of the Arab League; equally authentic copies shall be trans-
mitted to each of the Contracting States.
MILITARY ANNEX
1. The Permanent Military Commission provided for in Article 5 of the Joint
Defense and Economic Cooperation Treaty between the States of the Arab League,
shall undertake the following:
(a) in cooperation with the Joint Defense Council, to prepare plans to deal with
all inticipated dangers or armed aggression that may be launched against one or
more of the Contracting States or their armed forces, such plans to be based on
the principles determined by the Joint Defense Council;
(b) to submit proposals for the organization of the forces of the Contracting
States, stipulating the minimum force for each in accordance with military exi-
gencies and the potentialities of each State ;
(c) to submit proposals for increasing the effectiveness of the forces of the
Contracting States in so far as their equipment, organization, and training are
concerned
;
so that they may keep pace with modern military methods and devel-
opment; and for the unification and coordination of all such forces;
(d) to submit proposals for the exploitation of natural, agricultural, industrial,
and other resources of all Contracting States in favor of the Inter-Arab military
effort and joint defense;
(e) to organize the exchange of training missions between the Contracting States
for the preparation of plans, participation in military exercises and maneuvers
and the study of their results, recommendations for the improvement of methods
to ensure close cooperation in the field, and for the general improvement of the
forces of all the Contracting States ;
(f) to prepare the necessary data on the resources and military potentialities
of each of the Contracting States and the part to be played by the forces of
each in the joint military effort;
(g) to discuss the facilities and various contributions which each of the Con-
tracting States, in conformity with the provisions of this Treaty, might be asked
to provide, during a state of war, on behalf of the armies of such other Con-
tracting States as might be operating on its territory.
2 The Permanent Military Commission may form temporary or permanent sub-
committees from among its own members to deal with any of the matters falling
within its jurisdiction It may also seek the advice of any experts whose views on
certain questions are deemed necessary.
3 The Permanent Military Commission shall submit detailed reports on the results
of its activities and studies to the Joint Defense Council provided for in Article 6
of this Treaty, as well as an annual report giving full particulars of its work and
studies during the year,
4. The Permanent Military Commission shall establish its headquarters in Cairo
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but may hold meetings in any other place the Commission may specify. The Com-
mission shall elect its Chairman for two years, he may be reelected Candidates for
the Chairmanship shall hold at least the rank of a high commanding officer Each
member of the Commission must have as his original nationality that of the Con-
tracting State he represents
5 In the event of war, the supreme command of the joint forces shall be entrusted
to the Contracting State possessing the largest military force taking actual part in
field operations, unless, by unanimous agreement, the Commander-in-Chief shall
be assisted in directing military operations by a Joint Staff
The Tripartite Declaration:
France, United Kingdom, United States
May 25, 1950
"I. The three Governments recognize that the Arab States and Israel all need
to maintain a certain level of armed forces for the purposes cf assuring their
internal security and their legitimate self-defence and to permit them to play their
part in the defence of the area as a whole All applications for arms or war material
for these countries will be considered in the light of these principles In this con-
nection the three Governments wish to recall and reaffirm the terms of the state-
ments made by their representatives on the Security Council on 4th August, 1949,
in which they declared their opposition to the development of an arms race between
the Arab States and Israel
2 The three Governments declare that assurances have been received from all
the States in question to which they permit arms to be supplied from their coun-
tries that the purchasing State does not intend to undertake any act of aggression
against any other State Similar assurances will be requested from any other States
in the area to which they permit arms to be supplied in the future.
3. The three Governments take this opportunity of declaring their deep interest
in and their desire to promote the establishment and maintenance of peace and
stability in the area, and their unalterable opposition to the use of force or threat
of force between any of the States in that area The three Governments, should
they find that any of these States was preparing to violate frontiers or armistice
lines, would, consistently with their obligations as members of the United Nations,
immediately take action, both within and outside the United Nations, to prevent
such violation."
Assurances in the terms of paragraph 2 of the statement were received by the
United Kingdom from Egypt, Jordan, Iraq and Saudi Arabia; by the United States
from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Israel and Syria, and by France from Syria and the
Lebanon.
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Law Nationalizing the Oil Industry in Iran
May 1, 1951
ART. 1 With a view to arranging the enforcement of the law of 24th and 29th
Esfand, 1329 (15th and 20th March, 1951), concerning the nationalisation of the
oil industry throughout Persia, a mixed board composed of five Senators and five
Deputies elected by either of the two Houses and of the Minister of Finance or
his Deputy shall be formed
ART. 2. The Government is bound to dispossess at once the former Anglo-
Iranian Oil Company under the supervision of the mixed board If the Company
refuses to hand over at once on the grounds of existing claims on the Government,
the Government can, by mutual agreement, deposit in the Bank Milli Iran or in any
other bank up to 25 per cent of current revenue from the oil after deduction of
exploitation expenses in order to meet the probable claims of the Company
ART. 3 The Government is bound to examine the rightful claims of the Gov-
ernment as well as the rightful claims of the Company under the supervision of
the mixed board and to submit its suggestions to the two Houses of Parliament in
order that the same may be implemented after approval by the two Houses
ART 4 Inasmuch as the nationalisation of the oil industry was also approved
by the Senate on 29th Esfand (20th March, 1951) and inasmuch as all income
from oil and oil products are the established property of the Persian nation the
Government is bound to audit the Company's accounts under the supervision of
the mixed board which must also closely supervise exploitation as from the date
of the implementation of this law until the appointment of an executive body.
ART 5. The mixed board must draw up. as soon as possible, the statute of the
National Oil Company in which provision is to be made for the setting up of an
executive body and a supervisory body of experts, and must submit the same to the
two Houses for approval.
ART. 6. For the gradual replacement of foreign experts by Persian experts the
mixed board is bound to draw up regulations for sending, after competitive exam-
inations, a number of students each year to foreign countries to undertake study
in the various branches of required knowledge and gain experience in oil industries,
the said regulations to be carried out by the Ministry of Education after the ap-
proval of the Council of Ministers The expenses connected with the study of such
students shall be met out of oil revenues.
ART. 7. All purchasers of products derived from the wells taken back from the
former Anglo-Iranian Oil Company can in future buy annually the same quantity
of oil they used to buy annually from the Company from the beginning of the
Christian year 1948 up to 29th Esfand, 1329 (20th March, 1951), at a reasonable
international price. For any surplus quantity they shall have priority in the event
of equal terms of purchase being offered.
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ART. 8 All proposals formulated by the mixed board for the approval of the
Majlis and submission to the Majlis must be sent to the Oil Commission
ART 9 The mixed board must finish its work within three months as from the
date of approval of this law and must submit the report of its activities to the
Majlis in accordance with Article 8 In the event of requiring an extension it must
apply, giving valid reasons, for such extension Whilst, however, the extension is
before the two Houses for approval the mixed board can continue its functions.
From Agreement on Suez Canal Base:
United Kingdom and Egypt
October 19, 1954
ART 1. Her Majesty's Forces shall be completely withdrawn from Egyptian
Territory in accordance with the Schedule set forth in Part A of Annex 1 within a
period of twenty months from the date of signature of the present Agreement.
ART. 2 The Government of the United Kingdom declare that the Treaty of
Alliance signed in London on 26th August, 1936, with the Agreed Minute, Ex-
changed Notes, Convention concerning the immunities and privileges enjoyed by
the British Forces in Egypt and all other subsidiary agreements, is terminated.
ART 3. Parts of the present Suez Canal Base, which are listed in Appendix A
to Annex II, shall be kept in efficient working order and capable of immediate use
in accordance with the provisions of Article 4 of the present Agreement To this
end they shall be organized in accordance with the provisions of Annex II.
ART. 4 In the event of an armed attack by an outside Power on any country
which at the date of signature of the present Agreement is a party to the Treaty
of Joint Defence between Arab League States, signed in Cairo on 13th April, 1950,
or on Turkey, Egypt shall afford to the United Kingdom such facilities as may be
necessary in order to place the Base on a war footing and to operate it effectively.
These facilities shall include the use of Egyptian ports within the limits of what is
strictly indispensable for the above-mentioned purposes.
ART 5 In the event of the return of British Forces to the Suez Canal Base area
in accordance with the provisions of Article 4, these forces shall withdraw immedi-
ately upon the cessation of the hostilities referred to in that Article.
ART. 6 In the event of a threat of an armed attack by an outside power on
any country which at the date of signature of the present Agreement is a party to
the Treaty of Joint Defence between Arab League States, or on Turkey, there shall
be immediate consultation between Egypt and the United Kingdom.
ART. 7. The Government of the Republic of Egypt shall afford over-flying,
landing and servicing facilities for notified flights of aircraft under Royal Air
Force control For the clearance of any flights of such aircraft, the Government
of the Republic of Egypt shall accord treatment no less favourable than that ac-
corded to the aircraft of any other foreign country with the exception of States
parties to the Treaty of Joint Defence between Arab League States. The landing
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and servicing facilities mentioned above shall be afforded at Egyptian airfields in
the Suez Canal Base area.
ART. 8. The two Contracting Governments recognize that the Suez Maritime
Canal, which is an integral part of Egypt, is a waterway economically, commer-
cially and strategically of international importance, and express the determination to
uphold the Convention guaranteeing the freedom of navigation of the Canal
signed at Constantinople on 29th October, 1888.
ART. 9. (a) The United Kingdom is accorded the right to move any British
equipment into or out of the Base at its discretion.
(b) There shall be no increase above the level of supplies as agreed upon in
Part C of Annex II without the consent of the Government of the Republic of
Egypt.
ART. 10. The present Agreement does not affect and shall not be interpreted as
affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the parties under the Charter of
the United Nations.
ART. 11 The Annexes and Appendices to the present Agreement shall be con-
sidered as an integral part of it.
ART. 12 (a) The present Agreement shall remain in force for the period of
seven years from the date of its signature.
(b) During the last twelve months of that period the two Contracting Govern-
ments shall consult together to decide on such arrangements as may be necessary
upon the termination of the Agreement.
(c) Unless both the Contracting Governments agree upon any extension of the
Agreement it shall terminate seven years after the date of signature and the Gov-
ernment of the United Kingdom shall take away or dispose of their property then
remaining in the Base.
ART. 13 The present Agreement shall have effect as though it had come into
force on the date of signature. Instruments of ratification shall be exchanged in
Cairo as soon as possible.
From "The Baghdad Pact":
Iraq and Turkey
February 24, 1955
ART. 1. Consistent with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, the high
contracting parties will co-operate for their security and defence Such measures as
they agree to take to give effect to this co-operation may form the subject of special
agreements with each other.
ART. 2. In order to ensure the realization and effect application of the co-opera-
tion provided for in Article 1 above, the competent authorities of the high con-
tracting parties will determine the measures to be taken as soon as the present
pact enters into force. These measures will become operative as soon as they have
been approved by the Governments of the high contracting parties.
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ART 3 The high contracting parties undertake to refrain from any interference
whatsoever in each others' affairs They will settle any disputes between themselves
in a peaceful way in accordance with the United Nations Charter
ART 4 The high contracting parties declare that the dispositions of the present
pact are not in contradiction with any of the international obligations contracted
by either of them with any third State or States They do not derogate from, and
cannot be interpreted as derogating from, the said international obligations. The
high contracting parties undertake not to enter into any international obligation
incompatible with the present pact
ART. 5 This pact shall be open for accession to any member State of the Arab
League or any other State actively concerned with the security and peace in this
region and which is fully recognized by both of the high contracting parties Ac-
cession shall come into force from the date on which the instrument of accession
of the State concerned is deposited uith the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iraq
Any acceding State party to the present pact may conclude special agreements in
accordance with Article 1, with one or more States parties to the present pact The
competent authorities of any acceding State may determine measures in accordance
with Article 2 These measures will become operative as soon as they have been
approved by the Governments of the parties concerned
ART 6. A permanent council at ministerial level will be set up to function
within the framework of the purposes of this pact when at least four Powers be-
come parties to the pact The council will draw up its own rules of procedure
ART 7. This pact remains in force for a period of five years renewable for other
five-year periods Any contracting party may withdraw from the pact by notifying
the other parties in writing of its desire to do so, six months before the expiration
of any of the above mentioned periods, in which case the pact remains valid for
the other parties
[In an exchange of letters, the Parties placed on record their understanding that
"this pact will enable our two countries to co-operate in resisting any aggression
directed against either of them and that, in order to ensure the maintenance of
peace and security in the Middle East region, we have agreed to work in close
co-operation for effecting the carrying out of the United Nations resolutions concern-
ing Palestine Great Britain, Pakistan, and Iran joined the Pact under Article 5 "]
Egyptian Agreement with Czechoslovakia for the Purchase of Arms:
Prime Minister Gamal Abdul Nasser
September 27, 1955
My Brothers,
I am glad today to see this exhibition which the armed forces have set up to show
the extent of progress and development which the army has made
I am glad also to speak to you today for I now recall my last talk to the men
of the armed forces some months ago I remember also that I spoke then to thou-
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sands of officers. Now I see them amongst us I see them carrying out their duty
on the frontiers of our homeland for the safety of our country and for the glory of
our country.
When I speak to you now, my brothers, I speak to all the men of the armed
forces, I speak to all the men of the fatherland, I speak to Egypt Egypt which
revolted on July 23, 1952 Egypt which placed its faith in the goals of this Revolu-
tion; Egypt which was determined to achieve these goals Egypt which finally
threw off the occupation and threw off slavery When I speak to you today, I speak
to all Egypt,
My brothers, this is my feeling when I look at the battlefield, and I see the men
of the armed forces on guard along the frontiers; when I look at the frontiers of
Egypt and see the men of the armed forces standing staunch and firm and faithful,
exerting every effort for the safety of this country and its sons
The fifth goal of your Revolution was to set up a strong national army From
the beginning of the Revolution you have all exerted every effort to achieve this
goal and we have worked with you with all our might and with every means at our
disposal. We have worked with you to achieve this goal because to achieve it means
liberty; to achieve it means glory; to achieve it means dignity.
My brothers, we met the greatest obstacles we met many difficulties in achiev-
ing our aim. We did everything we could to set up military factories; we did every-
thing we could to provide the army with the heavy armaments it needed; and we
did everything we could so that Egypt's army might be a strong national army.
Yes, my brothers, we did a lot.
But there were the greatest difficulties in our way We believed that if we wanted
to create such an army for Egypt we had to preserve our freedom We believed
that if we wanted to achieve this strong national army for Egypt, we had to be-
come free in our internal and our foreign policies
My brothers, we will never agree that this army be formed at the expense of
this country's freedom, or at the expense of this country's glory, or at the expense
of this country's dignity. We have always been determined that the formation of
this strong national army should go hand in hand with true liberty and with real
glory
We have proclaimed Egypt's policy on many occasions We declared that Egypt
after the Revolution of July 23 would go forward with its independent policy; it
would go forward having rid itself of imperialism; it would go forward having rid
itself of domination
;
and it would go forward having rid itself of foreign influence
These were our hopes and these were your hopes We did everything we could to
preserve these hopes We did everything we could, my brothers, to preserve these
goals and we were confronted by many obstacles.
You know that heavy weapons are controlled by the big powers. You know that
the big powers have never agreed to supply our army with heavy weapons except
with conditions and except with stipulations You know that we refused these con-
ditions and these stipulations because we are jealous of our true freedom and we
are jealous of our independent policy. We are anxious that Egypt have a strong
independent policy so that we may make of Egypt a new independent personality
which will really rid itself of imperialism, will really rid itself of occupation, will
really rid itself of foreign domination in all its aspects We have been making
progress along this path.
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Today, my brothers, we hear an outcry from London, we hear an outcry from
Washington about the arming of Egypt's troops But I would like to tell you that
throughout the last three years we have tried to get heavy weapons for the army
by every means, not for aggressive purposes, not to attack, not to make war, but
for defense, for security, for peace
We wanted to strengthen our army so as to provide security for ourselves, to
provide security for our nation, to provide security for our "Arabism
" We wanted
to get weapons for the army so that we could always feel secure, safe, and tranquil
We never intended to strengthen our army for aggressive purposes. We never
intended to strengthen the army for wars But the army which is the defender and
protector of our homeland must always stand prepared to defend the borders and
the country's honor. Such is our purpose and this is our goal We have always
declared this throughout the last three years. \Ve do not want arms for aggression.
We want arms so that we can be tranquil, so that we feel at peace and not
threatened.
Today, my brothers, I sense an outcry here and I sense an outcry there. I sense
these outcries now that we have been able to obtain for the army the weapons of
which it is in need, without conditions and without restrictions, so as to achieve
the goal which this Revolution undertook that Egypt should have a strong na-
tional army to defend its true independence and protect its true freedom.
On this occasion I would like to tell you, my brothers, the story of the arming of
our troops When the Revolution took place we went to each of the states, we went
to every quarter to get weapons for the army. We went to Britain; we went to
France; we went to America; we went to the rest of the states to get weapons for
the army in the interest of peace and defense. What did we get? We got only
demands They wanted to arm the troops after we had signed a document or after
we had signed a pact. We declared that even though we had wanted and had
decided to arm our troops, we would never sign a document We were arming our
troops in the interest of our freedom, of our independent personality, of our
Revolution, of the glory of our country, of Egypt's dignity We declared that we
would not arm our troops at the expense of our freedom
We requested arms but what was the result? The result, my brothers, is a long
and bitter story. I remember now, I remember as I talk to you that we sometimes
humiliated ourselves but we never abandoned our principles. We humiliated our-
selves when we requested arms we begged for arms but at the same time we
were determined to hold to our principles and we were determined to preserve our
high ideals. And what was the result? Never, my brothers, could we achieve our
goal, the greatest goal for which this Revolution was undertaken, the creation of a
strong national army.
France always bargained with us. She bargained with us over North Africa She
says to us, "We will give you arms on the condition that you should not criticize
our position in North Africa, and on condition that you relinquish your 'Arabism,'
that you relinquish your humanitarianism and on condition that you should keep
silent and close your eyes when you see the massacres in North Africa."
WTe said to her, "How can we relinquish our 'Arabism'? How can we give up our
humanitarianism? We never can."
France's arms offer to us was always like a suord above our necks. We were al-
ways being threatened, my brothers, with the cutting off of arms. We were always
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being threatened, my brothers, with the supply of arms to Israel and the cutting off
of arms for Egypt. This is the story of France and now I'll tell you the story of
America.
From the time of the Revolution we asked for arms and we were promised arms.
And what was the result?
The promise was a promise circumscribed with conditions. We would get arms if
we signed a mutual security pact. We would get arms if we would sign some form
of alliance WTe refused to sign a mutual security pact. We refused to sign any form
of alliance And, my brothers, we could never get a single weapon from America.
What was the story of England. England told us that she was ready to supply us
arms. We accepted gratefully. W7hat was the result? England provided us with a
quantity of arms which was not sufficient to achieve the goals of this Revolution
What was the result of all this, my brothers? The army opposing us is obtaining
arms from various parts of the world Israel's army has been able to obtain arms
from England, France, Belgium, Canada, Italy and from various other states It can
always find someone to supply it arms, while we read in the foreign press in the
British, American or French newspapers that Israel's army can defeat all the Arab
armies combined. It was only last month, my brothers, that I read many articles
in that sense, that the Israeli army could defeat Egypt, that the Israeli army could
beat the Arabs, that the Israeli army wras superior in armament, that the Israeli
army was superior in equipment.
This is what they have said in their press and I said to them, since you feel like
this why do you prevent us from obtaining arms? I asked them this, and what w?as
the result? France complained about our feelings toward North Africa, and pre-
vented us from obtaining arms.
When we saw this, when we saw this domination, when we saw this influence
which was being used against us, we decided to ask all the states of the world to
supply us arms without conditions. I told them these arms would not be used for
aggression, that they would be used for defense, that we had no aggressive intent,
that our intentions were peaceful, that we wanted to have a strong independent
army to defend our country and help it to achieve its free and independent goals,
that we want to have a strong army not for aggression but for defense.
I said this, my brothers, in the name of Egypt to America, to England to France,
to Russia, to Czechoslovakia and to the rest of the states and I waited for their
answers. I waited, and what was the result 5 I got answers from some of them that
I could get arms with conditions. I refused, for I have already told you that al-
though we are ready to humiliate ourselves by asking for arms, we will never
abandon our principles.
WTe received a reply from Czechoslovakia saying that she was prepared to supply
arms in accordance with our needs and those of Egypt's army on a commercial
basis, the transaction to be considered like any other commercial transaction. We
agreed and last week Egypt signed a commercial agreement with Czechoslovakia to
supply us arms. This agreement permits Egypt to pay in Egyptian products such
as cotton and rice. This offer wre gratefully accepted. In this way, my brothers, we
achieve one of the goals of the Revolution, the formation of a strong national army.
Today, my brothers, as I talk to you I sense the outcry raised here and there
an outcry in London, an outcry in Washington These outcries seek to continue to
control us, to continue to influence us.
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We will fight to destroy this control We will fight to destroy this influence. We
will fight to achieve the goals of the Revolution and we will fight to create a strong
national army able to achieve the greatest goals of the Revolution, able to obtain
peace Yes, my brothers, peace that peace which we proclaimed at Bandung, the
peace which we have proclaimed on many occasions
This army which we create is for the sake of peace. We create it so that we can
be secure in our lot, we create it so that Egypt will not be a state of refugees We
create it against aggression, we create it against any territorial designs against our
nation's soil.
When I hear someone say that this opens the way for Russian influence or
foreign influence in Egypt or the Middle East, I think of the remote past and I
say that this commercial agreement without conditions does not open the way for
Russian or foreign influence, but, my brothers, it means the eradication of the
foreign influence which so long oppressed and dominated us
My brothers, when we are able to equip our army with the necessary arms with-
out conditions or restrictions, we destroy foreign control that control which I have
felt and which you have felt in the guise of equipping our army and in the guise of
providing it with arms Those who talk to us about foreign influence know that they
themselves have no intention of seeing foreign influence wiped out.
We intend to destroy foreign influence Egypt independent Egypt, revolutionary
Egypt, strong Egypt will never allow foreign influence in her land They know we
will never accept their influence, and their control. They know that Egypt after
the Revolution of July 23 has determined to destroy forever foreign influence,
foreign oppression and foreign control and to go forward as a free independent
power with her own foreign policy, motivated by her own interests and not by the
interest of any of the foreign carnps.
They know this when they talk of influence for they think that it is their in-
fluence which has come to an end in this country that it is their influence which
has gone away forever.
Today we are a free and independent nation We will fight for our liberty and
we will fight for our independence and may God be with us all.
Nationalization of the Suez Canal Company:
Presidential Decree
July 26, 1956
President of the Republic Order concerning the issuance of Law No. 285 of 1956
on the Nationalization of the Universal Company of the Suez Maritime Canal.
In the Name of the Nation
The President of the Republic,
Considering the two firmans issued on November 30, 1854 and January 5, 1856
(respectively) concerning the preferential rights related to the administration of
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the Suez Canal Transit Service and the establishment of an Egyptian joint-stock
company to operate it ;
and Law No. 129 of 1947 concerning public utility concessions;
and Law No. 317 of 1952 concerning individual labor contracts;
and Law No. 26 of 1954 concerning joint-stock companies, limited partnerships
by shares and limited liability companies ;
with the advice of the State Council;
has issued the following law :
ART. 1 The Universal Company of the Suez Maritime Canal (Egyptian joint-
stock Company) is hereby nationalized. All its assets, rights and obligations are
transferred to the Nation and all the organizations and committees that now operate
its management are hereby dissolved
Stockholders and holders of founders shares shall be compensated for the
ordinary or founders shares they own in accordance with the value of the shares
shown in the closing quotations of the Paris Stock Exchange on the day preceding
the effective date of the present law.
The payment of said indemnity shall be effected after the Nation has taken
delivery of all the assets and properties of the nationalized company.
ART. 2. An independent organization endowed with juristic personality and
annexed to the Ministry of Commerce, shall take over the management of the Suez
Canal Transit Service. The composition of the organization and the remuneration
of its members shall be fixed in an order of the President of the Republic. In so
far as managing the Transit Service is concerned the organization shall have ail the
necessary powers required for the purpose without being restricted by Government
regulations and procedures.
Without prejudice to the auditing of its final accounts by the State Audit De-
partment, the organization shall have an independent budget prepared in accordance
with the rules in force for commercial concerns Its financial year shall begin on
July 1, and end on June 30 each year. The budget and final accounts shall be
approved by an order of the President of the Republic. The first financial year
shall begin on the effective date of the present law and end with June 30, 1957.
The organization may delegate one or several of its members to implement its
decisions or to discharge any duty assigned to these members.
It may also set up from among its own members of from among other people,
a technical committee to assist it in its own research work and studies.
The chairman of the organization shall represent it before the courts, government
agencies, and other places, and in its dealings with third parties.
ART. 3. The assets and rights of the nationalized company in the Republic of
Egypt and abroad, are hereby frozen. Without specific permission obtained in ad-
vance from the organization provided for in Article 2 above, banks, organizations
and private persons are hereby prohibited from disposing of those assets or making
any payment requested them or due by them.
ART. 4. The organization shall retain all the present officials, employees, and
laborers of the nationalized company at their posts ; they shall have to continue with
the discharge of their duties; no one will be allowed to leave his work or vacate
his post in any manner and for any reason whatsoever except with the permission
of the organization provided for in Article 2
ART. 5. All violations of the provisions of Article 3 above shall be punished
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by imprisonment and a fine equal to three times the value of the amount involved
in the offense All violations of the provisions of Article 4 shall be punished by
imprisonment in addition to the forfeiture by the offender of all right to com-
pensation, pension or indemnity
ART 6 The present order shall be published in the Official Gazette and shall
have the force of law It shall come into force on the date of its publication. The
Minister of Commerce shall issue the necessary administrative orders for its
implementation
It shall bear the Seal of the State and be implemented as one of the State laws.
Given this 18th day of Zul Heggah, 1375 A H (July 26, 1956)
Gamal Abdul Nasser
Nationalization Speech:
Gamal Abdul Nasser
July 26, 1956
This speech makes reference to a meeting with Mr. Eugene R.
Black, president of the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, with which Egypt had been negotiating for a loan
to help finance the construction of a high dam on the Nile at
Aswan (translation made from tape recording),
I began to look at Mr Black sitting in his chair imagining that I was sitting
before Ferdinand de Lesseps.
I recalled the words which we used to read. In 1854, Ferdinand de Lesseps ar-
rived in Egypt He went to Mohammed Said Pasha, the Khedive He sat beside him
and told him,
uWe want to dig the Suez Canal. This project will greatly benefit
you It is a great project and will bring excellent returns to Egypt/'
While Black was speaking to me, I felt the complexes which his words revived.
I was again carried back to Ferdinand de Lesseps.
I told him we have complexes from such matters, and we do not want to see
another Cromer governing us again. Loans and interests on these loans have ended
in the occupation of our country. I requested him to take this into consideration. We
have complexes from de Lesseps and from Cromer, and from political occupation
through economic occupation.
That was the picture I had in mind, the picture of De Lesseps who arrived on
November 7, 1854. He arrived in Alexandria and began to work cautiously and
treacherously. On November 30, 1854, he had already contacted the Khedive and
obtained the Concession for the Canal from him The Concession said. "Our friend
De Lesseps has drawn our attention to the benefits which will accrue to Egypt by
joining the Mediterranean and the Red Sea by a waterway for the passage of ships
He informed us of the possibility of forming a company for this purpose to com-
prise the investors of capital We have approved the idea and have authorised him
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to form and to operate a company for the digging of the Suez Canal and to exploit
it between the two seas."
This was in 1854. In 1856, a hundred years ago, a Firman was issued whereby
the company was formed Egypt got 44 per cent of the shares and bound herself
with certain obligations to De Lesseps The De Lesseps company is a private com-
pany' It has nothing to do with governments, domination, occupation or imperial-
ism! De Lesseps told the Khedive, "I am your friend, I have come to benefit you
and to dig a canal between the two seas for your advantage
"
The Suez Canal Company was formed, and Egypt got 44 per cent of the shares
Egypt undertook to supply labour to dig the Canal by corvee, of whom 120,000 died
without getting paid We also paid De Lesseps in order that he might give up some
concession. We gave up the 15 per cent of the profits which we were supposed to
get over and above the profits of our 44 per cent of the shares Thus, contrary- to
the statements made by De Lesseps to the Khedive in which he said that the Canal
was dug for Egypt, Egypt has become the property of the Canal.
Article 16 of the agreement concluded on February 22, 1866, stipulated that in
view of the fact that the Suez Canal Company is an Egyptian company, it is sub-
ject to the country's laws. [But it has been] subject neither to the country's laws
nor its regulations. It considers itself a state within a state. The disputes which
arise between Egypt and the Company or between individuals of any nationality
are to come before Egyptian courts in accordance with the regulations set forth
by the laws of the country Egyptian courts are competent in giving their verdict
with regard to disputes which may come up between the Egyptian government and
the company according to Egyptian laws
The result of the words of De Lesseps in 1856, the result of friendship and loans,
was the occupation of Egypt in 1882
Egypt then borrowed money What happened? Egypt was obliged, during the
reign of Ismail, to sell its 44 per cent of the shares in the company. Immediately,
England sent out to purchase the shares It bought them for 4 million pounds. Then,
Ismail gave up his 5 per cent of the company's profits against the ceding of some
concessions by the Company which were granted to it.
Then Ismail was obliged to pay to Britain the 5 per cent profit which he had
relinquished This amounted to over 4 million pounds. In other words, Britain got
Egypt's 44 per cent of the Company's shares free. This was the history which took
place a century ago.
Is history to repeat itself again with treachery and deceit ? W
T
ill economic inde-
pendence ... or economic domination and control be the cause of the destruc-
tion of our political independence and freedom?
Brothers, it is impossible that history should repeat itself.
Today, we do not repeat what happened in the past. We are eradicating the
traces of the past. We are building our country on strong and sound bases.
Whenever we turn backwards, we aim at the eradication of the past evils which
brought about our domination, and the vestiges of the past which took place despite
ourselves and which were caused by imperialism through treachery and deceit.
Today, the Suez Canal where 120,000 of our sons had lost their lives in digging
it by corvee, and for the foundation of which we paid 8 million pounds, has be-
come a state within the state. It has humiliated ministers and cabinets.
This Canal is an Egyptian canal. It is an Egyptian Joint Stock Company. Britain
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has forcibly grabbed our rights, our 44 per cent of its shares Britain still collects
the profits of these shares from the time of its inauguration until now
All countries
and shareholders get their profits. A state within the state, an Egyptian Joint Stock
Company.
The income of the Suez Canal Company in 1955 reached 35 million pounds, or
100 million dollars Of this sum, we, who have lost 120,000 persons, who have
died in digging the Canal, take only 1 million pounds or 3 million dollars
' This is
the Suez Canal Company, which, according to the Firman, was dug for the sake
of Egypt and its benefit '
Do you know how much assistance America and Britain were going to offer us
over five years? 70 million dollars. Do you know who takes the 100 million dollars,
the Company's income, every year? They take them of course.
It is no shame that I may be poor and borrow money to build my country It is
no shame that I should attempt to get aid for the sake of my country But, it is
shameful that I suck peoples
1
blood and rights
We shall not repeat the past We shall eradicate it by restoring our rights in the
Suez Canal This money is ours This Canal is the property of Egypt because it
is an Egyptian Joint Stock Company
The Canal was dug by Egypt's sons and 120,000 of them died while working. The
Suez Canal Company in Paris is an imposter company It usurped our concessions.
When De Lesseps came over to Egypt, his arrival was the same as Black who
came to Egypt to talk with me. The same action.
But history will never repeat itself On the contrary, we shall build the High
Dam We shall restore our usurped rights We shall build the High Dam as we
want it. We are determined to do it. 35 million pounds the company gets every
year; let Egypt take it. 100 million dollars are collected every year by the com-
pany which collects them for the benefit of Egypt Let it be so, and Egypt will
collect the 100 million dollars for the benefit of Egypt.
Thus, today, citizens, when we build the High Dam, we are actually building
the dam to defend our dignity, freedom, and pride, and to eradicate humiliation
and submission.
Egypt the whole of Egypt one national front one unified and solid front
announces that it will fight to the last drop of its blood. Everyone of its sons will
be like Salah Mustafa and Mustafa Hafez We shall all fight to the last drop of our
blood for building our country, for the sake of Egypt. We shall not let war
mongers, imperialists or those who trade in human beings dominate us. We shall
depend on our hands and on our blood We are rich, but we were careless We shall
restore these rights. The battle continues We shall restore these rights step by
step We shall realize everything. We shall build a strong and dignified Egypt, the
Arab Egypt.
Therefore, I have signed today the following law which has been approved by
the Cabinet : [reads text of decree Doc. 18]
Citizens,
We shall not let imperialists or exploiters dominate us. We shall not let history
repeat itself once more. We have gone forward to build a strong Egypt. We go
forward towards political and economic independence. We go forward towards na-
tional economy for the sake of the whole people. We go forward to work. But,
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whenever we look behind, we do so to destroy the traces of the past, the traces of
slavery, exploitation and domination.
Today, citizens, rights have been restored to their owners. Our right in the Suez
Canal have been restored to us after 100 years
Today, we actually achieve true sovereignty, true dignity and true pride The
Suez Canal Company was a state within a state It was an Egyptian Joint Stock
Company, relying on imperialism and its stooges.
The Suez Canal was built for the sake of Egypt and for its benefit But is was a
source of exploitation and the draining of wealth
As I said a short while ago, it is no shame to be poor and to work for the build-
ing of my country. But it is shameful to suck blood They used to suck our blood,
our rights and take them.
Today, when we regain our rights, I say in the name of the people of Egypt
that we shall defend these rights and shall hold fast We shall sacrifice our lives and
our blood in defending them. We shall make up for the past.
Today, when we build the edifice of our dignity, freedom and pride, we feel
that it will not be completely sound until we eradicate domination, humiliation and
submission The Suez Canal constituted an edifice of humiliation.
Today, citizens, the Suez Canal Company has been nationalized This order has
been published in the Official Journal. It has become a matter of fact.
Citizens, today we say our wealth has been restored to us
Citizens. Today, the Suez Canal income is estimated at 35 million pounds or 100
million dollars per annum or 500 million dollars in five years. We shall not seek
the 70 million dollar American aid.
Today, fellow-countrymen, by our sweat, our tears, the souls of our martyrs and
the skulls of those who died in 1856, a hundred years ago during the corvee, we
are able to develop this country We shall work, produce and step up production
despite all these intrigues and these talks. Whenever I hear talk from Washington,
I shall say, "Die of your fury
"
We shall build up industry in Egypt and compete with them They do not want
us to become an industrial country so that they can promote the sale of their
products and market them in Egypt I never saw any American aid directed towards
industrialization as this would cause us to compete with them. American aid is
everywhere directed towards exploitation
On entering upon the fifth anniversary of the Revolution, as I said at the begin-
ning of my speech, we feel stronger, more resolute and faithful than during the
former years
On embarking upon the fifth year of the Revolution, as Farouk was expelled
on July 26, 1952, the Suez Canal Company will depart on the very same day. We
are conscious of accomplishing glories and achieving true dignity. Sovereignty in
Egypt will belong only to her sons.
We shall march forward united . one nation confident in itself, its mother-
land and its power, one nation relying on itself in work and in the sacred march
towards construction, industrialization and creation . one nation . a solid
bloc to hold out treason and aggression and resist imperialism and agents of im-
perialism.
In this manner, we shall accomplish much and feel dignity and pride and feel
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that we are building up our country to suit ourselves . . . We build what we want
and do what we want with nobody to account to
When we obtain our usurped and stolen rights, we shall turn towards strength. We
shall become stronger each year, and, God willing, next year we shall become more
powerful with increased production, work and factories
Now, while I am speaking to you, fellow countrymen, brothers of yours are tak-
ing over the administration and the management of the Canal Company, the
Egyptian Canal Company not the foreign Canal Company They are taking over
the Canal Company and its facilities for the direction of navigation in the Canal,
the Canal which is situated in the territory of Egypt, cuts through the territory of
Egypt, is a part of Egypt and belongs to Egypt. We now perform this task to
compensate for the past and build up new edifices for pride and dignity.
May God guide you and peace be with you.
SECTION 2
The Suez Crisis: World Reaction
From Address to the Security Council:
Abba Efoan
October 30, 1956
The objective of the security measures which the Israel defense forces have felt
bound to take in the Sinai Peninsula is the exercise of our country's inherent right
of self-defense. The object of these operations is to eliminate the Egyptian
Fedayeen bases from which armed Egyptian units, under the special care and
authority of Colonel Nasser, invade Israel's territory for the purposes of murder,
sabotage and the creation of permanent insecurity to peaceful life. World opinion
is naturally asking itself what these Fedayeen units are; what their activities imply
for Israel's security, whether their actions in the past and their plans for the future
are really full of peril for Israel; and whether this peril is so acute that Israel
may reasonably regard its elimination a primary condition of its security and indeed
of its existence
The Government of Israel is the representative of a people endowed with a
mature understanding of international facts We are not unaware of the limitations
of our strength. We fully understand how certain measures might at first sight evoke
a lack of comprehension, even in friendly minds. Being a democracy, we work under
the natural restraints of a public opinion which might compel us to weigh drastic
choices with care and without undue precipitation. It is therefore a Government
which governs its actions by a single exclusive aim to insure life and security and
opportunities for self-development for the people whom it represents while also
safeguarding the honor and trust of millions linked to it by the strongest ties of
fraternity. In recent days and months the Government of Israel has had to face a
tormenting question: Do its obligations under the United Nations Charter require
us to resign ourselves to the existence of uninterrupted activity to the South and
North and East of our country, of armed units practising open warfare against us
and working from their bases in the Sinai Peninsula and elsewhere for the main-
tenance of carefully regulated invasions of our home, our lands and our very lives?
On the other hand, are we acting with an inherent right of self-defense when, having
found no other remedy for over two years, we cross the frontier against those who
141
142 The Suez Crisis; World Reaction
have no scruple or hesitation in crossing the frontier against us? Members of the
Security Council may be in a better position to evaluate this choice and to identify
themselves with this situation if they hear something about the Fedayeen move-
ment, of its place in the total pattern of Egyptian belligerency, of its extension
under Egyptian direction, to other Arab countries falling under Nasser's sway, and
of what would happen if we made no attempt at this time to resist that movement
in its drive towards total conflict.
The system of waging war against Israel by Fedayeen is the product of Colonel
Nasser's mind It is one of his contributions to the international life and morality
of our times. After intensive preparations during the Spring and Summer of 1955,
this new weapon was launched in August of that year, breaking a period of relative
tranquillity on the Egyptian front, and indeed coming at a time when Egypt and
Israel were engaged in hopeful negotiations with the United Nations Chief of Staff,
looking towards integral implementation of the 1949 Armistice Agreement The
Government of Egypt made no secret of these activities or of its responsibility for
them. It might be convenient, to summarize some of the effects of these actions, if
I were to tell the Security Council the entire toll of violence and murder inflicted
upon Israel by this phase of Egyptian belligerency During the six years during
which this belligerency has operated in violation of the Armistice Agreement, there
have occurred 1,843 cases of armed robbery and theft, 1,339 cases of armed
clashes with Egyptian armed forces, 435 cases of incursions from Egyptian-con-
trolled territory, 172 cases of sabotage perpetrated by Egyptian military units and
Fedayeen in Israel As a result of these actions of Egyptian hostility within Israel
364 Israelis were wounded and 101 killed. In 1956 alone, as a result of this aspect
of Egyptian aggression, 28 Israelis were killed and 127 were wounded.
It cannot be seriously suggested that these activities are not the direct re-
sponsibility of the Government of Egypt In recent months it has become apparent
to us that the Arab Governments, and especially Egypt, have come to regard the
Fedayeen weapon as an instrument not for mere harrassment but for Israel's
destruction The Commander-in-Chief himself, Colonel Nasser, defined their mis-
sion on May 28 when he said 1
The Fedayeen, the Palestine army, which started as a small force of 1,000
men last year, is today greater in number and in training and equipment. I
believe in the strength, the ability, the loyalty and the courage of this army.
Its soldiers will be responsible for taking revenge for their homeland and
people.
On June 19, Colonel Nasser declared, in the context of this Fedayeen movement .
We are obliged to be strong in order to liberate the entire Arab land from
Morocco to Baghdad and in order to retrieve the rights of Palestine's people.
Having concerted his military plans with Syria and Saudi Arabia, the Commander-
in-Chief of the Egyptian army, General Abdel Hakim Amer, spoke as follows :
Now that the hour is approaching, I, and the members of the Revolutionary
Council will be in the front line of battle. In this battle our enemies will be
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convinced of their weakness, and the victories will be yours and that of all
the Arab states.
A little later, the same Commander-in-Chief said :
The Israeli danger no longer exists. Egypt has enough strength to wipe
Israel off the map.
The Security Council will observe that this was merely the spearhead of Egyptian
belligerency. It was a new device for making war, and for making it with safety.
The doctrine was that of unilateral belligerency The Egyptian-Israeli frontier is to
be a one-way street; it is to be wide open for these armed Egyptian units to pene-
trate as deeply as possible into Israel as they like, to accomplish their mission and
then return. It is to be closed in their favor against any defensive response
I have spoken of these penetrations into Israel by armed units under the re-
sponsibility and control of Colonel Nasser. No one ever called a session of the
Security Council to condemn these penetrations or to call for their withdrawal, or
to threaten Egypt with the consequences of non-compliance Can Israel be required
to reconcile itself with a situation in which any Arab country which chooses to send
units into Israel to murder its population, to plunder and destroy, should be able to
rely upon a large measure of international apathy?
It is one thing to present resolutions for protecting the Fedayeen against the risks
that they might not be safe in their abode It is a fact that there have never been
any resolutions adopted by the Security Council designed specifically to protect the
Israel civilian population against the encroachments and the depradations of the
Fedayeen units The people of Israel are not able to understand the meaning of this
distinction They do not know why the shelter of the Charter should not be spread
over innocent workers tilling their fields, over women in their homes, over children
in the sacred hour of religious observance who were mowed down and killed by
Fedayeen encroachments, and why this protection should only apply to those who,
across the frontier, organize these penetrations for death and destruction. Would it
not be a paradox if these Fedayeen units, the greatest plague to security in the
Middle East, were to become inadvertently, the beneficiaries of international pro-
tection?
In discussing the Suez Canal case on a previous occasion, I referred to this
paradox of unilateral belligerency I ask leave to recall what I said in that context:
At the root of these tensions lie a theory and practice of belligerency. Egypt
considers and proclaims that there is a state of war. In the name of that state
of war Egypt asserts a right to perform hostile acts of its own choice against
Israel On the other hand, Egypt claims from the United Nations immunity
from any response emanating from Israel This is the doctrine of unilateral
belligerency, and it has no parallel or precedent in the jurisprudence of nations.
The Government of Israel has had ample reason to fear that this activity was to
be renewed on a scale unprecedented even during the first wave of Fedayeen inva-
sions in August 1955, or during its recrudescence in the Spring of 1956. Following
the meeting of the Chiefs of Staff of Egypt, Syria and Jordan in Amman, we had
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stronger reason than ever before to believe that this recrudescence would take place.
We duly gave this information to many Governments concerned with the mainte-
nance of peace and security in the Middle East The very day after we gave notice
of this apprehension, the Fedayeen units began to arrive. Three of these units
entered our territory on Sunday (October 21), two of them being captured, the
other retreating to one of their bases in the Sinai Peninsula
From a study of official Arab sources it is quite clear that again there was to be
a refreshing candor about the renewal of this assault. Here is one official Arab
broadcast on October 16, 1956, at 1630 hours'
The Fedayeen Headquarters in Gaza has issued a communique stating that a
group of Fedayeen succeeded on October 13 to cross the southern border of
Palestine in order to discover the concentration points and the factories which
the Zionists have started to transfer to the coastal region so as to get them
out of the firing-range of Egyptian guns which threaten to destroy them. The
communique of Fedayeen Headquarters in Gaza states also that all the
Fedayeen returned safely to their bases, except two who are believed to have
been killed in an encounter which took place between them and the guards of
Prime Minister Ben Gurion's home at Sde Boker. Further, it is believed that
two other Fedayeen have been wounded and taken to a hospital in Rehovoth.
The fifth of the Fedayeen has not yet returned from his mission in occupied
Palestine.
This was a broadcast heard in Damascus, giving the text of the communique
issued from Fedayeen Headquarters in Gaza.
In these circumstances, both the position and the attitude of the Israel Govern-
ment are clear. The attitude is based on our fundamental concept of reciprocity.
If the frontier between Egypt and Israel is to protect Egyptian territory against
Israeli entry, then it must protect Israel territory against Egyptian entry. We hold
as a self-evident truth that the lives of Israeli men, women and children are not
less worthy of international protection or less sacrosanct than the lives of these
hired Fedayeen gangs which are the main instrument of Nasserism in its assault
upon the peace and the decencies of Middle Eastern life.
Behind these incidents, grave as they are, we discern issues of even greater
moment. World opinion must choose between two candidates for its confidence: on
the one hand, farmers and workers, the men, women and children of Israel; on the
other hand, these fanatic warriors of the Fedayeen groups Behind this confronta-
tion, there stands the broader alignment between Israel and Nasser. A small
people builds its society and culture in its renascent homeland In the early days
of its independence it is set on by the armed might of all its neighbors, who attempt
to wipe it off the face of the earth.
My memory tells me that it took something like eight weeks for the Security
Council to secure the withdrawal of Egyptian and other Arab armies from the
sovereign soil of Israel. The effort to secure that withdrawal was, perhaps, not
marked by a sufficient urgency or zeal. In the following years of the conflict,
Israel's neighbors have continued to assault her with warlike acts of their own
choice, to attempt her destruction by armed intervention, by blockade and boycott.
They send armed units into her territory to murder and plunder. They strive by
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every means to ensure that nowhere in Israel shall there be tranquillity for peace-
ful pursuit They blare forth the most violent threats for Israel's destruction They
accumulate vast armaments for bringing that result about They announce, as they
did last week from Cairo, that it is they \\ho will choose the time and the place for
the final assault, and that it is for us to wait passively for that selection, They
proclaim that a state of war with Israel already exists They seize the greatest of
the world's international waterways and convert it into an instrument for unilateral
national pressure, while maintaining a constant violation of international maritime
law.
Across Africa and Asia, wherever Nasserism spreads its baneful influence, it
works actively to subvert all peace and progress to establish an ambitious and
insatiable hegemony. Now, having considered that it has humbled the international
community and maritime Powers, Nasser's action returns to his first target-
Israel which is to be swamped from three sides with a new wave of Fedayeen
violence Accordingly, while studying with attention all proposals for strengthening
security in the Middle East, we reject with vehement indignation the charge of
aggression launched against us. There is aggression, there is belligerency in the
Middle East; but we are its victims and not its authors. That is what I mean when
I say that world opinion must decide whom to trust. Shall it be a small, free people
establishing its homeland in peace and constructive progress, or shall it be the
dictatorship which has bullied and blustered and blackmailed its way across the
international life of our times, threatening peace in many continents, openly avow-
ing belligerency, placing its fist on the jugular vein of the world's communications,
bringing the Middle East and the \\orld ever nearer to the precipice of conflict;
intimidating all those who stand in its path all except one people, at least, which
will not be intimidated, one people which no dictator in history has even intimi-
dated, a people which has risen up against all the tyrants of history, a people which
knows that the appeasement of despots yields nothing but an uneasy respite and
that a Government which allowed its citizens to be murdered daily in their homes
would lose the essential justification for \^hich Governments are instituted among
men.
This is the background, and these are the issues which have guided my Govern-
ment's choice. We have faced them alone, and we made a decision to invoke for this
purpose, and no other, our sovereign right of self-defense. Israel is not out to con-
quer any new territory, but is determined to wipe out the bases in the Sinai wilder-
ness from which murder and death and destruction are launched against it.
We believe, as we have always believed, in our destiny of peace, and for that
we are ready now, but it must be a real peacepeace by agreement, peace without
boycott or blockade, peace without murdering Fedayeen gangs peace, in short,
within a framework of a reciprocal regard for the ideals and principles of the
United Nations Charter. . . .
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Letter and Statement to the Security Council:
United States
October 30, 1956
UNITED STATES LETTER
The Government of the United States has received information to the effect that
in violation of the Armistice Agreement between Israel and Egypt, the armed forces
of Israel have penetrated deeply into Egyptian territory. This military action com-
menced Oct. 29 and is continuing in the Sinai area. This situation makes imperative
an immediate meeting of the Security Council, charged as it is with the primary
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security as well as
responsibility for the observance of the Armistice Agreement
I have the honor, therefore, in behalf of my Government to request to convene
a meeting of the Security Council as soon as possible to consider "The Palestine
Question Steps for the immediate cessation of the military action of Israel in
Egypt."
STATEMENT BY THE UNITED STATES
The United Nations has requested this urgent meeting of the Security Council
to consider steps to be taken to bring about the immediate cessation of military
action by Israel against Egypt The Security Council has been meeting on the
Palestine question within the last few days and repeatedly in recent months to
consider actions which the Council unanimously believed constituted a grave danger,
and I am therefore sure that there can be no question about the adoption of the
agenda.
I therefore request the president to put to the vote the question of the adoption
of the agenda, which I am certain each member of the Council will consider ap-
propriate in these grave circumstances, and I am sure that the Council will act with
the same unanimity now with which it has acted on the Palestine question in
numerous recent meetings. After the adoption of the agenda, I would appreciate the
opportunity to speak immediately on the substance of the question.
[The agenda was then adopted ]
We have asked for this urgent meeting t>f the Security Council to consider the
critical developments which have occurred and which are unfortunately still con-
tinuing in the Sinai Peninsula as the result of Israel's invasion of that area
yesterday
It comes as a shock to the United States Government that this action should
have occurred less than twenty-four hours after President Eisenhower had sent a
second earnest personal appeal to the Prime Minister [David Ben-Gurion] of
Israel urging Israel not to undertake any action against its Arab neighbors, and
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pointing out that we had no reason to believe that those neighbors had taken any
steps justifying Israel's action of mobilization.
Certain things are clear. The first is that, by their own admission, Israeli armed
forces moved into Sinai in force "to eliminate the Egyptian Fedayeen bases in the
Sinai Peninsula " They have admitted the capture of Quseima and Ras el Naqb.
Second, reliable reports have placed Israeli armed forces near the Suez Canal
Third, Israel has announced that both the Egyptian and Israeli armed forces were
in action in the desert battle.
An official announcement in Tel Aviv stated that Egyptian fighter planes strafed
Israeli troops We have a report that President [Gamal Abdel] Nasser has called
for full mobilization in Egypt today and that the Egyptian Army claims that it has
halted the advance of major Israeli forces driving across the Sinai Peninsula The
Secretary General [Dag Hammarskjold] may receive more information from
General [E L. M. Burns] and the Truce Supervision Organization, and I am sure
that we shall continue to be fully informed as we proceed with our deliberations
here.
These events make the necessity for the urgent consideration of this item all too
plain Failure by the Council to react at this time would be a clear avoidance of its
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The United
Nations has a clear and unchallengeable responsibility for the maintenance of the
Armistice Agreements.
The Government of the United States feels that it is imperative that the Council
act in the promptest manner to determine that a breach of the peace has occurred,
to order that the military actions undertaken by Israel cease immediately, and to
make clear its view that the Israeli armed forces should be immediately withdrawn
behind the established armistice lines Nothing else will suffice.
It is also to be noted that the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Super-
vision Organization [General Burns] has already issued a cease-fire order on his
own authority which Israel has so far ignored. Information has reached us also that
military observers of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization have
been prevented by Israeli authorities from performing their duties
We, as members of the Council, accordingly should call upon all members of the
United Nations to render prompt assistance in achieving a withdrawal of Israeli
forces Ail members, specifically, should refrain from giving any assistance which
might continue or prolong the hostilities. No one, certainly, should take advantage
cf this situation for any selfish interest Each of us here, and every member of the
United Nations, has a clear-cut responsibility to see that the peace and stability
of the Palestine area is restored forthwith. Anything less is an invitation to disaster
in this part of the world.
This is an immediate responsibility which derives from the Council's obligations
under its cease-fire orders and the Armistice Agreements between the Israelis and
the Arab states endorsed by this Security Council It derives, also, of course, from
the larger responsibility under the United Nations Charter
On behalf of the United States Government, I give notice that I intend at the
afternoon meeting to introduce a draft resolution whereby the Council will call
upon Israel to withdraw and will indicate such steps as will assure that it does.
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From Address to the Security Council:
Sir Piersoii Dixon
October 31, 1956
I should like at the outset to associate myself with the expression of regard for the
Secretary General which have been voiced by various members of the Council We
have the highest regard for the integrity and imparliality of Mr Hammarskjold
As members of the Council will be a^are, since our meeting yesterday evening
it has been announced that the Egyptian Government regrettably has rejected the
communication from Her Majesty's Government and from the French Government
dated 30 October, and as a consequence Her Majesty's Government and the French
Government have intervened in accordance v.ith that communication
I should like to say at once that I have informed myself on the true nature of
the press and agency reports which have been quoted around this table in regard
to military operations I am authorized to say that the action which is being taken
is strictly limited to military targets, primarily air-fields, and I would draw atten-
tion to the fact that the civilian population was warned to keep clear of such
targets before the operations started.
This intervention, as I hope to show in the course of my remarks, has as its
overriding purposes the safeguarding of the Suez Canal and the restoration of
peaceful conditions in the Middle East
It is one facet of a highly complex and dangerous situation and it cannot there-
fore be considered, as the Egyptian representative in his letter contained in Docu-
ment S/3712 invites us to do, as a separate and isolated development
I do not, of course, for one moment accept the implications and insinuations in
that letter. But in so far as this matter relates to an aspect, and a troubling aspect,
of the general situation, naturally I am ready to discuss it.
The Soviet representative told us yesterday, and he has repeated it again today,
that this intervention was part of a long-prepared plot hatched by the British,
French and Israeli Governments, designed to stir up trouble in the Middle East in
order to restore old colonial empires, or words to that effect.
I think nobody will take this very seriously. I think we can all understand why
the representative of the Soviet Union would wish to invent such stories in view of
his own country's troubles in East Europe.
I need only make this simple point It is common knowledge that over the past
few months our relations with Israel have been very difficult and even strained. And
why? Because of the strenuous efforts made by Her Majesty's Government to re-
duce the tensions around its borders.
Indeed, my colleagues will recollect that it v\as only a few days ago that the
representative of Israel had some sharp words to say about the sympathy I had
expressed for Jordan
We have also heard the argument that, since the Government of Israel has agreed
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to keep its troops ten miles away from the Suez Canal, no threat to the canal now
exists and the Anglo-French intervention is no longer justified
But I must point out that the Israel Government accepted the terms of the
communications of the United Kingdom and French Governments on the assump-
tion that the Egyptian response would be positive. But, as we know, the Egyptian
response was unfortunately negative.
From all the information at our disposal, and we can claim, I think, to be
reasonably well informed about affairs in the Middle East, we judged that the
danger of a major clash between Israel and its Arab neighbors had become more
imminent than at any time since the signing of the armistice agreements.
I am not, of course, in a position to reveal the full evidence, and I must ask my
colleagues to accept that this judgment was well founded It was in the light of this
weighty judgment that Her Majesty's Government and the French Government took
the grave decision that their immediate intervention was required to safeguard the
Suez Canal and prevent a disastrous conflagration which might spread.
Whether or not our intervention will extinguish the conflict as it is intended to
do, is not dependent on us alone. It depends very much on the understanding sup-
port of those members of the international community who are also concerned to
see peace and order restored in the Middle East.
As there has regrettably been a considerable misunderstanding of the policies
of Her Majesty's Government and the French Government in this matter, may I
once again formulate what are the objectives behind our intervention. They are, in
the first place, to stop all warlike action on land, sea and air as soon as possible ;
secondly, to enforce a separation of the belligerents; and thirdly, to protect the
Suez Canal for the free passage of ships of all nations.
Any prolonged fighting along the banks of the [Suez] Canal would seriously
endanger the lives and shipping of many nations of the world. Great Britain and
France are the main users of this canal, and our vital interests would be endangered
if free passage were interrupted I need not go far back into the past, but I should
like to recall that the circumstances in which the canal was seized were circum-
stances in which violence and resort to illegal methods were employed.
We have a right to defend these vital interests, and we believe, moreover, that in
so doing we are also defending the interests of all nations, and there are many,
whose economies depend on this great international right-of-way.
But although we have acted to protect our vital interests and those of other
nations in this international waterway, our other purpose, as I have made abun-
dantly clear, has been, and remains, to prevent an armed clash between Israel and
Egypt leading to a general conflagration.
Our intervention is a temporary measure which we were obliged to take in the
absence of any effective collective machinery for restoring peace and order in a
matter of such extreme emergency.
Moreover, it is our firm intention to insure that the Israel forces now in the
neighborhood of the canal should be withdrawn as soon as possible from Egyptian
territory.
Let me state also with emphasis that we do not and could not condone any Israel
action aimed at the occupation of positions in Egyptian territory. Let there be no
misunderstanding about this. It is our view that Israel should withdraw its forces
from their present positions as soon as this can be satisfactorily arranged. As I
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stated yesterday, we have no hesitation in regarding Israel's incursion across the
Egyptian border as a violation of the armistice agreement
In the misleading version of events contained in the letter from the delegation
of Egypt now before us, and in the statement made this afternoon by the repre-
sentative of Egypt, my Government and the French Government are accused of
committing an act of aggression
This is a very serious charge to make in the Security Council, bearing in mind
the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter We strongly deny such charges and
do not think it will be profitable for the Council to discuss them What does con-
stitute and what does not constitute an act of aggression is, as we all know, a
matter of debate
But the matter \\hich the Council should consider today and on which we ask
for the Council's understanding support is a temporary intervention by the two
Governments that are in a position to restore peace and order effectively and
speedily in an area of the world where a major conflagration threatens us. Our
intervention is not aimed at the sovereignty of Egypt, still less at the territorial
integrity of Egypt
Address to the Security Council
Louis de Guiringaud
October 31, 1956
I shall now speak as representative of France It is with regret that the French
delegation found itself compelled last night to oppose the adoption of the draft
resolutions submitted to the Council, If we did this, it was because we thought
that in the present case the Council could not only confine itself merely to the
consideration of only one aspect of the problem, and that in our view it was
necessary for us to take account of all the elements involved in the situation.
The French Government considered that the tension in the Middle East had
become gradually so serious that it ^as no longer possible not to view the situation
as a whole and in every aspect and to act accordingly
We were confronted with an attack carried out by Israel forces in the Suez
Canal Zone and in the direction of the Canal. We had every reason to believe that
the military developments might go so far as to hinder free transit through the
canal The latest news received from Egypt, which referred to the positions of the
Israel troops, show how well founded our apprehensions were.
Experience has also taught us that, whatever the moral weight of the Council's
decisions, unfortunately, in that part of the world, they had little practical effect,
as the United Kingdom representative pointed out yesterday, for lack of force to
implement them.
The French and British Governments considered, therefore, that a serious threat
existed against the Suez Canal and that if rapid, effective and decisive action were
not undertaken immediately, we were running the risk of seriously jeopardizing
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traffic through the Canal for an indefinite period of time. Now, free navigation
through the Suez Canal is of vital importance to most countries of the world.
The French and British Governments considered it their duty to take all neces-
sary7 measures, even if these measures would be misunderstood at first by some of
their friends, in order to guarantee and prevent any impairment of freedom of
navigation through the Canal The French Government considered that the attack
carried out by the Israel forces was only an episode in the permanent state of
hostilities which exists between Egypt and the state of Israel It seemed to us
that the time had come to take measures likely to prevent any repetition of these
incidents.
These are the reasons underlying the action taken by the French Government in
the Suez Canal area In our view, this action is designed to assure an immediate
settlement of the current incidents and to make it possible to find a solution very
quickly which would be likely to eliminate the threats to the Canal
The French Government would stress the temporary7 nature of the presence of its
troops in the Canal Zone and would stress also the fact that it in no way intends
to infringe upon Egyptian sovereignty
Like the United Kingdom Government, the French Government cannot accept
the accusations that it has acted counter to the principles of the Charter The deci-
sion was taken only with the desire to insure as effectively as possible the restoration
of order in the Canal Zone before it was too late
In these circumstances the French Government is convinced that the purposes
which it pursues are the same as those of the majority of members of the Council
which we wish to reach, and we ask them to understand the motives which inspired
it and to assist it in carrying out the action which, in agreement with the Govern-
ment of the United Kingdom, the French Government has undertaken in the inter-
ests of the international community.
Address to the Security Council:
Arkady A. Sobolev
October 31, 1956
May I begin by stating that the Soviet delegation trusts the Secretary General of
the United Nations and supports him.
The situation in the Near East has grown sharply worse since yesterday's meeting
of the Security Council. According to information just received, an invasion has
begun an invasion of joint United Kingdom French troops in Egypt. Thus the
Governments of the United Kingdom and France, from the threat of armed inter-
vention in the Near East, have proceeded to the implementation of their proclaimed
plan of occupation of the Suez Canal Zone
The Soviet delegation expresses its deep sympathy with the people and Govern-
ment of Egypt confronted with a severe ordeal We have no doubt that the people
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of Egypt, which has gone through many trials, in this difficult hour as well will be
able to defend its independence and freedom against any attacks from without.
The acts of the United Kingdom and France, which have committed aggression
against Egypt, constitute a crude violation of their obligations assumed under the
United Nations Charter. The Charter requires members of the United Nations to
refrain from the threat of the use of force or the use of force in their relations with
other states. France and the United Kingdom, in their acts against Egypt, not only
threatened to use force but, at the present time, are carrying out aerial bom-
bardments of Egyptian towns and landing their armed forces on the territory of
Egypt, a member of the United Nations. That is to say, in violation of the United
Nations Charter they are using force
The responsibility of the Governments of the United Kingdom and France for
the extremely dangerous situation created by their acts in the Near East is ag-
gravated by the fact that they did not allow the Security Council to carry out its
functions in connection with the maintenance of international peace as defined by
the Charter.
The Governments of the United Kingdom and France have assumed the heavy
responsibility for a serious aggravation of the international situation, committing
armed intervention against Egypt at a time when Egypt was repelling Israel ag-
gression. Attention has already been called to the fact that Israel aggression and
the aggression of the United Kingdom and France against Egypt is being carried
out according to a single plan prepared in advance. The Israel aggression was
calculated to create conditions facilitating the seizure by United Kingdom and
French forces of the Suez Canal.
The Governments of the United Kingdom and France are attempting to justify
their acts by the statement that they are taking the Suez Canal under their pro-
tection and insuring freedom of transit through the canal. However, it is quite clear
that this artificial justification is designed only to cover up the aggressive acts of
the United Kingdom and France against Egypt.
Indeed, on the one hand, Israel aggression is instigated against Egypt and, on
the other hand, the United Kingdom and France are striking a blow against the
victim of that aggression, which is Egypt
If the United Kingdom and France really wanted a just settlement of the Suez
question, they have at their disposal other, peaceful ways and means. As is known,
the Security Council in the past considered the question of the Suez Canal and
prepared a plan for the settlement of the Suez question by peaceful means.
Under that plan, it would have been possible to secure a settlement of the Suez
question which would have corresponded both to the national interests of the
sovereign Egyptian state and to the interests of the users of the canal
However, such a method was not to the liking of the United Kingdom and
France. They preferred a forcible solution of this question, and precisely for that
purpose they utilized Israel aggression against the Egyptian state.
The representatives of the United Kingdom and France here attempted to
justify the aggressive acts by stating that the United Kingdom and France were
attempting to put an end to combat and restore peace and quiet in the area. How-
ever, the behavior of the United Kingdom and France testifies to the contrary.
At the moment when the Security Council was considering the question of Israel
aggression against Egypt and was attempting to find ways and means to reach a
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peaceful settlement of the conflict, the United Kingdom and France bypassing
the Security Council and violating the standards of international law and the prin-
ciples of the United Nations issued a crude ultimatum
This ultimatum, incompatible with the dignity of a sovereign state, had the
purpose of serving as a pretext for the seizure of the Suez Canal by United
Kingdom and French troops. In that ultimatum the United Kingdom and France
demanded that Egypt withdraw Egyptian troops ten miles from the Suez Canal.
In issuing such an ultimatum, the United Kingdom and France are, on the one
hand, attempting to force Egypt to hand over to the Israel troops territory to the
east of the Suez Canal and, on the other hand, demanding in violation of all
agreements that Egypt give up its protection of the Suez Canal
Thus the United Kingdom and France are acting like colonialists used to dictat-
ing their will to the peoples of the past. But the time of the domination of this
area by colonialists has long since passed. This action can only cause regret on the
part of all peace-loving peoples in the world.
The action of the United Kingdom and French Governments constitute a crude
violation of the United Nations Charter and of the dignity and sovereign rights of
the Egyptian state. It constitutes a denial of the inalienable right of peoples to
independence and freedom.
The Security Council cannot remain idle in the face of such a complicated
situation. It must adopt immediate measures to put an end to the aggression
against the Egyptian state and to restore peace and calm to that area of the world.
Concerned by the situation in the Near East, the Soviet Union delegation con-
siders it necessary for the Security Council to condemn the aggressive acts of the
United Kingdom and France, acts which have taken the form of bombing popu-
lated Egyptian territory and landing United Kingdom and French forces in Egypt.
We think that the Security Council should request the Governments of the
United Kingdom and France immediately to withdraw their armed forces from
Egyptian territory. If necessary, the Soviet Union delegation is prepared to submit
an appropriate draft resolution to the Security Council.
The Security Council, which bears the main responsibility for the maintenance
of international peace and security, cannot remain aloof; it must fulfill its direct
and immediate responsibility. The peoples all over the world are waiting for the
Security Council's decision.
Address to the Security Council:
Nasroilah Entezam
November 1, 1956
The only excuse they [Britain and France] had found for their act was a refer-
ence to the threats existing at present in the Middle East, and in particular in the
Suez Canal area.
But where did those threats come from? If it was Egypt that had created a
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menacing situation, then, sir, may I ask, why did not your countries come before
the Security Council and explain their case and seek a solution?
Then it would have been for Egypt to find an excuse to explain why she had
sent troops and state the views it held in respect of the situation and justify the
action it had undertaken. However, I believe that an excuse of that kind, coming
from those who had themselves sent troops, is completely unjustified.
The second excuse that might have been invoked was that a threatening situation
existed in the canal zone because of the aggressive action undertaken by one state.
In that case, what did your countries do to stop that aggression? Your countries,
sir, opposed the draft resolution that was submitted yesterday. Today, instead of
punishing aggression, you have attacked the victim of that aggression How could
it be possible for your countries to find some excuse before world opinion?
My delegation stands for a peaceful settlement of these issues in accordance
with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, avoiding all armed inter-
vention and respecting the sovereignty of states None of that has been done No
heed has been paid to those principles The council must not simply listen to
speeches, but must find practical means to bring an end to this unwarranted
attack
Address to the General Assembly:
Omar Loutfi
November 1, 1956
Mr. President:
I sincerely thank the members of the Security Council who yesterday voted in
favor of the draft resolution presented by the distinguished representative of
Yugoslavia and likewise the member states which were kind enough to advise the
Secretary General that they supported that resolution and who today voted in favor
of the inclusion of this matter in the agenda.
They have given me the opportunity to address the General Assembly this
world forum in the cruel ordeal through which my country is now passing.
You are fully alive to the question, I am sure, gentlemen I shall be brief. As
I told the Security Council, this is not the time for oration My country has been
subjected to bloody aggression. The shedding of blood which is the consequence
of aggression is proceeding apace.
During the night of Oct 30 Israel committed the most heinous unprovoked
armed aggression since the conclusion of the armistice agreement. This was no
mere reprisal raid It was a premeditated, carefully prepared, armed attack whose
purpose it is to occupy part of Egyptian territory so as to provoke war in this part
of the world
During the day of Oct. 30, 1956, a note from the United Kingdom Government
was handed to the Egyptian Ambassador in London. An ultimatum was served
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upon the Egyptian Government, asking it to cease all hostilities on land, at sea
and in the air, to withdraw all Egyptian armed forces ten miles from the Suez
Canal, to accept the occupation of part of Egyptian territory by French and
British armed forces, especially the towns of Ismailia, Port Said and Suez.
The ultimatum required an answer before 6:30 Cairo time, October 31, in the
absence of which the Governments of the United Kingdom and France would inter-
vene to the extent which they would judge necessary in order to obtain satisfaction
of their demands.
Since that time, Anglo-French aviation based on Cyprus against the will of the
inhabitants of that island have bombarded Egypt A number of raids took place
yesterday, especially against the city of Cairo According to information at my
disposal the three raids carried out yesterday by British and French jet bombers at
7 o'clock, 8:25 and 10.25 covered the mosque, the Almaza hospital, a number of
Cairo airfields and a number of points near Shubra. Nine human lives were lost.
Throughout last night British and French bombers carried out continuous raids
over all Egyptian airfields. French aviation joined with Israeli aircraft in air attacks
against Egyptian positions in the Sinai Peninsula. Today twenty-one air raids took
place over Egypt, of which nine were in Cairo and the remainder in Ismailia, Port
Said and Suez. Installations at Alexandria were destroyed and the number of
victims there is not yet known.
Moreover, the Commander-in-Chief of the French-British forces attacking Egypt
declared today in Nicosia, Cyprus and I apologize for quoting him in English
"the bombing will continue until Egypt sees reason. The length of the operation
depends on how quickly Egypt accepts our terms. The sooner Egypt sees reason
the less damage will accrue. We have considerable strength to deal blows "
This cynical communique calls for no further comment.
Mr. President, Egypt has been subject to combined aggression premeditated
aggression by Israel, the United Kingdom and France. It is now abundantly
clear that the aggressors agreed in advance to perpetrate this act of war to justify
the armed aggression which they have committed. The Governments of the United
Kingdom and France have presented motives which I find it difficult fairly to
describe.
Sir Pierson Dixon said yesterday that he regretted that Egypt had regretted
the Anglo-French ultimatum. I am astonished to hear the representative of the
United Kingdom say that he expected for one moment that Egypt would accept
an ultimatum which asked for the landing against Egypt of Anglo-British forces
under conditions where Egypt had been subjected to aggression.
The representative of the United Kingdom said this was designed first of all
to safeguard the Suez Canal and restore peaceful conditions in the Middle East.
Now, no danger threatened the Suez Canal prior to the Franco-British inter-
vention. According to our information the aggressors' aircraft sank an Egyptian
warship in the canal This act of war committed by Israel, France and the United
Kingdom in the region of the canal is a violation of the Charter of the United
Nations and on the other hand it violates the Constantinople Convention of 1888
and the principle of free passage even in time of war, which is guaranteed to all
states under the provisions of Article 4 of the Constantinople Convention.
Moreover, who gave the United Kingdom and France the right to Intervene in
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order to safeguard the canal? The 1888 Convention confers upon Egypt alone the
right to take measures for the defense of the canal.
Was there a decision of the United Nations, a decision of the Security Council,
which conferred upon the United Kingdom and France the right to resort to
force in order, as they allege, to safeguard the canal and insure the freedom of
passage and traffic through the canal?
Many other states use the canal No one for a moment thought of using force or
joining the Franco-British forces in order to occupy the canal area.
What renders the situation even more bizarre, as stressed by the distinguished
representative of Yugoslavia, at the meeting of the Security Council held in the
afternoon of Oct. 30 of this year and I quote "is that this threat of force is
directed in the first instance against the country which is the victim of aggression.
Egypt is enjoined to forswear its right of legitimate defense under Article 51 of
the charter and Egypt is asked to acquiesce to the occupation of a part of its terri-
tory by two foreign powers and a time limit is set 'in the worst tradition of the
policy of ultimatums which we hoped was an obsolete one
"
Moreover, Mr. President, the representative of the United Kingdom claimed
that one of the objectives of the Franco-British intervention is to put an end as
early as possible to any warlike acts on land, at sea and in the air If this were
the genuine objective of Franco-British intervention, why is it that the repre-
sentatives of these two countries exerted the veto right against two resolutions
which specifically called for a cessation of hostilities for a cease-fire?
Another point which struck my delegation was an argument by France and the
United Kingdom representatives that this was a mere temporary measure. Occupa-
tion was a mere temporary measure But history has taught us that the phrase
"temporary measure" used by their delegates used by the representatives of the
United Kingdom is far removed from the ordinary sense of these words.
m
The occupation of Egypt in 1882 was, according to British leaders at the time,
a mere temporary measure It happens to have lasted seventy-four years.
But the ill-faith of the aggressors needs hardly be proved further. It is obvious
that the aggressive acts of France and the United Kingdom, which are trying to
settle by their own means and in a unilateral manner a question which was before
the United Nations, constitutes a most flagrant violation of the United Nations
Charter which was utterly unjustified.
We thought that the United Nations Charter had put an end to the reign of
force and that the epoch of ultimatums and dictates, which brings to mind sad
memories, had come to an end when the United Nations Charter was signed in San
Francisco. A resort to force now can only take place in accordance with the prin-
ciples and provisions of the charter.
France and the United Kingdom, which violated the charter, have assumed a
heavy onus of responsibility before the world This act is fraught with incalculable
repercussions of which France and the United Kingdom will bear the consequences.
Egypt is being invaded. Its sovereignty is being jeopardized. But one thing com-
forts us. This is the response to this act of aggression on the part of world public
opinion. Two prominent members of the Security Council the United States of
America and the Soviet Union condemn this resort to force by France and the
United Kingdom.
President Eisenhower and the Soviet leaders clearly declared that they were
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opposed to the use of force for the settlement of this dispute Numerous other
leaders have made similar statements Amongst them the head of the Yugoslav
state, Marshal Tito, as well as the Prime Minister of India, Mr Xehru,
I would wish to quote their statements and many others bu. I leave this for the
distinguished representatives' of the states themselves.
Even in the United Kingdom, members of the opposition party, the Labor party,
strongly and vigorously condemn the policy of the British Government. Mr.
Gaitskell, the leader of the opposition, stated in a speech yesterday in the House
of Commons, and I shall quote him:
k
'All I can say is that in taking this decision,
in the view of the Opposition, the Government have committed an act of disastrous
folly, whose tragic consequences we shall regret for years
"
He went on to say, "I can only say that any impartial observer must recognize
that this is a clear breach of the Charter of the United Nations
"
And he went on
to say that "there are millions and millions of British people as we believe, a
majority of the nation who are deeply shocked by the aggressive policy of the
Government and who still believe that it is both wise and right that we should
stand by the United Nations, the Commonwealth and the United States alliance."
The implications which are drawn from this are these that even in the United
Kingdom public opinion is far from being at one in approving the policy of the
present government.
Mr. President, as I had the honor to tell the Security Council, the Egyptian
Government, pending necessary measures by the Security Council and the General
Assembly, has no choice but to defend itself and to preserve its rights against this
armed unprovoked aggression. And we persevere in that attitude.
This act of war, committed by two members of the Security Council, constitutes
a heavy blow to the United Nations Organization, to world peace and to all of
mankind. France and the United Kingdom, in exerting their veto rights against
resolutions moved in the Security Council, stultified the council's action.
Under the circumstances, the following the adoption of the Yugoslav resolution
by the Security Council and in accordance with the provisions of the resolution
uniting for peace, it is up to you gentlemen to take the necessary measures in order
to prevent and remove threats to peace and to put an end to acts of aggression
and breaches of the peace.
It is incumbent on you gentlemen to take grave decisions fraught with heavy
consequences for the destiny of our organization and for the principles which
govern the world in which we live.
Egypt is defending herself and will continue to do so. The question is in your
hands. Condemn the aggressors, gentlemen, put an end to aggression.
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Statement by Nine Arab Leaders
November IS, 1956
Following an invitation of His Majesty, King Hussein, King of the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan, a meeting was held in Beirut on the 10th and llth day of
Rabi'al-Thann, 1376, of the Hegira [November 13 and 14, 1956], by His Majesty,
King Saud Ibn Abdel Aziz, King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; His Excellency,
Abdel Fattah Mohammed el-Mughrabi, President of the Sovereignty Council in
the Sudan; His Excellency, Shukri al-Kuwatly, President of the Republic of Syria,
His Majesty, King Faisal, King of the Kingdom of Iraq, His Excellency, Camille
Chamoun, President of the Republic of the Lebanon, His Excellency, Mustafa
ben Halim, Premier of Libya on behalf of the King; His Excellency, Abdel Hamid
Ghalib, Egyptian Ambassador in Beirut, on behalf of the President of the Republic
of Egypt; His Highness, Emir Saif ul-Islam Mohammed al-Badr, Crown Prince of
the Kingdom of Yemen, on behalf of the King.
The meeting was held to discuss the position arising from an aggression that had
been carried out by Britain, France and Israel against Egypt and the Gaza Strip
and also to reach an accord on what should be done to support Egypt in her
glorious .defense of the safety of her territories and sovereignty
The consideration of the fact that this aggression against Egypt is held to be an
aggression directed against all Arab states necessitates the unity of sovereignty
and efforts to safeguard joint Arab interests.
The participants have expressed their satisfaction with the measures taken by
the General Assembly of the United Nations by virtue of resolutions adopted by an
overwhelming majority, Nov. 2, 3 and 7, 1956
They have appreciated the effort made by the peace-loving states that contrib-
uted to the adoption of the resolution calling for the cessation of hostilities and
an immediate withdrawal of the aggressive forces from the Egyptian territories
and their return to behind the armistice lines
The following has been unanimously agreed
1
The need for the implementation of the previously mentioned resolution of the
United Nations should Britain and France refuse to comply with the United Nations
resolutions and fail to withdraw immediately and unconditionally from the Egyp-
tian territories
Moreover, should Israel oppose the United Nations resolutions, and fail to with-
draw unconditionally her forces to behind the armistice line, and should the atti-
tude of either Britain, France or Israel cause a conspiracy likely to lead to the
resumption of hostilities, Britain, France and Israel should be regarded as collec-
tively responsible for collaborating to continue the aggression.
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In that event all the states represented at the conference shall act immediately
in their own interest and in legal self-defense, in accordance with Article 41 of the
United Nations Charter, as well as take effective steps permissible by the utmost
capacity in compliance with their commitments under Article 2 of the Arab
collective defense agreement.
2
To insure the separation of the Suez Canal question from the circumstances that
accompanied the attack on Egypt; to regard this question as being independent
and on its own and to promote a solution that would comply with the requisites of
Egypt's sovereignty and dignity, namely within the framework of the United
Nations, and in negotiations that shall be held with the parties concerned, away
from any display of pressure and prejudice and on the basis of the 188S Conven-
tion and the six points laid down by the United Nations on Oct. 16, 1956.
3
To support the demands of the Algerian people in their struggle until the realiza-
tion of their nationalist aspirations for the attainment of independence and
sovereignty
The participants of this conference address true fraternal greetings, their ap-
preciation and admiration to His Excellency, the President of the Republic of
Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser, as well as to the Egyptian armed forces and the
people of Egypt for their patriotism and limitless self-sacrifice in the defense of
Arab nationalism, the dignity and pride of the Arab people.
Address to the Lok Safoha:
Jawaharlal Nehru
November 16, 1956
On the 13th September 1956, the last day of the last session of the Lok Sabha, I
made a statement in the House about the developments relating to the Suez Canal
issue Previous to that, on the Sth August, I had given to the House an account
of the developments which followed the action of the Egyptian Government in
nationalizing the Suez Canal Company.
Over two months have passed since my last statement on this subject in the
Lok Sabba, and much has happened which has been reported in the public press
and must be within the knowledge of hon Members The matter was taken up by
the Security Council, and there was broad approval of certain basic principles which
should govern any agreement in regard to the Suez Canal. It was proposed that
the chief parties to the dispute, namely, Egypt, the United Kingdom and France,
should meet soon after to discuss this subject further on the basis of those
principles.
That meeting did not take place. Instead, on the 29th October, Israel launched
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a sudden and premeditated attack on Egypt and large concentrations of Israeli
troops made deep penetrations into Egyptian territory. The next day, the Gov-
ernments of the United Kingdom and France sent an ultimatum to Egypt and Israel
to the effect that if they did not stop fighting and withdraw their forces to ten
miles on either side of the Suez Canal, British and French forces would intervene
to stop the fighting The ultimatum expired on the morning of the 31st October
and, soon after, British and French forces commenced aerial bombardment of
airfields and military objectives in Cairo and elsewhere in Egypt. This was followed
a few days later by landings of airborne troops near Port Said and heavy fighting
there.
As the House knows, India had viewed with grave apprehension the policy of
the U K and French Governments after the nationalisation of the Suez Canal
Company In particular, the massing of troops and aircraft for the purpose of
military operations in Egypt appeared to us to be a reversion to past colonial
methods and an attempt to coerce Egypt by show of armed might. Indeed, it was
stated by responsible statesmen in the United Kingdom and France that the
regime in Egypt must be changed and, in particular, the Head of the State and
of the Government of Egypt should be removed We had hoped, however, that
after the Security Council resolution, more peaceful methods would be adopted to
solve this dispute. The starting of military operations against Egypt by the United
Kingdom and France and, more particularly, the bombing of parts of Cairo city
and other parts of Egypt came, therefore, as a profound shock not only to people
in India but also to large numbers of people in other countries including the United
Kingdom This appeared to be a flagrant case of aggression by two strong powers
against a weaker country with the purpose of enforcing their will, even to the
extent of changing the Government of that country This led to widespread world
reactions against the Anglo-French action, and as the Security Council proved
ineffective because of the exercise of the veto by the United Kingdom and France,
the U N General Assembly, at an emergency session, expressed its disapproval of
this action and demanded the stoppage of military operations in Egypt and the
withdrawal of the armed forces of Israel, France and the United Kingdom from
Egyptian territory. An uneasy armistice followed, and it was declared on the
part of the United Kingdom, France and Israel that they would withdraw their
armed forces, though this was made subject to certain conditions.
These developments gave some hope that peaceful methods would henceforth be
employed and I ventured to say a few days ago that the situation had slightly
improved Today I am by no means sure that this improvement has taken place
There are numerous tendencies which may well lead, unless checked, to a rapid
deterioration of the situation and a reversion to warfare If unfortunately military
operations begin again, it is possible that they might extend over a much wider
area and might even develop into a major war.
Two days ago, the Prime Ministers of Indonesia, Burma, Ceylon and India
issued a joint statement which has already been placed on the table of the House
That statement gives expression to the views of these Prime Ministers to the
recent happenings in Egypt and in Hungary and points out the danger of war
inherent in the present grave international situation
In spite of the United Nations General Assembly, sporadic fighting continued
and there has been no attempt at withdrawal of forces from Egyptian territory.
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It would appear indeed that these forces have established themselves firmly on
Egyptian territory and have no present Intention of leaving it If these foreign
forces continue to remain on Egyptian territory, the situation is likely to deteri-
orate rapidly and bring the danger of fresh military operations nearer.
The Governments of the United Kingdom and France, though apparently ac-
cepting the U N. resolution, have laid down certain conditions which are not
consistent with that resolution. The Prime Minister of Israel has continued to
insist that he will not evacuate Gaza. If the foreign forces are not wholly removed
from Egyptian territory, this will amount to a clear violation of the U. X.
resolution.
Meanwhile, India has agreed to send a contingent of her armed forces for the
United Nations International Force and this contingent is expected to leave India
by air today This United Nations force will not be concerned with the Suez Canal
issue as such, which can only be considered separately after peace has been fully
established and all foreign forces removed. The main task of the international
force is said to be to ensure that Israel remains within the demarcation lines set
by the old Armistice Agreement.
The accounts that have appeared in the newspapers have not indicated that the
fighting in and around Part Said was severe. We have received some accounts of
this fighting and these show that the casualties, chiefly among Egyptian civilians
were very heavy, running into many thousands. Conditions in Port Said have been
distressing in the extreme. We are taking immediate steps to send a large stock
of medicines by special aircraft to Egypt for purposes of relief.
The story of the past three and a half months, ever since the nationalisation
of the Suez Canal Company, is full of tragic drama and events have happened which
I would have thought could not possibly occur in this modern age. I find it a little
difficult to deal with this record of unabashed aggression and deception. The
explanations that have been given from time to time, contradict one another and
exhibit an approach which is dangerous to the freedom of Asian and African
countries and to world peace itself It has brought misery and disaster, hatred
and illwill, with no gain whatever, and, in addition, we live now under the threat
of possible world war.
During all the controversies since the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Com-
pany, Egypt has conducted herself with a large measure of propriety and for-
bearance. Without the least justification, Egypt was attacked not only by Israel
but also by the United Kingdom and France Whether there was any previous
consultation between the aggressor countries, I do not know. But it is obvious
that their plans fitted in, and the Anglo-French attack helped Israel's aggression
and was itself helped by it. Egypt, the victim of Israeli aggression, was attacked
immediately after by the armed forces of the United Kingdom and France It was
only the widespread indignation of peoples not only in Asia and
Africa but also
in Europe and America and the action taken by the United Nations that put some
check on this aggression. But it appears to me that the cease-fire having
taken
place, there is a tendency to complacency and to allow matters
to drift. Indeed,
there has even been some attempt made to minimise and justify this utterly un-
provoked and brutal attack on Egypt Attention has been diverted
to some extent
to the grave and distressing occurrences in Hungary.
Even as we were distressed by events in Egypt, we viewed with grave concern
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and distress events in Hungary It is possible that what happened in one of these
countries produced its reactions in the other and both created a very serious inter-
national situation But it is well to remember that though both deserve serious
attention, the nature of each differed from the other Neither can be held to
justify the other
We are concerned with an attack on freedom anywhere in the world We are
concerned also with strong nations dominating, by armed force, weaker coun-
tries . .
I am convinced that it is not by war and violence that these problems will be
settled or freedom established I am convinced that colonialism, whatever new look
it may put on, can revert to its old brutal self and the only remedy is for it to
give place to freedom
The world stands facing great danger, and it may be that the little wars we have
had, are only a first round and bigger conflicts lie ahead In particular, the ambi-
tions of strong nations imperil weaker countries. The only hope lies in the United
Nations, representing the world community, succeeding in putting an end to the
law of force and substituting for it a more civilised method of dealing with
problems Today, the choice lies between the hydrogen bomb and the Panchsheel
Resolutions on the Suez Crisis:
United Nations General Assembly
November, 1956
RESOLUTION 997 (ES-l)
The General Assembly,
Noting the disregard on many occasions by parties to the Israel-Arab armistice
agreements of 1949 of the terms of such agreements, and that the armed forces
of Israel have penetrated deeply into Egyptian territory in violation of the General
Armistice agreement between Egypt and Israel of 24 February 1949,
Noting that armed forces of France and the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland are conducting military operations against Egyptian territory,
Noting that traffic through the Suez Canal is now interrupted to the serious
prejudice of many nations,
Expressing its grave concern over these developments,
1. Urges as a matter of priority that all parties now involved in hostilities in the
area agree to an immediate cease-fire and, as part thereof, halt the movement of
military forces and arms into the area ;
2. Urges the parties to the armistice agreements promptly to withdraw all forces
behind the armistice lines, to desist from raids across the armistice lines into neigh-
boring territory, and to observe scrupulously the provisions of the armistice
agreements ;
3 Recommends that all Member States refrain from introducing military goods
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in the area of hostilities and in general refrain from any acts which would delay
or prevent the implementation of the present resolution ;
4 Urges that, upon the cease-fire being effective, steps be taken to reopen the
Suez Canal and restore secure freedom of navigation ,
5 Requests the Secretary-General to observe and report promptly on the com-
pliance with the present resolution to the Security Council and to the General
Assembly, for such further action as they may deem appropriate in accordance
with the Charter,
6. Decides to remain in emergency session pending compliance with the present
resolution.
562nd plenary meeting,
2 November 1956
RESOLUTION 998 (ES-I )
The General Assembly,
Bearing in mind the urgent necessity of facilitating compliance with its resolu-
tion 997 (ES-I; of 2 November 1956,
Requests, as a matter of priority, the Secretary-General to submit to it within
forty-eight hours a plan for the setting up, with the consent of the nations con-
cerned, of an emergency international United Nations Force to secure and
supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with all the terms of the
aforementioned resolution.
563rd plenary' meeting,
4 November 1956.
RESOLUTION 999 (ES-I)
The General Assembly,
Noting with regret that not all the parties concerned have yet agreed to comply
with the provisions of its resolution 997 (ES-I) of 2 November 1956,
Noting the special priority given in that resolution to an immediate cease-fire
and, as part thereof, to the halting of the movement of military forces and arms
into the area,
"Noting further that the resolution urged the parties to the armistice agreements
promptly to withdraw all forces behind the armistice lines, to desist from raids
across the armistice lines into neighboring territory, and to observe scrupulously
the provisions of the armistice agreements,
1 Reaffirms its resolution 997 (ES-I), and once again calls upon the parties
immediately to comply with the provisions of the said resolution
2. Authorizes the Secretary-General immediately to arrange with the parties
concerned for the implementation of the cease-fire and the halting of the move-
ment of military forces and arms into the area, and requests him to report com-
pliance forthwith and, in any case, not later than twelve hours from the time of
adoption of the present resolution ;
3. Requests the Secretary-General, with the assistance of the Chief of Staff
and the members of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, to obtain
compliance of the withdrawal of all forces behind the armistice lines;
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4. Decides to meet again immediately on receipt of the Secretary-General's
report referred to in paragraph 2 of the present resolution.
563rd plenary meeting,
4 November 1956.
RESOLUTION 1000 (ES-Ij
The General Assembly,
Having requested the Secretary-General, in its resolution 998 (ES-I) of 4
November 1956, to submit to it a plan for an emergency international United
Nations Force, for the purposes stated,
Noting with satisfaction the first report of the Secretary-General on the plan,
and having in mind particularly paragraph 4 of that report,
1. Establishes a United Nations Command for an emergency international Force
to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with all the terms
of General Assembly resolution 997 (ES-I) of 2 November 1956;
2. Appoints, on an emergency basis, the Chief of Staff of the United Nations
Truce Supervision Organization, Major-General ELM Burns, as Chief of the
Command ;
3. Authorizes the Chief of the Command immediately to recruit, from the
observer corps of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, a limited
number of officers who shall be nationals of countries other than those having
permanent membership in the Security Council, and further authorizes him, in
consultation with the Secretary-General, to undertake the recruitment directly,
from various Member States other than the permanent members of the Security
Council, of the additional number of officers needed;
4 Invites the Secretary-General to take such administrative measures as may
be necessary for the prompt execution of the actions envisaged in the present
resolution.
565th plenary meeting,
5 November 1956.
RESOLUTION 1001 (ES-l)
The General Assembly}
Recalling its resolution 997 (ES-I) of 2 November 1956 concerning the cease-fire,
withdrawal of troops and other matters related to the military operations in Egyp-
tian territory, as well as its resolution 998 (ES-I) of 4 November 1956 concerning
the request to the Secretary-General to submit a plan for an emergency interna-
tional United Nations Force,
Having established by its resolution 1000 (ES-I) of 5 November 1956 a United
Nations Command for an emergency international Force, having appointed the
Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization as Chief of
the Command with authorization to him to begin the recruitment of officers for
the Command, and having invited the Secretary-General to take the administrative
measures necessary for the prompt execution of that resolution,
Noting with appreciation the second and final report of the Secretary-General
on the plan for an emergency international United Nations Force as requested in
General Assembly resolution 998 (ES-I), and having examined that plan,
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1. Expresses its approval of the guiding principles for the organization and
functioning of the emergency international United Nations Force as expounded
in paragraphs 6 to 9 of the Secretary-General's report ;
2. Concurs in the definition of the functions of the Force as stated in para-
graph 12 of the Secretary-General's report;
3 Invites the Secretary-General to continue discussions with Governments of
Member States concerning offers of participation in the Force, toward the objec-
tive of its balanced composition ;
4 Requests the Chief of the Command, in consultation with the Secretary-
General as regards size and composition, to proceed forthwith with the full organi-
zation of the Force;
5. Approves provisionally the basic rule concerning the financing of the Force
laid down in paragraph 15 of the Secretary-General's report;
6. Establishes an Advisory Committee composed of one representative from
each of the following countries; Brazil, Canada, Ceylon, Colombia, India, Norway
and Pakistan, and requests this Committee, whose Chairman shall be the Secretary-
General, to undertake the development of those aspects of the planning for the
Force and its operation not already dealt with by the General Assembly and which
do not fall within the area of the direct responsibility of the Chief of the Command;
7. Authorizes the Secretary-General to issue all regulations and instructions
which may be essential to the effective functioning of the Force, following con-
sultation with the Committee aforementioned, and to take all other necessary
administrative and executive action
;
8. Determines that, following the fulfilment of the immediate responsibilities
defined for it in operative paragraphs 6 and 7 above, the Advisory Committee
shall continue to assist the Secretary-General in the responsibilities falling to him
under the present and other relevant resolutions ;
9. Decides that the Advisory Committee, in the performance of its duties, shall
be empowered to request, through the usual procedures, the convening of the
General Assembly and to report to the Assembly whenever matters arise which,
in its opinion, are of such urgency and importance as to require consideration by
the General Assembly itself;
10. Requests all Member States to afford assistance as necessary to the United
Nations Command in the performance of its functions, including arrangements for
passage to and from the area involved.
567th plenary meeting,
7 November 1956.
RESOLUTION 1002 (ES-l)
The General Assembly,
Recalling its resolutions 997 (ES-I) of 2 November 1956, 998 (ES-I) and 999
(ES-I) of 4 November 1956, and 1000 (ES-I) of 5 November 1956, adopted by
overwhelming majorities,
Noting in particular that the General Assembly, by its resolution 1000 (ES-I),
established a United Nations Command for an emergency international Force to
secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with all the terms
of its resolution 997 (ES-I),
1. Reaffirms the above-mentioned resolutions;
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2 Calls once again upon Israel immediately to withdraw all its forces behind
the armistice lines established by the General Armistice Agreement between Egypt
and Israel of 24 February 1949;
3 Calls once again upon the United Kingdom and France immediately to with-
draw all their forces from Egyptian territory, consistently with the above-mentioned
resolutions;
4 Urges the Secretary-General to communicate the present resolution to the
parties concerned, and requests him promptly to report to the General Assembly
on the compliance with this resolution
567th plenary meeting,
7 November 1956.
RESOLUTION 1003 (ES-l)
The General Assembly,
1. Decides to place on the provisional agenda of its eleventh regular session, as
a matter of priority, the question on the agenda of its first emergency special
session
;
2. Refers to its eleventh regular session, for consideration, the records of the
meetings and the documents of its first emergency special session ;
3. Decides that, notwithstanding paragraph 1 above, the first emergency special
session may continue to consider the question, if necessary, prior to the eleventh
regular session of the Assembly
572nd plenary meeting,
10 November 1956
SECTION 3
The Eisenhower Doctrine and Alternatives
Broadcast on the Middle East Crisis:
Dwight D. Eisenhower
October 31, 1956
My fellow Americans :
Tonight I report to you as your President.
We all realize that the full and free debate of a political campaign surrounds
us. But the events and issues I wish to place before you this evening have no
connection whatsoever with matters of partisanship. They are concerns of every
American his present and his future.
I wish, therefore, to give you a report of essential facts so that you whether
belonging to either one of our two great parties, or to neither may give thoughtful
and informed consideration to this swiftly changing world scene.
The changes of which I speak have come in two areas of the world Eastern
Europe and the Mideast.
In Eastern Europe there is the dawning of a new day It has not been short or
easy in coming.
After World War II the Soviet Union used military force to impose on the
nations of Eastern Europe, governments of Soviet choice servants of Moscow.
It has been consistent United States policy without regard to political party
to seek to end this situation. We have sought to fulfill the wartime pledge of the
United Nations that these countries, overrun by wartime armies, would once again
know sovereignty and self-government
We could not, of course, carry out this policy by resort to force. Such force
would have been contrary both to the best interests of the Eastern European
people and to the abiding principles of the United Nations. But we did help to
keep alive the hope of these peoples for freedom
Beyond this they needed from us no education in the worth of national inde-
pendence and personal liberty. For, at the time of the American Revolution, it was
many of them who came to our land to aid our cause.
Now, recently the pressure of the will of these peoples for national independence
has become more, and more insistent.
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A few days ago the people of Poland, with their proud and deathless devotion
to freedom, moved to secure a peaceful transition to a new Government And this
Government, it seems, will strive genuinely to serve the Polish people.
And more recently, all the world has been watching dramatic events in Hungary,
where this brave people, as so often in the past, have offered their very lives for
independence from foreign masters.
We cannot yet know if these avowed purposes will be truly carried out.
But two things are clear.
First, the fervor and the sacrifice of the peoples of these countries, in the name
of freedom, have themselves brought real promise that the light of liberty soon
will shine again in this darkness.
And second, if the Soviet Union indeed faithfully acts upon its announced
intention, the world will witness the greatest forward stride toward justice, trust
and understanding among nations in our generation
These are the facts. How has your Government responded to them?
Today, it appears, a new Hungary is rising from this struggle; a Hungrry
which we hope, from our hearts, will know full and free nationhood.
We have rejoiced in all these historic events.
Only yesterday, the Soviet Union issued an important statement on its relations
with all the countries of Eastern Europe. This statement recognized the need for
review of Soviet policies, and the amendment of these policies to meet the demands
cf the people for greater national independence and personal freedom.
The Soviet Union declared its readiness to consider the withdrawal of Soviet
advisers, who have been, as you know, the effective ruling force in Soviet-occupied
countries And also to consider withdrawal of Soviet forces from Poland, Hungary
and Rumania.
The United States has made clear its readiness to assist economically the new
and independent governments of these countries. We have already some days
since been in contact with the new Government of Poland on this matter. We
have also publicly declared that we do not demand of these governments the
adoption of any particular form of society as a condition upon our economic assist-
ance. Our one concern is that they be free for their sake, and for freedom's sake.
We have also with respect to the Soviet Union sought clearly to remove any
false fears that we would look upon new governments in these Eastern European
countries as potential military allies We have no such ulterior purpose. We see
these people as friends and we wish simply that they be friends who are free.
It is not a situation that calls for extravagant fear or hysteria but it invites our
most serious concern.
I speak, of course, of the Middle East. This ancient crossroads of the world
was, as we all know, an area long subject to colonial rule. This rule ended after
World War II when all countries there won full independence.
Out of the Palestinian mandated territory was born the new State of Israel.
These historic changes could not, however, instantly banish animosities born of
the ages Israel and her Arab neighbors soon found themselves at war with one
another And the Arab nations showed continuing anger toward their former rulers,
notably France and Great Britain.
The United States, through all the years since the close of World War II, has
labored tirelessly to bring peace and stability to this area.
30
|
Broadcast on the Middle East Crisis: Dwight D. Eisenhower 169
We have considered it a basic matter of United States policy to support the
new State of Israel and, at the same time, to strengthen our bonds both with Israel
and with the Arab countries. But, unfortunately, through all these years, passion
in the area threatened to prevail over peaceful purpose, and, in one form or another,
there has been almost continuous fighting.
This situation recently was aggravated by Egyptian policy including rearmament
with Communist weapons. We felt this to be a misguided policy on the part of
the Government of Egypt. The State of Israel, at the same time, felt increasing
anxiety for its safety And Great Britain and France feared more and more that
Egyptian policies threatened their life line of the Suez Canal.
These matters came to a crisis on July 26 of this year when the Egyptian Gov-
ernment seized the Universal Suez Canal Company. For ninety years, ever since
the inauguration of the canal, that company has operated the canal largely under
British and French technical supervision.
Now, there were some among our allies who urged an immediate reaction to
this event by use of force We insistently urged otherwise, and our wish prevailed,
through a long succession of conferences and negotiations, for weeks even months
with participation by the United Nations.
And there, in the United Nations, only a short while ago, on the basis of agreed
principles, it seemed that an acceptable accord was within our reach.
But the direct relations of Egypt with both Israel and France kept worsening
to a point at which first Israel, then France and Great Britain also determined
that, in their judgment, there could be no protection of their \ital interests without
resort to force.
Upon this decision events followed swiftly.
On Sunday, the Israeli Government ordered total mobilization.
On Monday, their armed forces penetrated deeply into Egypt and to the vicinity
of the Suez Canal nearly 100 miles away.
And on Tuesday the British and French Governments delivered a twelve-hour
ultimatum to Israel and Egypt, now followed up by armed attack against Egypt.
The United States was not consulted in any way about any phase of these actions.
Nor were we informed of them in advance.
As it is the manifest right of any of these nations to take such decisions and
actions, it is likewise our right if our judgment so dictates, to dissent.
We believe these actions to have been taken in error, for we do not accept the
use of force as a wise or proper instrument for the settlement of international
disputes. ... , . , ,.
To say this, in this particular instance, is in no way to minimize our mendsnip
with these nations, nor our determination to maintain those friendships.
And we are fully aware of the grave anxieties of Israel, of Britain and France.
We know that they have been subjected to grave and repeated provocations.
The present fact nonetheless seems clear. This action taken can scarcely
be
reconciled with the principles and purposes of the United Nations to which we
have all subscribed. And beyond this we are forced to doubt that resort to force
and war will for long serve the permanent interests of the attacking nations.
Now we must look to the future.
In the circumstances I have described, there will be no United States involve-
ment in these present hostilities. I therefore have no plan to call the Congress
in
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special session. Of course, we shall continue to keep in contact with Congressional
leaders of both parties.
I assure you your Government will remain alert to every possibility of this
situation and keep in close contact and coordination with the legislative branch of
this Government.
At the same time it is and it will remain the dedicated purpose of your Gov-
ernment to do all in its power to localize the fighting and to end the conflict.
We took our first measure in this action yesterday. We went to the United
Nations with a request that the forces of Israel return to their own line and that
hostilities in the area be brought to a close.
This proposal was not adopted because it was vetoed by Great Britain and by
France.
It is our hope and intent that this matter will be brought before the United
Nations General Assembly. There, with no veto operating, the opinion of the
world can be brought to bear in our quest for a just end to this tormenting problem.
In the past the United Nations has proved able to find a way to end bloodshed.
We believe it can and that it will do so again.
My fellow citizens, as I review the march of world events in recent years I am
ever more deeply convinced that the United Nations represents the soundest hope
for peace in the world. For this very reason I believe that the processes of the
United Nations need further to be developed and strengthened.
I speak particularly of increasing its ability to secure justice under international
law.
In all the recent troubles in the Middle East there have, indeed, been injustices
suffered by all nations involved. But I do not believe that another instrument of
injustice war is a remedy for these wrongs.
There can be no peace without law And there can be no law if we work to
invoke one code of international conduct for those who oppose, and another for
our friends
The society of nations has been slow in developing means to apply this truth
But the passionate longing for peace on the part of all peoples of the earth compels
us to speed our search for new and more effective instruments of justice.
The peace we seek and need means much more than mere absence of war. It
means the acceptance of law and the fostering of justice in all the world.
To our principles guiding us in this quest we must stand fast. In so doing, we
can honor the hopes of all men for a world in which peace will truly and justly
reign.
I thank you, and good night.
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Address to Congress:
Dwight D. Eisenhower
January 5, 1957
Mr. Vice President, Mr. Speaker and Members of the Congress.
First may I express to you my deep appreciation of your courtesy in giving me,
at some real inconvenience to yourselves, this early opportunity of addressing you
on a matter I deem to be of grave importance to our country.
In my forthcoming State of the Union Message, I shall review the international
situation generally. There are world-wide hopes which we can reasonably entertain
and there are world-wide responsibilities which we must carry to make certain that
freedom including our own may be secure.
There is, however, a special situation in the Middle East which I feel I should,
even now, lay before this body.
Before doing so it is well to remind ourselves that our basic national objective
in international affairs remains peace a world peace based on justice. Such a
peace must include all areas, all peoples of the world, if it is to be enduring. There
is no nation, great or small, with which we would refuse to negotiate, in mutual
good faith, with patience and in the determination to secure a better understanding
between us Out of such understandings must, and eventually will, grow confidence
and trust, indispensable ingredients to a program of peace and to plans for lifting
from us all the burdens of these expensive armaments. To promote these objectives
our Government works tirelessly, day by day, month by month, year by year. But
until a degree of success crowns our efforts that will assure to all nations peaceful
existence, we must, in the interests of peace itself, remain vigilant, alert and strong.
The Middle East has abruptly reached a new and critical stage in its long and
important history. In past decades many of the countries in that area were not fully
self-governing. Other nations exercised considerable authority in the area and the
security of the region was largely built around their power. But since the First
World War there has been a steady evolution toward self-government and inde-
pendence. This development the United States has welcomed and has encouraged.
Our country supports without reservation the full sovereignty and independence of
each and every nation of the Middle East.
Now the evolution of independence has in the main been a peaceful process.
But the area has been often troubled. Persistent cross-currents of distrust and
fear, with raids back and forth across national boundaries, have brought about a
high degree of instability in much of the Mideast. Just recently there have been
hostilities involving Western nations that once exercised much influence in the
area. Also the relatively large attack by Israel in October has intensified the basic
differences between that nation and its Arab neighbors. All this instability has been
heightened and, at times, manipulated by international communism
Russia's rulers have long sought to dominate the Middle East. This was true of
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the Czars and it is true of the Bolsheviks The reasons are not hard to find Now
these reasons do not affect Russia's security, for no one plans to use the Middle
East as a base for aggression against Russia. Never for a moment has the United
States entertained such a thought.
The Soviet Union has nothing whatsoever to fear from the United States in
the Middle East, or anywhere else in the world, so long as its rulers do not them-
selves first resort to aggression
That statement I make solemnly and emphatically.
Now, neither does Russia's desire to dominate the Middle East spring from its
own economic interest in the area Russia does not appreciably use or depend upon
the Suez Canal. In 1955, Soviet traffic through the canal represented about three-
quarters of one per cent of the total The Soviets have no need for, and could
provide no market for, the petroleum resources which constitute the principal
natural wealth of this region. Indeed, the Soviet Union is a substantial exporter of
petroleum products.
The reason for Russia's interest in the Middle East is solely that of power
politics Considering her announced purpose of communizing the world, it is easy
to understand her hope of soon dominating the Middle East.
This region has always been the crossroads of the continents of the Eastern
Hemisphere The Suez Canal enables the nations of Asia and Europe to carry on
the commerce that is essential if these countries are to maintain well-rounded and
prosperous economies The Middle East provides a gateway between Eurasia and
Africa.
This contains about two-thirds of the presently known oil deposits of the world
and it normally supplies the petroleum needs of many nations of Europe, Asia and
Africa. Now the nations of Europe are peculiarly dependent upon this supply,
and this dependency relates to transportation as well as production. This was
vividly demonstrated since the closing of the Suez Canal and some of the pipe-lines.
Alternate ways of transportation and, indeed, alternate sources of power, can, if
necessary, be developed. But these cannot be considered as early prospects.
But these things stress the immense importance of the Middle East If the
nations of that area should lose their independence, if they were dominated by
alien forces hostile to freedom, that would be both a tragedy for the area and for
many other free nations whose economic life would be subject to near strangula-
tion. Western Europe would be endangered just as though there had been no
Marshall Plan, no North Atlantic Treaty Organization The free nations of Asia
and Africa, too, would be placed in serious jeopardy. And the countries of the
Middle East would lose the markets upon which their economies depend All this
would have the most adverse, if not disastrous, effect upon our own nation's eco-
nomic life and political prospects. . . .
Thus we have these simple and indisputable facts
*
The Middle East, which has always been coveted by Russia, would today be
prized more than ever by international communism.
The Soviet rulers continue to show that they do not scruple to use any means
to gain their ends.
The free nations of the Mideast need, and for the most part want, added strength
to assure their continued independence.
Now our thoughts naturally turn to the United Nations as a protector of small
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nations. Its charter gives it primary responsibility for the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security Our country has given the United Nations its full
support in relation to the hostilities in Hungary and in Egypt. Now the United
Nations was able to bring about a cease-fire and withdrawal of hostile forces from
Egypt because it was dealing with governments and peoples who had a decent
respect for the opinions of mankind as reflected in the United Nations General
Assembly. But in the case of Hungary, the situation was different. The Soviet
Union vetoed action by the Security Council to require the withdrawal of Soviet
armed forces from Hungary. And it has shown callous indifference to the recom-
mendations, even the censure, of the General Assembly. The United Nations there-
fore can always be helpful, but it cannot be a wholly dependable protector of
freedom when the ambitions of the Soviet Union are involved.
Now, under all the circumstances I have laid before you, a greater responsibility
now devolves upon the United States. We have shown, this country has shown,
so that none can doubt, our dedication to the principle that force shall not be used
internationally for any aggressive purpose and that the integrity and independence
of the nations of the Middle East should be inviolate. Seldom in history has a
nation's dedication to principle been tested as severely as ours was tested during
recent weeks.
There is general recognition in the Middle East, as elsewhere, that the United
States does not seek either political or economic domination over any other people
Our desire is a world environment of freedom, not servitude. On the other hand
many, if not all, of the nations of the Middle East are aware of the danger that
stems from international Communism and welcome closer cooperation with the
United States to realize for themselves the United Nations goals of independence,
economic well-being and spiritual growth.
Now if the Middle East is to continue its geographic role of uniting rather than
separating East and West; if its vast economic resources are to serve the well-
being of the peoples there, as well as that of others, and if its cultures and religions
and their shrines are to be preserved for the uplifting of the spirits of these
peoples, then the United States must make more evident its willingness to support
the independence of the freedom-loving nations of the area.
Under these circumstances I deem it necessary to seek the cooperation of the
Congress. Only with that cooperation can we give the reassurance needed to deter
aggression, to give courage and confidence to those who are dedicated to freedom
and thus prevent a chain of events which would gravely endanger all of the free
world.
Now there have been several Executive declarations made by the United States
in relation to the Middle East. There is the Tripartite Declaration of May 25, 1950,
followed by the Presidential assurance to the King of Saudi Arabia on Oct. 31,
1950. There is the Presidential declaration of April 9, 1956, that the United States
will within constitutional means oppose any aggression in the area. There is our
declaration of Nov. 29, 1956, that a threat to the territorial integrity or political
independence of Iran, Iraq, Pakistan or Turkey would be viewed by the United
States with the utmost gravity.
Nevertheless, weaknesses in the present situation and the increased danger from
international communism convince me that basic United States policy should now
find expression in joint action by the Congress and the Executive. Furthermore,
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our joint resolve should be so couched as to make it apparent that if need be our
words will be backed by action
Now it is nothing new for the President and the Congress to join to recognize
that the national integrity of other free nations is directly related to our own
security
We have joined to create and support the security system of the United Nations
We have reinforced the collective security system of the United Nations by a
series of collective defense arrangements Today we have security treaties with
forty-two other nations which recognize that their, and our, peace and security are
intertwined We have joined to take decisive action in relation to Greece and
Turkey and in relation to Taiwan
Thus, the United States through the joint action of the President and the Con-
gress, or, in the case of treaties, with the Senate, has manifested in many endan-
gered areas its purpose to support free and independent governments and peace
against external menace, notably the menace of international communism Thereby
we have helped to maintain peace and security during a period of great danger. It
is now essential that the United States should manifest through joint action of the
President and the Congress our determination to assist those nations of the Mid-
east area which may desire that assistance. .
Proposed Resolution on the Middle East:
United States
January 5, 1957
To authorize the President to undertake economic and military cooperation with
nations in the general area of the Middle East in order to assist in the strengthen-
ing and defense of their independence.
Whereas a primary purpose of the United States in its relations with all other
nations is to develop and sustain a just and enduring peace for all, in accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations
;
and
Whereas the peace of the world and the security of the United States are
endangered as long as international Communism and the nations it controls seek
by threat of military action, use of economic pressure, internal subversion, or other
means to attempt to bring under their domination peoples now free and inde-
pendent; and
Whereas such danger now exists in the general area of the Middle East There-
fore be it
SEC. L Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled, that the President be and hereby is
authorized to cooperate with and assist any nation or group of nations in the
general area of the Middle East in the development of economic strength dedicated
to the maintenance of national independence
SEC 2 The President is authorized to undertake, in the general area of the
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Middle East, military assistance programs with any nation or group of nations of
that area desiring such assistance Furthermore, he is authorized to employ the
armed forces of the United States as he deems necessary to secure and protect the
territorial integrity and political independence of any such nation or group of
nations requesting such aid against overt armed aggression from any nation con-
trolled by international Communism; provided, that such employment shall be
consonant with the treaty obligations of the United States and with the Charter
of the United Nations and actions and recommendations of the United Nations,
and, as specified in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, measures pursuant
thereto shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any
way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council to take at any
time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international
peace and security.
SEC 3 The President is hereby authorized, when he determines that such use
is important to the security of the United States, to use for the purposes of this
joint resolution, without regard to the provisions of any other law or regulation.
not to exceed $200,000,000 from any appropriations now available for carrying out
the provisions of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended This authorization
is in addition to other existing authorizations with respect to the use of such
appropriations.
SEC. 4. The President shall within the month of January of each year report
to the Congress his action hereunder.
SEC 5, This joint resolution shall expire when the President shall determine
that the peace and security of the nations in the general area of the Middle East
are reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United
Nations or otherwise.
Resolution on the Middle East:
United States Senate and House of Representatives
Adopted March 5, 1957
Joint resolution to promote peace and stability in the Middle East
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled,
That the President be and hereby is authorized to cooperate with and assist any
nation or group of nations in the general area of the Middle East desiring such
assistance in the development of economic strength dedicated to the maintenance
of national independence.
SEC. 2. The President is authorized to undertake, in the general area of the
Middle East, military assistance programs with any nation or group of nations^of
that area desiring such assistance Furthermore, the United States regards as
vital
to the national interest and world peace the preservation of the independence and
integrity of the nations of the Middle East. To this end, if the President determines
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the necessity thereof, the United States is prepared to use armed forces to assist
any such nation or group of such nations requesting assistance against armed ag-
gression from any country controlled by international communism: Provided that
such employment shall be consonant with the treaty obligations of the United
States and with the Constitution of the United States.
SEC. 3. The President is hereby authorized to use during the balance of fiscal
year 1957 for economic and military assistance under this joint resolution not to
exceed $200,000,000 from any appropriation now available for carrying out the
provisions of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, in accord with the
provisions of such act. Provided, that, whenever the President determines it to be
important to the security of the United States, such use may be under the authority
of section 401 (A) of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, (except that
the provisions of Section 105 (A) thereof shall not be waived) and without regard
to provisions of Section 105 of the Mutual Security Appropriation Act, 1957:
Provided further, that obligations incurred in carrying out the purposes of the first
sentence of Section 2 of this joint resolution shall be paid only out of appropria-
tions for military assistance, and obligations incurred in carrying out the purposes
of the first section of this joint resolution shall be paid only out of appropriations
other than those for military assistance.
This authorization is in addition to other existing authorizations with respect to
the use of such appropriations. None of the additional authorization contained in
this section shall be used until fifteen days after the Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions of the Senate, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representa-
tives, the committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Repre-
sentatives and, when military assistance is involved, the committees on Armed
Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives have been furnished a
report showing the object of the proposed use, the country for the benefit of which
such use is intended, and the particular appropriation or appropriations for carry-
ing out the provisions of the mutual security act of 1954, as amended, from which
the funds are proposed to be derived. Provided, that funds available under this
section during the balance of fiscal year 1957 shall, in the case of any report
submitted during the last fifteen days of the fiscal year, remain available for use
under this section for the purposes stated in such report for a period of twenty
days following the date of submission of such report. Nothing contained in this
joint resolution shall be construed as of itself authorizing the appropriation
of additional funds for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the first
section or of the first sentence of Section 2 of this joint resolution.
SEC. 4 The President should continue to furnish facilities and military assist-
ance, under the provisions of applicable law and established policies, to the United
Nations emergency force in the Middle East, with a view to maintaining the truce
in that region.
SEC. 5. The President shall within the months of January and July of each year
report to the Congress his actions hereunder.
SEC. 6. This Joint resolution shall expire when the President shall determine
that the peace and security of the nations in the general area of the Middle East
are reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United
Nations or otherwise except that it may be terminated earlier by a concurrent
resolution of the two houses of Congress,
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Alternative Resolution:
J. William Fulbright
January 11, 1957
Whereas peace with justice in the defense of human rights and fundamental
freedoms require international cooperation through more effective use of the United
Nations and otherwise, and
Whereas peace with justice is not now assured in the Middle East,
Therefore, be it resolved That the Senate reaffirm the policy of the United
States to achieve international peace and security in the Middle East, so that
armed force shall not be used except in the common interest and that the President
be advised that the sense of the Senate is that this Government, by Constitutional
process, should particularly pursue the following objectives in the Middle East
within the United Nations Charter:
1. In furtherance of the traditional policy of the United States to foster inter-
national trade and the unobstructed international movement of the world commerce,
negotiate arrangements wrhich will assure free passage on equitable terms in war
and in peace of the Suez Canal to all nations.
2. In furtherance of the United Nations Charter to strive for a reduction in
tensions between Israel and the Arab states, assist as may be possible in the nego-
tiation of mutually acceptment of refugees, the protection of holy places, and the
conclusion of treaties of peace; and until these purposes are accomplished, seek
the continued intervention of the United Nations police forces between Israel and
Egypt.
3. In support of programs developed by the International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development, and otherwise, contribute its fair share of resources,
including technical assistance, to long-range economic development and to the
development of independent and progressive social institutions in the Middle East
area.
4. Contribute to the maintenance of peace by reaffirming, with particular refer-
ence to the Middle East, the determination of the United States to exercise the
right of individual or collective self-defense under Article 51, should any armed
attack occur affecting its national security.
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From Middle East Proposal:
Harry S. Tramasi
January 13, 1957
We cannot hesitate, and we dare not falter in what we must do in the Middle
East. The peace and economy of the whole world depend upon the resources con-
centrated in that area. So long as these resources are available to all nations,
unhampered by capricious and tyrannical barriers, the chances for peace will be
good
We must do all that we can to insure free access of this area to all nations But
Russian intrigues and designs to move into the Middle East would deny the world
the free access it must have to survive and would inevitably lead to war Let us
make no mistake. This is what Russia is after control of these resources.
The proposals made by the President, when approved by the Congress, will
strengthen the position of the free world But I do not think they go far enough.
I suggest that certain further steps need to be taken to undo the Russian
encroachments in the Middle East and check new penetrations there. Recurring
armed clashes and flare-ups, arising from ancient and special troubles in this area,
must be settled soon, or else Russia will continue to exploit these troubles for her
own expansionist purposes
These are the steps I have in mind .
First. An embargo ought to be imposed on the shipment of all arms and am-
munition by Russia to the Middle East It would be desirable to have an embargo
on shipments of all arms to the Middle East by all nations until tensions subside
and security pacts and disarmament agreements in the area can be worked out.
Arms and ammunition shipped into the area should go only to the emergency
forces of the United Nations stationed in that area I hear the Russians are con-
tinuing shipment of arms to Syria, and I expect they will resume shipments to
Egypt Russia must be warned that these must stop
When Russia began penetration of the Middle East by sending arms to Egypt
more than a year ago we should have warned the Kremlin that we would not
stand for this trouble-making maneuver All we had to do was to say "You can't
do that" and be ready to back it up All we would have needed to back up this
warning was to put a couple of cruisers at the end of the Black Sea Straits and a
couple of cruisers and air carriers in the Eastern Mediterranean
Our past experience as in the case of the Berlin Airlift showed that the
Russians would not dare to risk open war by shooting down our planes, once we
had made clear that we intended to maintain that airlift and that we were not
bluffing
Second The United Nations emergency forces should be enlarged and strength-
ened to whatever size events may prove necessary to maintain order until the
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Suez Canal problem has been completely resolved and a peace treaty between
Israel and Egypt has been concluded.
The Suez Canal is the economic jugular vein of the European economy and one
of the vital waterways of the world. A stoppage of traffic through the canal of
only a few weeks has paralyzed the European continent and even the Middle East.
We have had to ship oil from this country to meet the emergency, although we have
been trying to build up our own dwindling oil reserves here to meet future
emergencies.
I believe very strongly that all the vital waterways of the world, upon which
the peace and economy of the world depend, should be freely opened to all
commerce
At the Potsdam conference I tried to get recognition of this problem of open
traffic on the waterways of the world. I urged that the Black Sea Straits, the Kiel
Canal, the Rhine and Danube rivers, the Suez Canal, Gibraltar and the Panama
Canal be made free waterways for merchant shipping.
I suggest that we ought to keep on working to relieve world tensions. And the
first practical step we can take along that line is to achieve a permanent settle-
ment of the Suez Canal, for we cannot leave it to the caprices of a military
dictator or the political whims of any one nation.
And we must realize that it is naive and fantastic to hope that we can achieve
any kind of peace in the Middle East as long as there are bitterness and open
clashes between the Arabs and the Jews. The nation of Israel is here to stay.
The United States, as well as the United Nations, should do everything possible
to cool the passions of those extremists who want to destroy Israel. The boundary
lines between Israel and Egypt must be settled and those boundaries guaranteed.
The United Nations Emergency Forces could play a highly constructive role in
this.
Third: In our own interests and in the interest of the peace of the world we
should never again allow ourselves to become separated from our allies. We cannot
be part internationalist, part isolationist, part pacifist and part appeasers.
We fought two world wars to keep Britain, France and Western civilization
from being destroyed by an ambitious Kaiser and a madman Hitler. At the end
of the second World War we set up a number of important barriers to see that
Britain, France and the free world were safe against the threat of international
communism. Vacillation, indecision and failure to state clearly our foreign policy
during the past few years and neglecting to keep our allies informed of our aims
and intentions contributed to the recent tragic events in the Middle East and
almost brought us to a third World War.
Perhaps this is no time to remind ourselves that we must assume some respon-
sibility for the panicky military moves of the British, French and Israelis in Egypt.
Yet we had better draw a lesson from what happened I would ask what the
American people would think we would do if the Panama Canal were seized in
violation of treaties and made subject to the will of a dictator. I know what I
would do
I feel certain that if we had kept close diplomatic contact with our allies and
maintained a frank and forthright understanding of what was involved in the
Middle East, we could well have avoided the debacle that followed, I think it is a
historic blunder to have found ourselves on the same side with expansionist and
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Communist Russia in a move to rebuke and weaken our allies with whom we had
to fight jointly two World Wars, because their security and ours are inseparable
During my administration we kept an intimate understanding with the leaders
of our allies France and Britain have, for over a century, been with us, and we
have managed to get along and cooperate on all major world problems.
It was inevitable that, at times, we would find ourselves disagreeing on certain
issues, sometimes with Britain and sometimes with France On some occasions we
even found ourselves in sharp contention But we never failed to treat them as
free and independent allies
We always got along and worked together for our mutual security and peace
We conducted our relations in a free and candid manner. We never failed to tell
each other what we intended to do, and we always did exactly what we said we
would do.
As President of the world's leading power, I thought it not only essential but
proper to keep the doors of the White House open to all our allies at all times
with equal treatment for all As President, I welcomed the visits of all heads of
state, as well as Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers.
At the end of the Potsdam Conference I informed Stalin that if any further
joint conferences of heads were to be held, they would have to take place in
Washington, since President Roosevelt and I had already come to meet them in
Europe Now that we have a promise of a new foreign policy, I hope that all the
Allied leaders will soon again be invited to come to Washington and that invita-
tions for such visits will not be limited to a few men we favor or court,
As we back the President in his announced program for the Middle East, let us
also make sure that we restore the strength, dignity and prestige of our allies,
without whom we cannot be certain of the maintenance of peace for all the
people of the world.
Alternative Resolution:
Michael Mansfield
January 29, 1957
Whereas the preservation of the independence and territorial integrity of the
nations of the Middle East is vital to the interests of the United States;
Whereas the welfare of the United States and other nations is related to the
prevention of further hostilities in the region of the Middle East, and the resump-
tion of passage of ships of all nations through the Suez Canal ;
Whereas the present truce maintained by the United Nations in the Middle
East may prove temporary if there is no lasting settlement of the Suez dispute
and the Arab-Israeli conflict and if economic instability in the region persists,
Whereas the peace of the world and the security of the United States are
endangered as long as international communism and the nations it controls seek
by threat of military action, use of economic pressure, internal subversion, or other
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means to attempt to bring under their domination peoples now free and inde-
pendent; and
Whereas such danger now exists in the general area of the Middle East'
Therefore be it resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled
1. That the United States regards as vital to the national interest and world
peace the preservation of the independence and territorial integrity of the nations
of the Middle East. To this end, if the President determines the necessity thereof,
the United States is prepared to use armed forces to assist any nation or group of
nations requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country con-
trolled by international communism- Provided, that such employment shall be
consonant with the treaty obligations of the United States and with the Charter of
the United Nations
2. Notwithstanding any limitations in existing law, the President may use ap-
propriations made pursuant to the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, to
furnish facilities and military assistance, on such terms and conditions as he may
deem appropriate, to the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East;
3. The President should call upon the United Nations General Assembly to
establish at once a Special Commission on Arms Traffic in the Middle East with a
view to recommending measures for regulating the flow of military materiel into
that region ;
4. The President should recommend to the Congress an economic program of
specific nature, amount and duration, which in his judgment will facilitate a settle-
ment of the Suez dispute and the Arab-Israeli conflict and otherwise promote
stability in the Middle East and the peaceful progress of the nations of that
region.
From a Statement of Turkey's Middle East Policies:
Fuat Koprulu
April 5, 1956
The "recent events" in the Middle East to which you allude can neither weaken
the Baghdad Pact nor prevent its development, for the clear-cut aim of this Pact
is to create an effective system of defense in the Middle East area in conformity
with Art. 51 of the United Nations Charter against those who nurture aggressive
designs.
Penetration by the Soviets into the Middle East and their attempts to create
confusion there dates from long before the Baghdad Pact. If Egypt, Saudi Arabia
and Syria oppose the Pact and have started to move towards the Soviets, we are
of the opinion that this indicates that the big and common danger is being in-
advertently neglected due to certain considerations of prestige and petty rivalry.
I am of the opinion that the day will come when the emotional and impulsive
state of affairs in the Middle East will be replaced by reason and moderation, and
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that regional disputes can be resolved, so that the Baghdad Pact may become
identified with every state in the area.
I do not believe that there is any need to orient the Baghdad Pact in a new
direction in the face of the political and economic penetration of the Middle East
by the Soviets. The direction of the Pact is manifest, and it behooves us only to
work in that direction.
With respect to the suggested need for increased cooperation in the field of
economy, this necessity is already embodied in the Baghdad Pact itself. On the
other hand, efforts in this respect cannot be taken as involving any neglect or
reduction of political and military endeavors.
Should the United States of America also adhere to the Baghdad Pact in the
near future, and remember that this Pact is in complete conformity with the prin-
ciples of American foreign policy, such a move would undoubtedly constitute an
important event from the viewpoint of the growth of the Pact. . . .
It would be appropriate to make a distinction between Turkey's efforts on
behalf of the Baghdad Pact on the one hand and Turkish-Israeli relations on the
other. As already clarified on different occasions, since the beginning of the
Palestine problem the Turkish Government has acted within the framework of
the United Nations and in loyalty to the decisions adopted by that body. Not for
the sake of peace in the Middle East alone but also for world peace and tranquility
as a whole, Turkey hopes that an equitable solution will be found with the least
possible delay to this dispute which is still creating tension and in respect to
which it is hard to say that it may not lead to war Recent developments in par-
ticular have made it clear for all to see that the flames of this dispute are fanned
solely by those who nurture hidden aspirations regarding the Middle East Turkey
has not abandoned the hope that this dispute may yet be resolved in a conciliatory
manner and within the framework of the United Nations. . . .
Statement on Egypt's Middle East Policy:
Gamal Abdul Nasser
November 21, 1956
The policy of Egypt is a policy of national independence Egypt and Egyptians
value this independence more than life itself. I will not become the stooge or
satellite or pawn or hireling of anybody. Just as Egypt is determined to have
political independence so also Egypt is determined to have and maintain ideological
independence from all foreign ideologies such as Marxism, Fascism, Racism,
Colonialism, Imperialism and Atheism, all of which incidentally are European in
origin. The revolutionary government of Egypt is dedicated to the universal ideals
of justice between men and justice between nations, the equality of all men and
all nations before the world and individual and personal freedom, and to achieve
these ideals the new Egypt will work in accordance with her own special circum-
stance, in accordance with her own religious teachings and cultural heritage. Dedi-
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cated to
^rational independence, Egypt is profoundly aware of the necessity of the
cooperation of nations Situated where it is in one of the historic crossroads of
the world Egypt could not lack this awareness Egypt desires to cooperate an
honorable cooperation with other countries. Concretely and specially Egypt stands
for international law. I pledge myself to the strict observance of all the interna-
tional law which now exists. More than that I desire the expansion of international
law to meet the needs of the complex modern world. Egypt like all other nations
has a special fellow feeling for those nations which share its cultural traditions
and for those excolonial nations which are in a similar phase of transition to inde-
pendent democracy and economic progress. But the idea of trying to create an
Arab empire or of attempting to dominate such an empire is repugnant to Egypt
and to me. Just as European nations work toward European union and just as the
twenty-one sovereign nations of North and South America have developed a Pan
American Union so the Arab countries work toward an ideal of fruitful coopera-
tion. But each Arab nation cherishes its integrity just as Egypt does. The concept
of Arab imperialism is foreign fiction or foreign propaganda based on ignorance
or worse. The primary and basic objective of the revolutionary government of
Egypt is the radical improvement of the economic and social conditions of the
Egyptian people as a free and independent nation. It is to this purpose that I
desire to concentrate the energies of my government. But that cannot be the case
until certain highly inflammable problems are solved. I call upon all the govern-
ments of the world and upon every man and woman of good will to join in serious
efforts to achieve just and honorable solutions of these problems.
From Address to General Assembly:
Abba Eban
November 23, 195G
... I should like to tell the General Assembly quite frankly what is the philosophy
which underlies our present approach to this problem or the withdrawal of Israel
forces in accordance with our undertaking of S November. (The General Assembly
will recall that in response to the resolution of 2 November and the subsequent
resolutions the Government of Israel notified the Secretary-General on 8 Novem-
ber as follows- kt . . The Government of Israel will willingly withdraw its forces
from Egypt immediately upon the conclusion of satisfactory arrangements with
the United Nations in connection with the emergency international force ") Many
representatives have spoken as if, in their view, the only important consideration
is when we withdraw. Of far greater moment is the question. How do we with-
draw? What situation will the withdrawal create? What comes in its place? Will
the withdrawal become an integral stage in the promotion of peaceful conditions?
Or will it pave the way to a return to the previous state of siege and of anarchy?
This is perhaps the most fateful practical question which the United Nations now
faces in the conduct of its work.
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There are two possible approaches to this problem of withdrawal. One is a
system, which I am certain the General Assembly will instantaneously reject,
under which we would carry out the withdrawal without any coordination with the
movements of the United Nations Force, without any care for the future and
without any guarantee of Egypt's future conduct toward Israel Sinai would then
become again a base for Nasser to renew against Israel the deadly menace which
I have but briefly described. Once again the peaceful desert would become a
source of blood and of peril.
Let me again say that an Egyptian military base in the Sinai Peninsula cannot
possibly have any other purpose except to sustain an assault against Israel Armor
and weapons would again pour into the peninsula in preparation for the next
round. Egypt and Israel would again face each other near Gaza, which Egypt seized
by aggression eight years ago. From that position the jedayeen commando squads
would again roam through the countryside, which has known a blessed tranquillity
in the past few weeks. The illicit blockade would again be established on the Gulf
of Aqaba, for the first time an international waterway open today to the ships of
all nations without distinction of flag, and thereby another grotesque situation
would have been brought about. The United Nations would have been active in
restoring to a state of blockade what had hitherto been an open waterway. Egypt
has blocked one waterway, the Suez Canal, contrary to the 1888 Convention
Under this system, which I propose that the General Assembly reject, of a
reckless and unplanned withdrawal, the United Nations would find itself inad-
vertently responsible for bringing Egypt back to block the other waterway, so that
the protection of blockade would become an international objective. Thus, belliger-
ency will be restored, acts of war by sea or land will again arise until they provoke
the inevitable explosion and who knows how far or how much any such explosion
will be localized. This is a startling prospect, but it is exactly what will happen
if the method of effecting and implementing the withdrawal of troops is not
approached with minimum care and precision. This return to the status quo of
belligerency is precisely what Nasser wants. It is what some delegations quite
inadvertently may be proposing when they urge that the withdrawal take place in
disregard of what will ensue and in detachment from the plans now under way for
defining the tasks of the United Nations Emergency Force now entering the Canal
area. This question of a return to the status quo of insecurity was frankly dis-
cussed in the General Assembly during the first debates on the establishment of
the United Nations Force On that occasion, too, the Canadian representative
invited our attention to that problem. He said :
What then, six months from now? Are we to go through all this again? Are
we to return to the status quo? Such a return would not be to a position of
security, or even to a tolerable position, but would be a return to terror, blood-
shed, strife, incidents, charges and counter-charges, and ultimately another
explosion. . . ,
These, too, are instructive words, except that one might have a reservation
whether peace could endure for six months in an atmosphere of renewed belliger-
ency.
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It was in order to avoid such a blind procession back to disaster and belligerency
that the General Assembly devised machinery in the form of the United Nations
Emergency Force.
I have then portrayed one method of effecting a withdrawal which would contain
within it the seeds of a future conflict.
But there is another system of withdrawal fully consistent with the resolutions
of the General Assembly, but also with the purpose and objectives of the United
Nations and its Charter. Let me again stress that the Government of Israel will
carry out the undertaking for the withdrawal of its troops from Egypt as defined
in its communication of 8 November. We shall do this. But is it essential or wise
or permissible that Sinai must again become remilitarized as a base for future
assaults? Are there no other alternatives whereby the very emptiness of that
historic desert may become a bridge of peace between two countries? There are
ways of reconciling Israel's obligation to withdraw with the avoidance of this
danger. I will not make detailed proposals at this forum, but we have constructive
proposals which would fulfill both of these objectives, the principle of withdrawal
and the avoidance of the perils emanating from the re-creation of this base. Simi-
larly, is it essential or wise or permissible that maritime belligerency shall be
restored in the Gulf of Aqaba in defiance of United Nations decisions against
belligerency and of the international law governing narrow waterways? What shall
we have achieved if we leave behind a position at the entrance to the Gulf of
Aqaba in which acts of maritime war can be achieved, evoking in the course of
time a natural response and re-creating that vicious circle of violence from which
it is our passionate desire to break loose?
There are ways of reconciling the resolutions of 2, 5 and 7 November with the
creation of such conditions as will preclude that danger, and we shall make pro-
posals accordingly in the proper contexts.
There are solutions for Gaza other than the renewal of this Egyptian salient in
a position which would make Egyptian-Israel peace impossible.
There is the problem of the Suez Canal This is not affected one way or the
other by Israel's policy on the withdrawal of troops from Egypt, but we have a
special interest and a special experience. Under the 1888 Convention this waterway
was to be opened to the ships of all nations in time of peace and in time of war.
Article 4 of the Convention emphasizes that the obligation to keep the Canal open
even in time of war rests upon Egypt even when Egypt is a belligerent, and there-
fore, the present situation in which the Canal is blocked is a violation of that
convention.
But even before that violation there was another long-established violation
through the discriminatory closing of the Canal to Israel's ships and cargoes. The
Canal is now closed to all nations. May we not hope that when it is opened it shall
be opened to all nations without distinction of flag in conformity to the Constanti-
nople Convention and the resolutions of the Security Council?
This, then, is the summary of our position We are still convinced of the neces-
sity, the justice, the rectitude of what we had to do for Israel's defense against
an open threat to destroy it. This salutary resistance may be written in history as
a triumphant assertion that small democracies have a right to live and not only
large dictatorships supported by larger Powers,
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We shall carry out our 8 November undertaking, but there is a way of carrying
it out which might lead to war There is a way of carrying it out which gives a
chance of peace We choose, urge and advocate the latter course. These problems
must be seriously and constructively and rapidly discussed.
We invite the United Nations authorities concerned with the implementation of
these resolutions to consider with us the proposals which we have conceived and
might continue to present for carrying out the agreed principle of withdrawal from
Egypt in a manner conducive to peaceful conditions in the area to be affected by
the withdrawal. In the meantime we would urge the necessity of avoiding any
increase of tension, including such increase of tension as arises from false reports
I will again repeat the denial which I gave from this rostrum yesterday of
mischievous reports asserting an imminent danger to Syria from troop concentra-
tions in Israel. There is no foundation whatever for those reports which have
unfortunately been transmitted not only by Syria but by other representatives
here. We have invited United Nations observers to study the scene on the Israel-
Syrian frontier. Their report, which entirely disputes the Syrian contention, has
now been made available and it is the hope of my delegation that the Secretary-
General will find means of making it known to all Members of the General
Assembly.
A final consideration brings us back to the crux of our problem, whether the
implementation of the General Assembly's resolution is to be succeeded by a state
of war. This belligerency, this state of war, is the great paradox of this discussion
A nation claims and exercises a state of war against its neighbor and then com-
plains about the absence of peace Egypt behaves to Israel as though there is war.
Israel is called upon to behave towards Egypt as though there is peace. Egypt comes
in full belligerency to the United Nations and says, "I seek your protection; I am
only working for Israel's destruction; I am at war with Israel; I wish to send
people to Israel to kill and to plunder; I will seize Israel's ships in international
waterways; I will build up armaments for Israel's destruction; I will concert
alliances to bring about Israel's downfall I ask the United Nations to protect me
while I do all of this."
The complete incongruity of belligerency in the system of the Charter is the
shocking and tragic spectacle that we have seen.
In conclusion we seek the understanding and counsel of the General Assembly
on the need for carrying out our 8 November undertaking in conditions which will
prevent a recurrence of the conflict. We call for this prudence out of the depths
of our heart because we know what is here at stake The thousands who fell in
our War of Independence, the hundreds slain in homes and fields by Nasser and
his fellow potentates, the lives lost in the effort to push disaster away a few weeks
ago these are all vividly before us. We speak out of the deep pathos of a people
which more than any other has faced the prospect of physical extinction in its
journey across history and which during eight years of its statehood has unreason-
ably been called upon to live under the dark and dreadful shadow of physical
destruction. It is then in the name of that sentiment that we say: Let Sinai become
a place of peace and not a base of war. Let the closed waterway of Suez be
opened Let the open waterway at the Gulf of Aqaba not be closed Let us find
means of avoiding that explosive proximity of Egyptian and Israel forces which
is fatal for peace.
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The danger and opportunity walk here hand in hand It is within our capacity
in a matter of days so to arrange affairs that the recent struggle might be the
last page in the chapter of Egyptian-Israel conflict.
Joint Declaration on Middle East Policy:
USSR and Communist China
January 8, 1957
In the course of an all-around exchange of opinion, both sides have recorded
complete unanimity of views on the present day international situation and major
international problems. Following the Geneva conference of 1954, the four-heads-
of-Government conference of 1955 and the Bandung Conference of Asian and
African countries, an obvious tendency toward a detente appeared In the interna-
tional situation, and ideas of peaceful coexistence between states with different
social systems began to prevail in the minds of the people,
As a result of the armed attack of the imperialist aggressive forces against Egypt
and their subversive activities in Hungary, the tendency of easing the international
situation has run up against the obstacles and destructive resistance of these forces.
With the support of the Socialist states and the other peaceable states and
nations of the world, the peoples of Egypt and Hungary have achieved victory^in
their heroic and resolute struggle. The conspiracies of the imperialist aggressive
circles have suffered utter defeat The imperialists, however, cannot reconcile
themselves to this and continue their aggressive subversive activity.
The facts indicate that the development of international events is proceeding
along tortuous roads All the peace-loving peoples of the world
must be constantly
on the alert and prepared to wage a consistent and prolonged struggle against
the
mechinations of the aggressive imperialist forces.
Both sides emphasize that, unlike the policy of aggression and war preparation
pursued by the imperialist camp headed by the monopoly groups
of the United
States, the countries of the Socialist camp are steadfastly following
a policy of
upholding and safeguarding world peace.
At the same time, there are many nationally independent states in Asia
and
Africa, and primarily such a great power as India, which firmly abide by
the policy
of peace and neutrality.
There are not a few states in Europe and other areas of the world that also come
out for peace and neutrality, or are beginning to show a tendency
for such a policy.
Public forces championing peace and opposed to war are growing
with every day
on all continents.
Contradictions and disagreements in the camp of imperialism arising
from the
struggle for raw material sources, markets and spheres
of influence are growing
more deep and acute with every day.
With the exception of the aggressive forces in a few imperialist
states the
peoples of all the world yearn for peace and come
out against war
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The united forces of peace in the Socialist states, the nationally independent
and other peaceable countries and nations are far superior to the forces of aggres-
sive imperialist blocs If all the peaceable forces in the international arena unite,
join efforts in a resolute struggle, any intrigues of the aggressive imperialist quarters
will definitely be frustrated
Both sides note that after Britain, France and Israel had suffered defeat in their
aggression against Egypt, American imperialism is trying to make use of the
situation so as to take the place of the colonialist powers Britain and France
in the Near and Middle East, to suppress the movement for national independence
and enslave the peoples of these countries, and is also striving to step up the
policy of aggression and war preparations in this area.
This is precisely the essence of the so-called Eisenhower doctrine This colonial-
ist policy of the United States in the Near and Middle East creates fresh tensions
in this area, recently the arena of hostilities caused by the aggression against Egypt.
The Governments of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China
resolutely condemn this policy of the United States and are ready to continue
rendering the necessary support of the peoples of the Near and Middle East so as
to prevent aggression and interference in the affairs of the countries in this area.
With a view to completely eliminating the consequences of imperialist aggres-
sion in Egypt, both Governments hold that it is necessary to satisfy the Egyptian
Government's lawful demand for complete compensation by Britain, France and
Israel of the damage caused by their aggressive actions
Both Governments resolutely come out against any imperialist machinations
aimed at placing the Suez Canal under "international control" and are for the
settlement of the question of free passage of shipping through the Suez Canal by
way of negotiations between the states concerned on the basis of complete respect
for Egyptian sovereignty.
The Governments of the Soviet Union and China wholeheartedly support the
countries and nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America in their striving to fight
against colonialism, to uphold and consolidate their national independence, sover-
eignty and freedom, to achieve industrial progress and economic independence.
In the struggle against war, against colonialism and in defense of world peace,
the Socialist states and the nationally independent countries can effect all-round
cooperation in conformity with the five principles of peaceful coexistence
The facts show that this sincere cooperation has already played an important
part in present-day international affairs Friendly cooperation of the Socialist
states with countries that have won their national independence accords both their
mutual national interests and the interests of world peace.
Both Government delegations note that in suppressing the national liberation
movement and perpetrating aggression against the nations that have won their na-
tional independence, the aggressive imperialist alignments do not give up their
attempts to conduct subversive activity against the Socialist states .
Of late, the aggressive imperialist alignments are intensifying the
u
cold war"
and conducting subversive activities against the Soviet Union, against communism
and the cause of peace
It is necessary to be vigilant in the face of these schemes. The Soviet Union
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and China are united with all the Socialist states by their fraternal friendship and
mutual assistance commitments.
Any provocative actions of the aggressive imperialist forces aimed at under-
mining the Socialist states will meet with the most resolute rebuff
Soviet Proposals for the Middle East:
From a note handed to U.S. Ambassador Charles E. Bohlen
February 13, 1957
As a result of the efforts of the peace-loving peoples, supported by the United
Nations, the aggressive actions against Egypt were liquidated, and favorable condi-
tions arose and real possibilities emerged for insuring peace and also for the
solution of international problems in the Near and Middle East
The liquidation of the hot-bed of war in this region provided prerequisites for
the strengthening of national independence, sovereignty and economic development
not only in Egypt but in all the countries of the Near and Middle East, and also
opened the way for the broad cooperation of the countries of this region with all
countries on the principles of equality in relations between states as formulated in
the decisions of the Bandung conference [of Asian-African nations in 1955],
The peace-loving peoples justly expected that henceforth peace in the Near and
Middle East could be preserved and strengthened, and that an end would be put
to the policy of foreign interference in the internal affairs of this region, that the
sovereignty and independence of the countries of the Near and Middle East would
be sincerely respected, and that the countries of this region, and in particular the
victim of aggression Egypt will be given selfless economic aid.
However, the period of amelioration of the tense situation in this region was
regrettably short, and the hopes of the peoples were not justified. As a result of
the unilateral steps taken by certain powers, the situation in the Near and Middle
East has recently become very much more acute. This is mainly caused by the fact
that it is still intended to use without the consent of the United Nations and in
a unilateral manner the armed forces of one of the great powers in the Near and
Middle East, at the discretion of that power, in order to interfere in the internal
affairs of this region.
There is also the proposition for providing economic aid for the countries of
the Near and Middle East, along with the imposition upon them of conditions by
which these countries are to renounce any ties with certain countries which are
members of the United Nations that is, to accept political conditions for such
aid that are incompatible with the dignity and sovereignty of these countries and
with the high principles of the United Nations.
One cannot fail to be aware that the carrying out of such a policy, outside the
framework of the United Nations, would lead to a new and dangerous worsening
of the situation in the region, which has so recently been the theatre of military
action resulting from the aggression against Egypt, and would represent a threat
to the cause of peace throughout the world.
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The aforementioned plan is nothing but a continuation of a policy of isolated,
aggressive military blocs such as NATO, SEATO and the Baghdad Pact, and the
setting up of artificial economic and political barriers between states.
At the basis of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union lies the principle of the
peaceful coexistence of states, irrespective of differences in their social or state
system. It is a known fact that, in establishing its friendly relations with the Arab
countries, the Soviet Union not only did not seek any deterioration in the relations
of those countries with other great powers, but on the contrary upheld the need
for broad international cooperation, and the need to insure stable peace and the
creation of an atmosphere of trust in the area of the Near and Middle East.
The Soviet Union does not possess, and does not wish to possess, military bases
or any kind of concessions in countries of the Near and Middle East for the pur-
pose of making profits, nor does it seek to obtain any kind of privileges in that
area, because all that is incompatible with the principles of Soviet foreign policy
The Soviet Union is vitally interested that there should be peace in the area of
the Near and Middle East, situated in direct proximity to its borders It is
sincerely interested in the consolidation of the national independence of the coun-
tries of that area and in their economic prosperity.
In the opinion of the Soviet Government the preservation of peace in the Near
and Middle East is a necessary condition not only for the development of the
countries of the Near and Middle East, but, as recent events have shown for
safeguarding the economic prosperity of many other countries. The need to
strengthen peace and security in the Near and Middle East demands a broad
development of political, economic and cultural ties between all countries, and
joint action by the great powers primarily responsible for peace, this being par-
ticularly in accord with the United Nations Charter.
The Soviet Government considers that, by joint efforts on the part of the great
powers, the U S S R , the U S.A , Britain and France, the permanent United Nations
Security Council members, it would be possible to secure lasting and stable peace
in that area if all the afore-mentioned great powers built their relations with
countries of the Near and Middle East on the basis of the general principle of a
policy of noninterference in their internal affairs and respect for their national
independence and sovereignty
Proceeding from the above-mentioned, the Soviet Government addresses to the
governments of the USA, Britain and France the proposal to work out and to
proclaim basic principles in matters of peace and security in the Near and Middle
East and of noninterference into the internal affairs of the countries of this region.
These principles could be made the foundations of a joint declaration, the
adoption of which would exclude the possibility of any dangerous, unilateral action
by this or that great power in regard to the countries of Near and Middle East,
and would help to strengthen peace and security in this most important region, to
develop national economy and to consolidate the independence of these countries.
It is self-evident it would be open to any state interested in peace and security,
which desires to build its relations with the countries of the Near and Middle East
on the basis of the mentioned principles, to subscribe to this declaration
Proposals regarding the obligations of the member-powers under the declaration
could at once be conveyed to the governments and peoples of the Near and Middle
East countries.
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The Foreign Ministry appends the basic stipulations of the draft declaration
by the four powers the U.S.S.R
,
the U.S A
,
Britain and France as proposed
by the U.S S.R. Government, and would be grateful to the United States Embassy
for information regarding the acceptability to the United States Government of
the draft of the basic principles expounded in the declaration regarding peace and
security in the Near and Middle East and non-interference into the internal affairs
of the countries of this region.
The Soviet Government would have no objection to the Governments of the
United States, Britain, France and the Soviet Union coming out with separate
declarations (of similar context) regarding their relations with the countries of the
Near and Middle East, based on the principles expounded in the attached draft.
Draft of the basic principles of declarations by the Governments of the
U.S.S.R., the U.S.A., Britain and France regarding the question of peace and
security in the Near and Middle East and non-interference in the internal
affairs of the countries of this region
U.S.S.R., the U.S.A , the United Kingdom and the French Republic, guided by lofty
peace-loving aims and the principles of the United Nations as expressed in its
Charter, declare their agreement that at the basis of their policy in respect of the
countries of the Near and Middle East lies the desire to establish peace and
security in the Near and Middle East and throughout the world; acknowledge and
respect the lofty principles of relations between states formulated at the Bandung
conference of Asian and African countries; strive to create favorable conditions
for the strengthening of the national independence and national sovereignty of the
countries of the Near and Middle East; express a sincere desire to contribute
disinterestedly, by common efforts, to the economic development of the countries
of this area, and are in this proceeding from the fact that the natural wealth of
the underdeveloped countries is the inalienable national property of the peoples of
these countries, which have the full right to dispose of and use it in the interests
of the development of their national economy and progress.
The Governments of the U.S.S.R., the U.S A., Britain and France, desire to
contribute to the all-round development of economic, business and cultural rela-
tions of the countries of the Near and Middle East with all countries, on the basis
of equality and mutual advantage; are of the opinion that wide economic and trade
relations for the countries of this area accord not only with the interests of these
countries but also with the securing of the economic prosperity for other countries
of the world, and recognize the need for a peaceful settlement of all outstanding
international problems and questions relating to the Near and Middle East by
way of negotiations
Aware of the importance of the responsibility they bear for the maintenance of
peace and security throughout the world, the Governments of the U.S S R , the
U.S.A., Britain and France pledge themselves to follow, in their policy in respect
of the Near and Middle East, the principles stated below
1. The presentation of peace in the Near and Middle East by settling questions
at issue exclusively by peaceful means, on the basis of the method of negotiations.
2. Noninterference in the internal affairs of the countries of the Near and
Middle East. Respect for the sovereignty and independence of these countries
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3. Refusal to undertake any attempts to draw these countries into military
alignments with the participation of the great powers.
4. The liquidation of foreign bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops from
the territory of countries of the Near and Middle East.
5. Joint refusal to supply arms to countries of the Near and Middle East.
6. Assistance in the economic development of countries of the Near and Middle
East, without putting forward any political, military or other conditions incom-
patible with the dignity and sovereignty of these countries.
The Governments of the US.SR., the U.S.A , the United Kingdom and the
French Republic express the hope that other states as well will, in their relations
with countries of the Near and Middle East, adhere to the same principles.
From Address to National Press Club:
Guy Mollet
February 27, 1957
... Of course, the President [Eisenhower] and I have broached the subject of
the Middle East. Without concealing our disagreements of the past months, we
have recorded that our respective positions have always been clear-cut so that our
mutual confidence has remained unchanged. We have one common purpose, which
is the restoration of a lasting peace in the Middle East, a peace based on justice
and international law.
The worst possible formula would be to return purely and simply to the situa-
tion as it existed prior to the so-called Israeli aggression. This would even consti-
tute a crime against peace. All of us have had the weakness, for eight years, to
allow disturbances to develop and to accept an undeclared war, as the United
Nations' resolutions were repeatedly flaunted. Our peoples would not allow us to
repeat the same tragic error.
We must strike at the very factors of this state of tension, at all the factors.
A piecemeal or temporary solution in the Middle East will always be a bad solu-
tion. Some of the factors of the present situation are geographic, others are purely
political.
The first of these
"geographic" factors concerns the frontier of Israel and in
fact the very existence of the State of Israel. Let us not forget that Israel, en-
circled as it is by ill-intentioned neighbors and subjected to repeated aggressions
chiefly instigated by Egypt, was forced to resort to its elementary right of self-
defense. I refuse to brand this State as an aggressor.
Israel was born under the auspices of the United Nations. It is entitled to have
the question of its frontiers definitely settled and its territorial integrity guaran-
teed. At the same time as this problem is settled, the problem of the Arab refugees
in Gaza, until yesterday a base for attacks against Israel, must also be settled.
The second of these factors is the Gulf of Aqaba. Bordered by four States, the
Gulf of Aqaba is an international waterway. To guarantee free passage through
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the Straits of Tiran, and thus to prevent the choking of Israel, is nothing but
implementing international law.
The third factor is the Suez Canal The deliberate sabotage of the Canal by
Egypt without any military justification, as well as the blackmail of the past two
months with respect to the clearing up of a channel, are proof that we can place
little trust in the signature of the Egyptian Government.
The Suez Canal, an international waterway, like the Gulf of Aqaba. must be kept
free, in accordance with the resolution of the Security Council, from political inter-
ference on the part of any country and, first of all, on the part of Egypt.
The economic life of Europe and of many countries of Southeast Asia cannot
possibly depend on the goodwill of an Egyptian dictator.
The elimination of these three factors of tension may be obtained through the
customary international procedures. Some have already been started. We must not
relax our efforts before a general settlement has been reached.
The problems which I have called ''political
3 '
are even more serious. Among them,
I shall rate first the Pan-Arab activities of Egypt and Soviet infiltration in the
Middle East.
A year ago, when the French Government was denouncing the Pan-Arab ambi-
tions of Colonel Nasser, the response it met with was at times rather skeptical A
definite scheme had, however, been outlined in "The Philosophy of the Revolu-
tion." In this book, Nasser has proclaimed his will to unify the Arab world from the
Atlantic Ocean to the Persian Gulf around a "hero,"
1
himself, and to use for this
aim against the West the instrument of blackmail which the geographic position
of his country has put into his hands, the Suez Canal and the oil of the Middle
East. Subsequent events have proved that these were not empty threats.
Denouncing Pan-Arabism does not mean attacking the Arab world and even
less so the Moslem community. Isn't France, in any case, a Moslem power 5 Pan-
Arabism is not the expression of the feelings of a people. Like Pan-Germanism and
Pan-Slavism which other dictators have made famous, it is a myth, in the name
of which the independence of peoples is being threatened.
It would be the worst possible mistake to answer this Arab propaganda spread-
ing from Cairo and Damascus with concessions or counter-propaganda. The free
nations must make a stand; they must show the rest of the world that provocations
never pay and that one cannot compromise when the respect of international
obligations is at stake. Such a task will require time, much firmness and a large
dose of confidence.
Yet such effort is all the more necessary as Pan-Arabism is the best tool of
Communist infiltration. Following Lenin's advice, the leaders of Soviet Russia bring
aid to all movements of extreme nationalism. Cairo and Damascus, fountain-
springs of Pan-Arabisrn, are also the strongest bridgeheads of the Soviet Union.
The French Government has acknowledged the extreme importance of President
Eisenhower's message on the Middle East. The United States has acted with
leadership. Is has served well the cause of peace and we know that Soviet Russia
is not indifferent to warnings such as the one she has just received.
I do not want to abuse your patience in dealing in greater details with these
problems, however much they deserve a more thorough analysis Their settlement
requires that the free world engage in a joint and long-range policy. This, I indi-
cated to the President of the United States. . . .
194 The Eisenhower Doctrine and Alternatives
Statement by Four Arab Leaders:
From Cairo Radio Broadcast
February 27, 1957
A meeting was held between the 25th of the month of Rajab, 1376, corresponding
to the 25th of February, 1957, and 27th of the month of Rajab, 1376, correspond-
ing to the 27th of February, 1957, between His majesty King Saud Ibn Ebdum Aziz
al Saud, King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, His Majesty King Hussein I, King
of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan; His Excellency Shukri al-Kuwatly, President
of the Republic of Syria; His Excellency Gamal Abdel Nasser, President of the
Republic of Egypt, and their statesmen.
This was the fourth in a series of meetings that they hold from time to time in
order to study the international situation and to discuss problems affecting the Arab
nations, the course of their life, progress, and very existence
The participants [in the conference] were informed of the laudable efforts made
by His Majesty King Saud Ibn Abdul Aziz in the course of his visit to the United
States of America, the elucidations made by His Majesty to statesmen [in the
United States] on the Arab points of view with regard to Middle East problems
and the subjects of the discussions.
His Majesty also gave an account of explanations given by him to President
Eisenhower with particular reference to Arab rights and problems, including the
recent aggression against Egypt and its results, as well as Egypt's rights to sover-
eignty over the Suez Canal, and the seriousness of Israel's noncompliance with the
United Nations resolutions that stipulate an unconditional withdrawal from the
Gaza Strip and the Gulf of Aqaba beyond the armistice lines without Israel's
gaming any advantages as a result of the triple aggression.
The conferees affirm their anxiousness to play their part in the international
sphere and to contribute to the creation of international relations on a basis con-
ducive to peace, justice and well-being and respect for their sovereignty and
interests.
Their strength having grown through the unity of their people, their faith in the
safety of their aims having grown, the Arab countries meeting at the conference
reaffirm their earlier declared determination to protect the Arab nation from the
harm of the "cold war" and its dispute and to abide by the policy of positive
neutrality thus preserving its real national interests.
They also affirm the fact that the defense of the Arab world should emanate
from the Arab nation in the light of its real security and outside the scope of
foreign pacts.
The participants note that, despite the United Nations Resolution and in de-
fiance of unanimous world public opinion of the necessity of Israel's withdrawal
beyond the armistice lines, the triple aggression against Egypt still exists in all its
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effects and aspects since Israel has not complied with the United Nations resolu-
tions on unconditional withdrawal.
The participants [in the conference] hold, moreover, that peace and security in
the Middle East is in jeopardy while the population of Gaza continues to suffer
acute oppression and maltreatment at the hand of Israel.
Therefore, the conferees have decided:
1. To work for an immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Israel beyond the
armistice lines.
2. To uphold in full the rights of the Palestine Arabs and the Arabs
1
sovereignty
over the territories and territorial waters
3. The necessity on the part of the aggressive states to compensate Egypt for all
damages and losses caused through their aggression
4 To reject all attempts made with the view to reducing Egypt's sovereignty
and rights over the Suez Canal as the Suez Canal is an integral part of Egypt, her
sovereignty over the canal is absolute, and the freedom of navigation in the canal
is regulated in accordance with the provisions of the 18SS Constantinople
Convention.
5. To condemn British aggression against the territories of Yemen and to
assume an attitude of solidarity with Yemen in stemming this aggression
6. To support absolutely the rights of the Arabs of Algeria to freedom and
independence and the courageous struggle against imperialist force
The conferees hold that their liberal policy, emanating from their faith in the
right of their nation to a free and independent life and rooted in their Arab
patriotism which has proved to the world its real existence, increases their solidarity
in order to attain the Arab nation's aspirations of freedom, unity and progress.
SECTION 4
The Continuing Struggle
Proclamation of the United Arab Republic
February 1, 1958
On February 1, 1958, in a historic session held at Kubbah Palace in Cairo, His
Excellency President Shukry El-Kuwatly of Syria, and President Gamal Abdel-
Nasser of Egypt, met the representatives of the Republics of Syria and Egypt,
El-Sayed, Sabry El-Assaly, El-Sayed Abdel-Latif El-Baghdady, El-Sayed Khaled
El-Azm, El-Sayed Zakana Mohieddin, El-Sayed Hamed El-Khoga, El-Sayed
Anwar El-Sadat, El-Sayed Fakher El Kayyaly, El-Sayed Maamoun El-Kozbary, El-
Sayed Hussein El-Shaffei, El-Sayed Assaad Haroun, General Abdel-Hakim Amer,
El-Sayed Salaheddin El-Bittar, El-Sayed Kamaleddin Hussein, El-Sayed Khalil
El-Kallas, El-Sayed Noureddine Tarraf, El-Sayed Saleh Akeel, El-Sayed Fathy
Radwan, General Afif El-Bizry, El-Sayed Mahmoud Fawzy, El-Sayed Kamal Ramzi
Stino, El-Sayed Aly Sabri, El-Sayed Abdel-Rahman El-Azm and El-Sayed Mah-
mound Riad.
The purpose of this meeting was to discuss the final measures to be taken for
the realization of the Arab peoples' will, and the execution of what the constitutions
of both republics stipulate, namely that the people of each of them form a part of
the Arab Nation They, therefore, discussed the decisions unanimously approved by
the National Assembly of Egypt and the Syrian House of Representatives that
unity should be established between the two countries as a preliminary step towards
the realisation of complete Arab unity. They also discussed the clear signs manifest
in the past few years, that Arab nationalism was the inspiring spirit that dominated
the history of Arabs in all their different countries, their common present and
the hoped-for future of every Arab.
They came to the conclusion that this unity which is the fruit of Arab nation-
alism is the Arabs' path to sovereignty and freedom, that it is one of humanity's
gateways to peace and co-operation, and that it is therefore their duty to take
this unity with persistence and determination staunch and unwavering, out of the
circle of wishes and aspirations to where it can be converted into a reality. They
came out of this with the conviction that the elements conducive to the success of
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the union of the two republics were abundant, particularly recently after their
joint struggle which had brought them even closer to one another made the
meaning of nationalism considerably clearer, stressed the fact that it \\as a move-
ment for liberation and rehabilitation and that it was a faith in peace and co-opera-
tion
For all this, the participants declare their total agreement, complete faith and
deeply rooted confidence in the necessity of uniting Egypt and Syria into one state
to be named "The United Arab Republic."
They have likewise decided to declare their unanimous agreement on the adoption
of a presidential democratic system of government for the Arab Republic The
executive authority shall be vested in the head of the state assisted by the ministers
appointed by him and responsible to him.
The legislative authority shall be vested in one legislative house The new re-
public shall have one flag, one army, one people who shall remain joined in a unity
where all will share equal rights and duties, where all \\ill call for the protection of
their country with heart and soul, and compete in the consolidation of its integrity
and the insurance of its unvulnerability.
His Excellency President Shukry El-Kuwatly and President Gamal Abdel-Nasser
will each deliver a statement to the people in the Syrian and the Egyptian Parlia-
ments respectively on Wednesday, February 5, 1958 in which they \\ill announce
the decisions reached in this meeting and explain the principles of the unity on
which this rising young republic shall stand
The peoples of Egypt and Syria shall be called upon to participate in a general
plebiscite on the principles of this unity and the choice of the head of the state
within thirty days.
In proclaiming these decisions, the participants feel great pride and overwhelming
joy in having assisted in taking this positive step on the road to Arab unity and
solidarity a unity which had been for many an epoch and many a generation the
Arab's much cherished hope and greatly coveted objective In deciding on the unity
of both nations, the participants declare that their unity aims at the unification of
all the Arab peoples and affirm that the door is open for participation to any
Arab state desirous of joining them in a union or federation for the purpose
of protecting the Arab peoples from harm and evil, strengthening Arab sovereignty,
and safeguarding its existence.
May God protect this step we have taken and those which are to follow with
His ever vigilant care and benevolence so that the Arab people under the banner
of unity may live in dignity and peace.
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The Arab Federation:
Joint Communique of Iraq and Jordan
February 14, 1958
WHEREAS the great Arab Revolt, led by His late Majesty Al-Hussein Ibn All,
heralding the birth of a new dawn for the Arab Nation, and reflected by sacrifice for
the liberation of the Greater Arab Motherland and the unification of its peoples and
its lands with the aim of regaining the station of the Arabs among the nations of
the world and contributing to the advancement of civilization; and
WHEREAS that blessed Revolt derived its inspiration from the will of the
Arabs to achieve freedom and unity on the basis of their glorious history and their
faith in themselves and the immortal message of their Nationalism, and
WHEREAS the message of the Arab Revolt whose author gave his life in its
cause descended to sons and grandsons, inherited by generation after generation
as the torch that guides the Nation of the Arabs in its march towards the achieve-
ment of its cherished aims of comprehensive unity and full freedom and sovereignty
and for the recovery of its glory, the preservation of its sacred inheritance and the
realization of its aspirations for an auspicious future under this blessed unity
NOW therefore, the two Hashemite States have resolved to form a Federation
between them based on these high aims, and in fulfillment of this object and their
National aims agreement has been reached on what follows :
1. An Arab Federation is formed between the Kingdom of Iraq and the Hashe-
mite Kingdom of Jordan to be known as the Arab Federation and to take effect as
from Friday, 24 Rajab 1377 A H corresponding to 14th February 1958 A D
This Federation shall be open to the other Arab States who may wish to adhere
to it.
2. Each of the two States shall preserve its independent, international identity
and its sovereignty over its territories and retain its present regime of government.
3 International treaties, pacts and agreements entered into by either of the two
States before the formation of the Federation shall continue to be observed by the
State that concluded them but shall not bind the other State As for international
treaties, pacts and agreements that may be concluded after the establishment of
the Federation and which shall come within the terms of the Federation, these
shall come under the competence and authority of the Federal Government.
4 As from the date of the official proclamation of the establishment of the
Federation, measures for the complete unification of the following matters shall be
executed by the two States of the Federation .
(a) The unification of Foreign Policy and Diplomatic representation
(b) The unification of the Armies of Jordan and Iraq (the Arab Army)
(c) The removal of Customs barriers between the two States and unification
of their Customs laws
(d) The unification of educational programmes
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5. The two parties agree to take the necessary steps as quickly as possible to
unify currency and co-ordinate economic and financial policies between the two
States.
6 When necessity or the interests of the Federation require the unification of
any matter not mentioned in Article 4, the necessary steps shall be taken in accord-
ance with the Constitution of the Federation to bring such matters within the
competence and authority of the Federal Govenment.
7. The flag of the Arab Revolt shall be the flag of the Federation and of the
two States.
8. (a) Federal matters shall be dealt with by the Federal Government consisting
of a Legislative Chamber and Executive Authority
(b) The members of the Legislative Chamber shall be elected by the Parlia-
ments of Iraq and Jordan respectively, from among their own members, the two
States to be equally represented in numbers
(c) The members of the Executive Authority shall be appointed in accordance
with the Provisions of the Federal Constitution to assume responsibility for the
matters which come within the competence of the Federal Government.
9. The King of Iraq shall be the Head of the Federal Government and in the
event of his absence for any reason, the King of Jordan shall be head Each of the
two Kings shall retain his Constitutional powers in his own Kingdom. In the event
of any other State adhering to the Federation, the question of Head of the Federa-
tion shall be reconsidered as circumstances may require.
10 The seat of the Federal Government shall alternate between Baghdad and
Amman and for a period of six months in each
11. (a) The Federal Government shall draw up a Constitution for the Federa-
tion in accordance with the bases set out in this Agreement and the Constitution
of each of the two States shall be modified to the extent and limits required by the
provisions of the Federal Constitution.
(b) The necessary steps and measures shall be taken to establish the Federal
Government and draw up the Federal Constitution \\ithin a period not exceeding
three months within the date of the signature of this Agreement.
This Agreement shall be ratified according to the Constitutional procedures ob-
served in the two States. Done at Basman Palace, Amman, This Friday 24 Rajab
1377, A H. corresponding to 14th February 1958 A. D.
Statement on Sending Troops to Lebanon:
Dwight D. Eisenhower
July 15, 1958
Yesterday morning I received from President Chamoun of Lebanon an urgent
plea that some United States forces be stationed in Lebanon to help maintain
security and to evidence the concern of the United States for the integrity and
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independence of Lebanon. President Chamoun's appeal was made with the con-
currence of all of the members of the Lebanese Cabinet.
President Chamoun made clear that he considered an immediate United States
response imperative if Lebanon's independence, already menaced from without,
were to be preserved in the face of the grave developments which occurred yester-
day in Baghdad whereby the lawful Government was violently overthrown and many
of its members martyred.
In response to this appeal from the Government of Lebanon, the United States
has dispatched a contingent of United States forces to Lebanon to protect American
lives and by their presence there to encourage the Lebanese Government in defense
of Lebanese sovereignty and integrity. These forces have not been sent as any act
of war. They will demonstrate the concern of the United States for the inde-
pendence and integrity of Lebanon, which we deem vital to the national interest
and world peace. Our concern will also be shown by economic assistance. We shall
act in accordance with these legitimate concerns.
The United States, this morning, will report its action to an emergency meeting
of the United Nations Security Council. As the United Nations Charter recognizes,
there is an inherent right of collective self-defense. In conformity with the spirit
of the Charter, the United States is reporting the measures taken by it to the
Security Council of the United Nations, making clear that these measures will be
terminated as soon as the Security Council has itself taken the measures necessary
to maintain international peace and security.
The United States believes that the United Nations can and should take measures
which are adequate to preserve the independence and integrity of Lebanon. It is
apparent, however, that in the face of the tragic and shocking events that are
occurring near by, more will be required than the team of United Nations observers
now in Lebanon. Therefore, the United States will support in the United Nations
measures which seem to be adequate to meet the new situation and which will
enable the United States forces promptly to be withdrawn
Lebanon is a small peace-loving state with which the United States has tradition-
ally had the most friendly relations. There are in Lebanon about 2,500 Americans
and we cannot, consistently with our historic relations and with the principles of
the United Nations, stand idly by when Lebanon appeals itself for evidence of our
concern and when Lebanon may not be able to preserve internal order and to
defend itself against indirect aggression.
Address to Congress:
Dwight D. Eisenhower
July 15, 1958
On July 14, 1958, I received an urgent request from the President of the Re-
public of Lebanon that some United States forces be stationed in Lebanon Presi-
dent Chamoun stated that, without an immediate showing of United States support,
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the Government of Lebanon would be unable to survive. This request by President
Chamoun was made with the concurrence of all the members of the Lebanese
Cabinet. I have replied that we would do this and a contingent of United States
Marines has now arrived in Lebanon This initial dispatch of troops \vill be aug-
mented as required. United States forces will be withdrawn as rapidly as circum-
stances permit.
Simultaneously, I requested that an urgent meeting of the United Nations
Security Council be held on July 15, 1958. At that meeting, the permanent repre-
sentative of the United States reported to the Council the action which this
government has taken. He also expressed the hope that the United Nations could
soon take further effective measures to meet more fully the situation in Lebanon.
We will continue to support the United Nations to this end.
United States forces are being sent to Lebanon to protect American lives and
by their presence to assist the Government of Lebanon in the preservation of
Lebanon's territorial integrity and independence, which have been deemed vital to
United States national interests and world peace
About two months ago a violent insurrection broke out in Lebanon, particularly
along the border with Syria, which with Egypt forms the United Arab Republic
This revolt was encouraged and strongly backed by the official Cairo, Damascus
and Soviet radios, which broadcast to Lebanon in the Arabic language The insur-
rection was furthered by sizable amounts of arms, ammunition and money and by
personnel infiltrated from Syria to fight against the lawful authorities The avowed
purpose of these activities was to overthrow the legally constituted Government of
Lebanon and to install by violence a Government which would subordinate the
independence of Lebanon to the policies of the United Arab Republic.
Lebanon referred this situation to the United Nations Security Council. In view
of the international implications of what was occurring in Lebanon, the Security
Council on June 11, 1958, decided to send observers into Lebanon for the purpose
of insuring that further outside assistance to the insurrection would cease. The
Secretary General of the United Nations subsequently undertook a mission to the
area to reinforce the work of the observer.
It was our belief that the efforts of the Secretary7 General and of the United
Nations observers were helpful in reducing further aid in terms of personal and
military equipment from across the frontiers of Lebanon. There was a basis for
hope that the situation might be moving toward a peaceful solution, consonant with
the continuing integrity of Lebanon, and that the aspect of indirect aggression from
without was being brought under control.
The situation was radically changed, however, on July 14 when there was a
violent outbreak in Baghdad, in nearby Iraq Elements in Iraq strongly sympa-
thetic to the United Arab Republic seem to have murdered or driven from office
individuals comprising the lawful government of that country. We do not yet know
in detail to what extent they have succeeded We do have reliable information that
important Iraqui leaders have been murdered.
We share with the Government of Lebanon the view that these events in Iraq
demonstrate a ruthlessness of aggresive purpose which tiny Lebanon can not combat
without further evidence of support from other friendly nations.
After the most detailed consideration, I have concluded that, given the develop-
ments in Iraq, the measures thus far taken by the United Nations Security Council
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are not sufficient to preserve the independence and integrity of Lebanon. I have
considered, furthermore, the question of our responsibility to protect and safe-
guard American citizens in Lebanon, of whom there are about 2,500. Pending the
taking of adequate measures by the United Nations, the United States will be
acting pursuant to what the United Nations Charter recognizes is an inherent
right the right of all nations to work together and to seek help when necessary to
preserve their independence. I repeat that we wish to withdraw our forces as soon
as the United Nations has taken further effective steps designed to safeguard
Lebanese independence.
It is clear that the events which have been occurring in Lebanon represent in-
direct aggression from without, and that such aggression endangers the independence
and integrity of Lebanon.
It is recognized that the step now being taken may have serious consequences. I
have, however, come to the considered and sober conclusion that despite the risk
involved, this action is required to support the principles of justice and international
law upon which peace and a stable international order depend.
Our Government has acted in response to an appeal for help from a small and
peaceful nation which has long had ties of closet friendship with the United States.
Readiness to help a friend in need is an admirable characteristic of the American
people, and I am, in this message, informing the Congress of the reasons why I
believe that the United States could not in honor stand idly by in this hour of
Lebanon's grave peril As we act at the request of a friendly government to help it
to preserve its independence and to preserve law and order which will protect
American lives, we are acting to reaffirm and strengthen principles upon which the
safety and security of the United States depend.
Arab Resolution:
United Nations General Assembly
August 20, 1958
Compromise resolution drafted by delegates of ten Arab states.
The General Assembly,
Having considered the item "Question discussed at the 838th meeting of the
Security Council" on 7 Aug., 1958,
Noting the Charter aim that states should "practice tolerance and live together
in peace with one another as good neighbors,"
Noting that the Arab states have agreed in the pact of the League of Arab States
to strengthen the close relations and numerous ties which link the Arab states, and
to support and stabilize these ties upon a basis of respect for the independence and
sovereignty of these states, and to direct their efforts toward the common good of
all the Arab countries, the improvement of their status, the security of their future
and the realization of their aspirations and hopes ;
Desiring to relieve international tension,
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A
1. Welcomes the renewed assurances given by the Arab states to observe the
provisions of Article 8 of the Pact of the League of Arab States that "each mem-
ber shall respect the systems of government established in the other member states
and regard them as exclusive concerns of those states," and that "each shall pledge
to abstain from any action calculated to change established systems of government/'
2. Calls upon all member states to act strictly in accordance with the principles
of mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, of non-
aggression, of strict non-interference in each other's internal affairs, and of equal
and mutual benefit, and to insure that their conduct by word and deed conforms to
these principles;
B
Requests the Secretary General to make forthwith, in consultation with the gov-
ernments concerned and in accordance with the United Nations Charter, and having
in mind Section A of this resolution, such practical arrangements as would adequately
help in upholding the purposes and principles of the Charter in relation to Lebanon
and Jordon in the present circumstances, and thereby facilitate the early with-
drawal of the foreign troops from the two countries;
C
Invites the Secretary General to continue his studies now under way and in this
context to consult as appropriate with the Arab countries of the Near East with a
view to possible assistance regarding an Arab development institution designed to
further economic growth in these countries;
D
1. Requests member states to cooperate fully in carrying out this resolution;
2. Invites the Secretary General to report hereunder, as appropriate, the first
such report to be made not later than 30 September, 1958
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